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I. Norwegian abstract 
Denne oppgaven bruker de seneste tilgjengelige inntektsdata, fra år 2000, til å 
gjennomføre en sammenliknende analyse av fattigdom blant barn i New Zealand, Norge 
og Sverige.  
Ved å sammenlikne forskjellige land med forskjellig utbredelse av fattigdom og 
forskjellig fattigdomspolitikk er målet å undersøke årsakene til barnefattigdom og 
viktigheten av fattigdomspolitikk for å redusere den, med utgangspunkt i et gitt 
teoretisk rammeverk og forståelse av hva fattigdom er og hvorfor det er vesentlig.  
Mer spesifikt er formålet med oppgaven å undersøke i hvilken grad politiske 
forskjeller i form av (skatt og) trygdesystemer kan forklare forskjellene i fattigdomsnivå 
blant barn og unge, og i dette tilfelle forklare hvorfor barn i New Zealand er så mye mer 
utsatt for fattigdom enn barn i Norge og Sverige. Til dels blir dette gjort i en 
elimineringsprosess, hvor fattigdomsnivåer i ulike deler av samfunnet, inndelt etter 
demografiske, utdanningsmessige, etniske, og arbeidsforholdsmessige faktorer, 
sammenliknes før og etter skatter, trygder og støtteordninger er innkrevet og utbetalt. 
Til tross for at bildet som dannes her er komplekst, og at politiske forskjeller ikke kan 
forklare alle forskjellene, viser det tydelig at politiske variabler er avgjørende for å 
forklare forskjellene i utbredelse av fattigdom blant barn.  
For å oppsummere funnene på en mer tilgjengelig måte setter oppgavens siste del 
sammen ulike funn fra tidligere kapitler ved å stille kontrafaktiske ’hva om?’ spørsmål. 
Her beregnes det hva effekten av å ha samme grad av fattigdomsreduksjon som de 
ekvivalente gruppene i Skandinavia opplever ville vært i forskjellige deler av det New 
Zealandske samfunnet. I kapitlet testes også effekten av forskjeller i demografisk 
sammensetning og markedsinntekt (dvs. inntekten før statlige intervensjoner gjennom 
skatter og monetære støtteordninger). Også dette kapitelet understreker at 
sammenhengene er komplekse, men til tross for at mange variabler spiller en rolle er det 
hevet over tvil at politiske forskjeller er avgjørende for å forstå forskjeller i frekvens av 
fattige barn på tvers av landegrenser. Det er med andre ord rom for regjeringer å gjøre 
mer for å redusere fattigdom enn New Zealand gjorde i 2000. 
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II. English abstract 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of poverty among children in New 
Zealand, Norway and Sweden using the most recent available income data from year 
2000.  
By comparing different countries with different levels of poverty, and differing 
policies it attempts to say something about the causes of child poverty and evaluate the 
importance of policy as a remedy. This is done within one theoretical framework and 
understanding of what poverty is and why it is important.  
More specifically, the purpose is to explore to what extent policy in the form of 
benefits (and taxes) explain the differences in child poverty, in this case why children 
in New Zealand are so much more likely to be poor than those in Norway and Sweden. 
This is in part done by a process of elimination, where poverty levels before and after 
taxes and transfers are compared in various sectors of the population divided by 
demographic, ethnic, educational, employment status and other factors. Even though 
the picture formed by the findings is complex and far from straight forward, and 
policy differences cannot explain all the differences, policy variables are fundamental 
in explaining the differences in child poverty levels. 
In order to summarize the findings in a more accessible way the last part of the 
thesis puts together findings from previous chapters by asking a counterfactual ‘what 
if?’ question, based on the statistics in chapter 4 and 5. It estimates what the impact 
would have been on child poverty levels in various groups in the New Zealand 
community if its policy had achieved the same rate of poverty reduction as the 
equivalent groups experience in Scandinavia. In the counterfactual chapter the 
importance of differences across the countries in demographic composition and 
market income (i.e. the income before government intervention through taxes and 
benefits) are also tested for. This way of presenting the findings further reinforces the 
image of complexity with few straightforward causal mechanisms. However, while the 
thesis shows that many variables play a role in explaining the variation in outcome 
across the countries, it leaves little room for doubting that much of this variation must 
be explained by government intervention. There is, in other words, scope for 
governments to reduce poverty more than the New Zealand policies did in year 2000. 
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 1 
Child Poverty and Policy – 
A Comparison of New Zealand and Scandinavia 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Why is child poverty important, and why is 
studying it difficult? 
An improved understanding of the causes of child poverty is crucial for a 
variety of reasons, many of which also explain the complexities involved in achieving 
this. New family patterns and less family stability present families with different risks 
and challenges than those that faced the 1960s family structure, which the original 
welfare regimes were designed to handle (DiPrete and McManus, 2000:124, Esping-
Andersen, 2003). A better understanding of the causes of childhood poverty is 
fundamental in welfare systems’ adaptation to a changing reality, especially since one 
of the goals of public policy in modern welfare regimes is to ensure equal 
opportunities irrespective of family background (McLaughlin and Baker, 2007).  
There is no question that the conditions under which children grow up, 
and poverty in particular, impacts on their later life (Ballantyne et al., 2003, Brooks-
Gunn and Duncan, 1997), but the strength of this impact varies between countries 
(Beller and Hout, 2006, d' Addio, 2007:47). This suggests that differences in policy 
play a role, strengthening the need for governments to understand the long term 
consequences of policy decisions. In the US, costs associated with childhood poverty 
in the form of “lost economic productivity and earnings as adults, and also additional 
costs associated with higher crime and poorer health later in life” is conservatively 
estimated by Holzer et al. (2007:3) to be the equivalent of US$500 billion a year, or 
nearly 4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Further, according to Whiteford 
and Adema (2007:7), fighting child poverty does indeed rank high among the 
priorities of policy makers in many of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) member countries. 
Jenson(2004) suggests that a trend of changes in policy amounts to a 
change of paradigm: from an understanding where child welfare is the responsibility 
of parents, to one where governments can invest in children’s future by alleviating 
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poverty in families with children. However, the effect of policies aimed at reducing 
child poverty is far from straight forward. Often child poverty must be seen in the 
light of intergenerational transmission of poverty. In other words, one can assume 
that there is a causal relationship between intergenerational transmission of poverty 
and childhood poverty that work both ways. Increasingly, the policy response to child 
poverty is taking into account the duration of poverty. However, studying the 
intergenerational side of child poverty, and the measuring the duration of poverty 
presents a challenge because of the need for longitudinal data (Solon, 2002), which 
are scarce, especially outside of the US. 
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1.2. Why focus on New Zealand and Scandinavia? 
A good way of testing hypotheses in social science is to identify dependent and 
independent variables, and look for significant patterns in these. Variation can occur 
across individuals, time and (geographical) space. Changes in child poverty rates 
occur at a slower rate than many other variables, hence time alone is unlikely to 
provide enough variation to draw firm conclusions. As with many variables in social 
science, child poverty is often studied by looking at (variation in) probability or rates 
of poverty in different pools of individuals sharing certain characteristics, rather than 
simply different individuals. 
This thesis will look at rates of child poverty across space, specifically 
comparing rates in New Zealand and Scandinavia, defined here as Norway and 
Sweden. The most recent available data for all three countries are from the years 
2000-2001, and this will be the focus for this thesis. This comparative approach 
allows testing of hypotheses about how policies may affect child poverty rates, and 
this will receive particular attention. Studying the effect of policies is easier in a 
comparative (i.e. spatial) perspective, as policies – like their outcomes – change too 
slowly for change over time to give a good overview. Comparing New Zealand with 
Norway and Sweden gives a good range of similarities and differences (each of which 
are particularly interesting to the degree that they are associated with differences and 
similarities in outcomes, i.e. child poverty, respectively).  
Since the 1970s these three countries have each displayed distinct 
developments in the area of welfare (including family) policy: starting from a 
position where social policy achieved the outcome of somewhat similar degree of 
equality in childhood conditions in all three countries until about 1980, with lower 
rates of redistribution in New Zealand (which is retained to the present). In the late 
1980s and early 1990s reforms that Blaiklock, et al. (2002:1) describes as “the most 
sweeping in scope and scale in any industrialized democracy” reduced redistribution 
rates in New Zealand especially for the second poorest groups. This trend has 
possibly been reversed, or at least slowed down since 1999 (Starke, 2005). It is 
interesting to note that significant changes in the welfare system took place under 
both National (right of centre) and Labour (left of centre) governments.  
Sweden had the most extensive state welfare system, but experienced 
extensive cutbacks in the early/mid 1990s under Conservative governments, but 
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nowhere near the dimensions seen in New Zealand. Despite having a less dominant 
Labour party than Sweden, Norway’s welfare system has probably become more 
rather than less similar to Sweden over the last 30 years, at least when compared to 
developments in an international context. Economic growth has been stronger and 
more consistent in Norway than in the other two countries during this period, which 
has made the arguments for cutbacks less convincing and urgent.  
In terms of child poverty rate outcomes the situation in New Zealand has 
become much worse than in the other two countries. Using a 60 per cent of median 
income as a poverty threshold, the disposable income child poverty rate grew by 4.8 
percentage points in New Zealand, compared to 1.2 in Sweden and -0.3 in Norway 
between the 1980s and 2000. Market income child poverty rates1 have grown by 9.8, 
6.0 and 3.0 points respectively. In 2000 the market income and disposable income 
child poverty rates in per cent were 28.7, 14.6 (New Zealand); 16.1, 3.6(Sweden); and 
13.3, 4.4 (Norway) respectively, all according to Whiteford and Adema (2007:18). 
These differences are, more than anything else, what this thesis will primarily try to 
explain. The independent variable that will receive most focus is welfare policies, but 
obviously differences in policy can only explain a fraction of the differences, so the 
thesis will also review what other factors that can and should be taken into account. 
Policies are results of the political system, so it is necessary to look at this in order to 
understand differences in policy. Some of the input into the political system is 
societal variables such as the conditions in which children grow up, and in this way 
the topic forms a complete circle.  
This thesis will primarily focus on the part of the circle that links policy and 
social conditions. Looking systematically at differences in policy, outcomes, and 
other factors that influence the poverty rates, enables the conclusion to discuss to 
what extent it is possible for governments to reduce child poverty. In other words, 
whether other variables in which the countries differ override policies, and that some 
countries due to certain conditions will have higher child poverty rates regardless of 
what governments do. 
                                                 
1
 I.e. the poverty rate before taxes and government transfers are taken into account. 
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1.3. Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two describes the child poverty situation in the three countries. It 
raises the importance and difficulties associated with seeing poverty in a dynamic 
way which acknowledges that long term poverty is more likely to have negative 
consequences than short spells. It also provides a discussion of what these 
consequences are, and other factors associated with child poverty. 
Chapter three describes and discusses various factors that may impact on 
poverty rates and explain differences between countries. Much of this deals with 
issues around demographics and general economic conditions which either affect 
child poverty, or provide a natural context for describing differences in child poverty. 
The fourth chapter focuses specifically on differences in government policy in the 
three countries, the differences in policy. Each of these chapters includes a section on 
relevant theory and literature.  
The concluding fifth chapter discusses to what extent policy and other 
variables explain the differences in poverty rates outlined in chapter two. This is 
done by counterfactual analysis of the result of swapping policy and demographic 
conditions across countries, such the effect on poverty rates of having the Swedish 
tax system in New Zealand, or making the ethnic composition of the Norwegian 
population similar to the one in New Zealand. 
Chapter six provide a brief overview of the developments in New Zealand’s 
poverty policies since 2000, and concludes by summarising the questions that the 
thesis has and has not answered. 
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2. Child poverty 
 
This chapter contains two sections. The first provides a definition of child 
poverty, and the second discusses how and why poverty can be transferred across 
generations. The sum of these two sections should make it clear that these two issues 
are strongly connected. 
2.1. Defining child poverty 
Several clarifications are needed in order to reach a sufficiently precise 
definition of child poverty. By convention in the child poverty literature, and in 
accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Children, a child is defined as 
an individual under the age of 18 (Ballantyne, et al., 2003:6). Naturally, this means 
that only a very marginal fraction of all children will have their own (one-person) 
household supported by their own income. Hence, in order to say anything about the 
standard of living for children based on income or consumption data, one must 
assume that households to some extent pool their economic resources. From that 
starting point one must decide whether individuals or households will be the unit of 
analysis. Creedy & Sleeman (2004) provide a thorough discussion of the implication 
of this choice. This thesis uses data that are weighted by household when 
comparisons to households without children are useful. When available, equivalent 
data weighted by children are also provided. In analyses in which data is weighted by 
households the poverty rate reflects the fraction or, more commonly, the percentage 
of poor households out of the total number of households. When the data is weighted 
by children the poverty rate is the share of poor children out of the total number of 
children. In these cases households with more than one child is counted more than 
once.2 
It is common to assume that there exists some kind of economies of scale 
in household consumption that increase with the size of households, but there are 
several ways to take this factor into account. Some of these methods take into 
account the assumption that children consume less than adults. Equivalence scales 
                                                 
2
 Theoretically one could also use families as a unit of analysis, as it often, but not always overlaps with 
households. The data used in this thesis does not delve any deeper into this issue, and the thesis will 
employ households (as opposed to family) as unit of analysis. Where the word family is used (to avoid 
repetitive use of the word household), it refers to the household, with a few obvious exceptions. 
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assign a value to each household type in proportion to the household’s assumed 
needs, based on the number of members and sometimes the age of the members. 
Using this method, it is possible to compare families of varying size. However, the 
construction of the scale is a result of more or less arbitrary decisions made by the 
researcher, and several equivalence scales has been in use: a square root scale, an 
“Oxford scale”/“old-OECD scale” (1 to the first member, subsequently .7 per 
additional adult and .5 to each additional child), OECD-modified scale (1 to the first 
member, subsequently .5 per additional adult and .3 to each additional child), in 
addition to scales adapted to local conditions (Whiteford and Adema, 2007:12). 
Through the equivalence scale it is also possible to take into account the age of the 
child or children and other family members, and many other factors, such as local 
price variations. This thesis will use the square root scale for data from Norway and 
Sweden, and the Revised Jensen Scale for New Zealand data (see appendix 7.1 for a 
discussion), because it unfortunately is impractical to change the use of the Revised 
Jensen Scale in the dataset used for New Zealand. 
Once families with children have been defined and made comparable, it 
still remains to decide which of these are poor. Perry (2004:22) defines poverty as 
“exclusion from the minimum acceptable way of life in one’s own society because of 
inadequate [economic] resources” (italics in original removed). While the view may 
still be contested in some political circles, poverty in the developed world is now 
widely understood in relative terms by researchers. This means that who is poor and 
who is not depends not only on absolute or subsistence living standards, but also 
what way of life, or living standard, is expected in the given country. While the focus 
on living standards implies that a range of indicators that measure material quality of 
life (or living standard) is relevant for measuring poverty, most studies emphasise 
income as a practical and broad measure. A direct measure requires a measure of low 
well-being per se is usually deemed impractical (especially when comparing 
situations across countries), and income is used as an indirect definition regarding 
the (in-) ability to pursue well-being (Mogstad et al., 2007:116). Income is also a 
measure that assumes some degree of choice in terms of choosing what goods to 
consume.  
Poverty research deals with distribution of income or inequality on the 
lower end of the scale, and obviously this can be measured in many ways. Studies 
that deal with inequality more broadly, for example, often use the GINI-coefficient as 
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a measure of inequality. However, in poverty research, as a simpler measure, it is 
common to draw a specified threshold and measure the frequency with which 
individuals or households fall below this line, the so-called headcount ratio (Perry, 
2004: 33). This follows from the definition of poverty as a measure of inequality on 
the lower end of the scale. 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the median income are two 
common thresholds. Some studies use other, fixed or absolute poverty lines, often 
defined by governments. Throughout this thesis 60 per cent of the median disposable 
income will be used as the poverty line. Although, “[a]dopting a definition of ‘low 
income’ [or poverty threshold] inevitably involves a degree of arbitrariness” 
(Krishnan et al., 2002:124), they acknowledge that Stephens et al. (1995:11-12) 
provides a focus group study suggesting that in 1991 in New Zealand the minimum 
adequate household expenditure was very close to 60 per cent of the median 
disposable income. The same threshold is most commonly used in Europe. Using the 
median means that poverty statistics (both the threshold and the number of 
households falling below it) is unaffected by income changes among those above the 
median income, which reflects that the focus in poverty research is on the inequality 
between the poorest and the overall population and not on overall inequality. The 
poverty threshold approach requires a way or method of constructing a threshold 
that is valid across countries. This means that the NZ ELSI (New Zealand Economic 
Living Standard Index) (Krishnan, et al., 2002), while an interesting contrast to the 
income based studies, cannot be used in a comparative study like this. Perry (2002) 
analyses the difference between studies of poverty using income and direct outcomes 
as measures of poverty, and the mismatch between the two types of studies in a New 
Zealand context. The strength of outcome based studies are that they take into 
account other factors than income that are known to be relevant to achieve a certain 
standard of living, such as “cost of accommodation, debt repayments, ability to draw 
on assets when needs cannot be met from current income” (Krishnan, et al., 2002:8), 
etc. This strength means, however, that such studies almost by definition are 
specified to one particular context (i.e. country) and comparable data are not 
available across countries.  
According to Mogstad et al.(2007:115-16) the standard practice in most 
OECD countries is to apply a national poverty line, even though theoretically “this 
approach requires identical prices of goods and services as well as uniform norms 
and consumption habits across regions [, otherwise] a joint country-specific poverty 
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line might be biased.” They go on to construct regional poverty lines in Norway, and 
estimate the impact on poverty measures when these are used, rather than national 
thresholds. Their findings are interesting as an illustration of the sensitivity of the 
measuring problem (i.e. the assumption that prices of goods and services are 
identical throughout the area for which the poverty line is constructed) involved in 
using national poverty lines.  
On the basis that housing costs is the main expenditure for households 
with low incomes, they focus specifically on differences in house prices. Dividing 
Norway’s 435 municipalities3 into 21 groups according to (seven) regions and 
average cost per square meter of living area (three categories: top 25 per cent, bottom 
25 per cent and middle), they estimate the poverty threshold in each of these. In 
doing so they avoid “comparing the income of individuals from municipalities with 
high housing prices with that of individuals from municipalities with relatively low 
housing prices” (Mogstad, et al., 2007:115). The poverty line4 varies from NOK 73 
700 in the eight municipalities with low housing costs in Eastern Norway, to NOK 93 
800 in the two municipalities in the Oslo area with high housing prices. This group 
was something of an outlier, though, as the group with the second highest poverty 
line were the 3 high cost municipalities in Northern Norway (NOK 86 100).  
They find that the overall poverty rate is only marginally affected by 
implementing regional poverty lines, increasing from 3.2 to 3.3 per cent. However, 
the characteristics of the poor changes substantially, in particular regarding urban or 
rural living areas: the poverty rate in urban areas increase from 3.2 t0 3.5 per cent, 
while the rate in rural municipalities decrease by nearly a quarter from 2.9 to 2.2 per 
cent when using the region-specific rather than national poverty line (Mogstad, et al., 
2007:120). They also find that characteristics known to increase risk of poverty such 
as young singles, or non-western immigrants have even higher poverty risks when 
region specific thresholds are used. In conclusion they write that it is “important to 
introduce poverty thresholds that account for the heterogeneity in prices and 
minimum needs within a country.” (Mogstad, et al., 2007:121). However, this is 
easier said than done. First of all it requires such a large number of observations that 
register or census data are probably the only feasible solution; survey data will 
                                                 
3
 Which themselves are highly heterogeneous: varying from 200 inhabitants to 548 000 and from 9 km² to 9 000 
km². 
4
 The study employs the “Oxford Scale” equivalence scale, and the 50% of median market income poverty line. 
It uses data from 2001. 
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probably never be sufficient. Even where sufficient data exist, they are frequently 
difficult to access for privacy concerns. Mogstad et al. (2007) has convincingly 
demonstrated the superiority of region-specific thresholds, and the need for them, 
but it seems likely that the shortcut through country-level will still dominate at least 
for some time. The sensitivity of relative poverty rates in urban and rural areas 
means that studies of the relationship between this variable and poverty probably 
requires region specific poverty lines. For other relationships it’s worth noting that 
according to Mogstad, et al. (2007) the explanations of tend to be understated and 
not overstated when the less than perfect method of national poverty lines are used. 
The headcount ratio method does not show, however, how much below 
the poverty line those that are poor are. This can be expressed through the so-called 
poverty depth, i.e. how much the income must be increased to bring individuals 
above various poverty thresholds. A simple measure of poverty depth called is known 
as the poverty gap. This can be calculated in several different ways, in this thesis the 
gap will be defined as the average size of the gap between actual income and the 
poverty line among the households that falls below the threshold. Poverty gap and 
poverty depth will be used interchangeably in the remainder of this thesis. 
All the methodological decisions outlined in this section have important 
repercussions, both analytically and politically: the definition of the poverty 
threshold is obviously important for the findings, but differences in the household 
equivalence scales, whether to include in-kind benefits and definitions of households 
can also lead to very different findings.  
The poverty incidence given a specific threshold is only comparable if 
other factors such as equivalence scales are also comparable. To the extent that 
poverty research are taken into account by the public and policy makers, the 
methodological choices also affect outcomes: a low poverty threshold portrays may 
create an image of poverty as a problem that is not very widespread; using poverty 
rates without focus on poverty depth may give a focus on individuals just below the 
poverty line rather than those in most extreme poverty.  
However, those decisions must be made on a more or less arbitrary basis; 
it is hard to find grounds on which one solution can be said to be better than any 
other for all purposes. To highlight this it is often worthwhile to test the conclusions’ 
sensitivity to changes in these methodological decisions. 
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2.2. Effects of child poverty: intergenerational 
transfers 
The bulk of the data used in this thesis is static rather than dynamic in the 
sense that data are collected at only one point in time. This has two main advantages: 
firstly that data is collected only once saves resources in the data collection process, 
in part because it makes it easier to guarantee respondents full anonymity. Secondly, 
it makes it easier to interpret, present and read the findings. These two factors allow 
the inclusion of a larger number of other variables, and leaves space for an analysis of 
the relation with policy. The “snapshot” poverty data presented here thus cannot say 
anything about how much time individuals have spent in poverty. In many cases it 
may have been transient, a one-time slump. In more serious cases it could be 
intermittent or even become chronic. Importantly, it could also be permanent in the 
sense of lasting across generation, with little hope of a way out. While static and 
dynamic measures of poverty could be seen as two different things, all prevailing 
poverty will show up in static measures of poverty, and if there was no poverty in a 
static measure, that would also mean no permanent poverty.  
Similarly, it would certainly be interesting to know how successful 
governments’ efforts to prevent poverty to be inherited across generations have been. 
However, it is arguably even more important to evaluate governments’ effort to 
reduce poverty among children growing up today, even if the data does not 
differentiate between transient and chronic poverty, even though we know that 
chronic poverty is more damaging for an individual’s long term opportunities. 
One way of describing the long term effects on an individual of growing 
up in poverty is to look at intergenerational transmission of poverty and other 
advantages and disadvantages. This assumes that the conditions under which 
children grow up can be described by looking at the parents, and the long term 
effects of these by looking at the welfare that the child experiences as an (young) 
adult. There is a growing literature on the topic, but although it is an empirical 
question to what degree poverty and other factors are transferred across generations, 
the process creating this effect is still not thoroughly understood, for at least two 
reasons: first, this way of observing the consequences of childhood poverty requires 
data that describe individuals over a very long period of time (Solon, 1992). Such 
data are scarce for two reasons: because only relatively recently did it become 
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possible to analyse the amount of data required for such a study, and because such 
longitudinal studies of individuals must be tailored for its purpose. “Snapshot-data” 
collected for other purposes cannot be used because they, for privacy reasons, usually 
ensure that individuals cannot be identified, and thus cannot follow individuals or 
households through time. Second, even to the extent that data can be found, 
accounting for what mechanisms causes poverty to persist across generations is by 
no means straight forward, as there are many potential explanations, ranging from 
genetics and personality traits to education, health and social networks (d' Addio, 
2007). 
d’Addio (2007) reviews the international literature on the topic. She 
points out that sociologists typically focus on mobility across class and occupations, 
while economists deal with income mobility (2007:12). The sociology approach 
focuses on variables such as parental income and education, home and social 
environment where the children are raised, and where beliefs, attitudes and values 
are shaped. These factors interact with cognitive and non-cognitive abilities to affect 
life chances measured in outcomes such as early pregnancy, criminal activity, 
violence and drug use (d' Addio, 2007:26). Jencks & Tach (2005) discusses whether 
equal opportunity would actually result in more mobility, and concludes that there 
are many reasons why one could expect that even in a society where everyone 
experiences equal opportunities, many traits would still be passed on across 
generations.  
The economics literature dealing with the same issue focus on whether 
childhood or parent variables (such as parents’ income) predict future income of 
children, and through which channels such effects work.  
Maloney (2004) address the link between parental income and outcomes 
for young adults based on data from New Zealand, specifically the Christchurch 
Health and Development Study (CHDS), which follows a birth cohort of 1.200 
individuals born in Canterbury/Christchurch in 1977 up to age 21. One major 
weakness of the study is that it samples only one geographical area of New Zealand at 
one point it time, so it is not necessarily representative beyond that. Another 
weakness is that in terms of income, age 21 is too early to say much about income, as 
many individuals who will later experience relatively high lifetime income will still be 
students. Several observations of parental income provide a better picture of 
“permanent” income of the family and also the opportunity estimate income effects 
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at various stages in the children’s development. The dependent variables used are 
economic inactivity, early parenthood, alcohol or drug dependence or abuse, criminal 
activity/arrest or conviction, or no educational qualifications (Maloney, 2004:60-
62). Out of these, the variable with the strongest correlation with parental income 
during childhood is the absence of a formal educational qualification. However, when 
certain variables (gender, ethnicity, parents’ education and socio-economic status, 
mother’s age at birth of child, proportion of years lived in a single-parent family, and 
the number of siblings in family at age 15, in addition to two intelligence or problem 
solving tests seen as mediating variables) are controlled for, the effect of family 
income on lack of qualifications and economic inactivity and early parenthood were 
found to be similar. The study finds no effect of parental income on alcohol/drug 
abuse/dependence and only weak effects on criminal activity, which are further 
weakened by inclusion of the control variables, and disappears entirely when the 
mediating variable are included.  
The study uses various measures of the family/parental income, and finds 
that the effect of income in childhood is consistently stronger for lower incomes/ 
poverty than high incomes. In other words, among the children who experienced 
poverty it often contributed to detrimental outcomes, while experiencing very high or 
medium incomes made little difference. This is a strong justification for focusing on 
poverty specifically, rather than inequality as such.  
The study suggests that family income while the children were in their 
latter stage of child development (age 11-14) made most difference, except on the 
absence of qualification variable where the early stage (age 1-5) made most 
difference. On none of the variables was the middle stage most important (Maloney, 
2004:77-79). 
Despite the challenges related to measuring and comparing 
intergenerational mobility, research findings in the area hold important implications 
for the study of child poverty: it demonstrates to what degree child poverty has long 
term effects, and may also tell us about through what mechanisms poverty can be 
harmful and thus what kind of child poverty is most damaging (e.g. at what age are 
children most vulnerable to poverty, and what other factors make poverty 
particularly harmful). The wide range of approaches to measuring intergenerational 
mobility is appropriate given the diversity of effects that child poverty may have. The 
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public’s and policymakers’ understanding of such effects should also be expected to 
affect family and redistributive policies. 
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3.  Factors that determine, and correlate with 
market income 
 
Section 1.2 used the study by Whiteford and Adema (2007) to describe 
the differences in child poverty rates in New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. This 
chapter will explore how much of these differences existed “before” direct 
government interventions, i.e. market income. The approach does to some degree 
assume this order, i.e. that market income precedes government intervention, and in 
other words that employment decisions (and market income) are not themselves 
affected by government interventions. This market poverty rate does not describe 
“real” poverty in itself, but indicates to what extent the (levels of) wages and 
employment that the market offers is an opportunity to avoid poverty. The 
conceptual distinction between market income and disposable income is in other 
words central in this thesis. The policies that drives the difference will be 
interchangeably be referred to as (government) income redistribution, government 
intervention and income transfers. 
The income data will mostly rely on the 2000 Household Economic 
Survey (HES) for New Zealand data, and the 2000 Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
for Swedish and Norwegian data. For New Zealand poverty information has been 
obtained from Robert Stephens, New Zealand Poverty Measurement Project 
(NZPMP), and here the information was derived from the data from the 2001 edition 
of the Household Economic Survey (HES). This is a sample survey conducted every 
three years on “the incomes and expenditure patterns of private households 
throughout New Zealand” (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). Stephens, Waldegrave and 
Frater (1995) provide the NZPMP methodology, Waldegrave , Stephens and King 
(2003) provide an analysis of the 2000/2001 data. 
It is necessary to separate market income and disposable income/policy 
effects, because before one can say anything about the effectiveness of government 
intervention one must know the size of the problem the intervention is trying to 
solve. After a review of comparative literature that analyses international differences 
in market income poverty, the effect of various factors that describe households in 
the three countries at hand will be explored. This could be done in any order, but to 
make the interaction effects of these variables more readily understood they will be 
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organized according to how frequently they change; hence starting with ethnicity, 
followed by family structure and age, education, employment, the effect of spouse 
resemblance,  and lastly a discussion of how these factors may interact. The findings 
in this chapter will be used in chapter 5 to summarize the relative importance of the 
factors explored in this chapter relative to the policy lever variables that will be 
discussed in chapter 4. 
3.1. Cross-national explanations of poverty 
 Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, & Nielsen (2003) applies data from 14 
advanced capitalist countries5 from the period 1970 to 1997 in order to evaluate 
several variables’ importance in explaining variation in pre-tax/transfer poverty, and 
poverty reduction through tax and transfers (see section 4.1). Their dependent 
variable is pre-tax/transfer poverty rates (in the overall population, the study is not a 
specific study on child poverty) and the effect of tax and transfers on poverty rates. 
They test a wide range of independent variables: economic development (PPP6 
adjusted GDP per capita, agricultural employment, percent of the population below 
15 years old, secondary school enrolment, and vocational training), inverted-U 
relationship7 between modernisation and equality (industrial employment, 
LDC8imports, capital market openness, direct foreign investments overseas, 
immigration, unemployment rates, female labour force participation, and single 
mother families), labour market institutions (union membership and coordinated 
wage bargaining), politics (left cabinet, Christian democratic cabinet, women’s 
organizational strength and constitutional veto points), and policies (welfare 
generosity, share of social transfers that are: means tested; child and family 
allowances; maternity allowances; and unemployment replacement rates). They find 
that employment rates,9 and wage coordination are the strongest and most 
significant positive predictors (the only variables significant at a .001 level when 
                                                 
5
 Using data from among others, the LIS, which includes Norway and Sweden, but unfortunately not New 
Zealand. 
6
 Purchase power parity, a measure that corrects for differences in purchasing power when comparing the value 
of an amount of money across time, space and currency. 
7
 Moller et al.(2003)’s term for the theory that suggests that equality is lowest at very high or very low levels of 
modernisation, and vice versa. The term refers to the shape of a function for equality where modernisation is the 
independent variable on the X-axis. 
8
 Least Developed Countries; http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm (accessed 28/5-08) provide a 
definition. 
9
 The unemployment variable is not complemented with a variable for economic growth, which could 
potentially be an important driver behind this finding. 
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variables from all categories above are included) of low pre tax/transfer poverty 
rates.10 In their model they achieved a R² of .67.11 This indicates that the labour 
market is where one should look for explanations for cross-national differences in 
overall market income poverty rates (without a specific focus on child poverty), i.e. 
the size of the problem poverty policies attempts to remedy.  
 Brady (2004) provides a study dealing with similar issues, focusing on the 
differences and similarities of child poverty, elderly poverty and overall poverty. The 
study incorporates data from 18 rich, western, democracies between 1969 and 2000 
(N=91). According to the study child poverty is significantly and negatively correlated 
with social security transfers, public health spending, female labour force 
participation (all of which also affects overall and elderly poverty), manufacturing 
employment and economic growth (which affect overall poverty, but not elderly 
poverty). It is also positively correlated with children in single-mother families (i.e. 
this is associated with higher child poverty rates), but this variable does not affect 
overall poverty or elderly poverty. Child poverty is not affected by unemployment 
(which curiously enough is negatively correlated with elderly poverty), or elderly 
population (associated with higher overall poverty). 
                                                 
10
 The study does not, however, say anything about for how long individuals remain poor. 
11
 This means, somewhat simplistically put, that the model could account for 67% of the variation in the dataset. 
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3.2. Ethnicity and immigration 
Borjas and Sueyoshi (1997) demonstrate that in the US ethnicity (and the 
dominating ethnicity of neighbourhoods) affects not only the incidence and duration 
of what they call “welfare spells”, which presumably is strongly correlated with 
poverty, but also the probability of poverty being “inherited” across generations. 
They argue that both the traditional economic approach to explaining 
intergenerational transfer of poverty through parental investments in the human 
capital stock of their children (e.g. Becker, 1991), and the sociology literature 
approach to the same phenomenon which stresses the importance of neighbourhood 
or environmental variables (e.g. Coleman, 1988, Wilson, 1987) are necessary to 
understand how ethnicity affects cross-generational poverty. The hypothesis put 
forward in Borjas and Sueyoshi (1997:2) is that “ethnicity matters because it 
influences the “quality” of the environment in which human capital decisions are 
made.” They do, in other words, presume that parents’ wish to invest in their 
children’s future (through education and other forms of well-being) exist across 
ethnic boundaries. However, ethnicity is correlated with sociological environment 
which affects the payoff from such investments, and thus the incentive to spend on 
this ‘investment’. Their analysis of the US’ National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
confirms their hypothesis. It thus seems likely that ethnicity’s impact on poverty is a 
factor that it is worth including also in this study. Given the static nature of the data 
used in this study, the focus is limited to how ethnicity determines frequency of 
poverty and related factors, the data used here does not permit analysis of how 
ethnicity affects cross-generational transfer of poverty. 
Ethnicity is a factor that, while frequently a strong predictor of income 
and life chances, is too unique to each country to be run in large-N cross country 
study like those referred to in the previous chapter. A small-N study like this, on the 
other hand, does allow the inclusion of this variable, even though data availability 
requires that ethnicity and migration are to some extent used as proxies to for 
another, with all the problems that entails. To compare the ethnicity factor across 
countries is still complicated, and requires some simplifications that are partially at 
odds with conclusions reached by studies that focus specifically on ethnicity in one 
country, but should still be acceptable in a study on child poverty in multiple 
countries. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to look at why ethnicity seems to 
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determine social outcomes. It will, however, look at to what extent ethnicity and 
immigrant status affects income directly and works through other variables. 
When comparing the three countries it is striking how the issue of 
ethnicity is referred to as an issue of immigration in Norway and Sweden, where the 
non-immigrant population is ethnically highly homogenous compared to New 
Zealand. It is in fact hard to imagine being asked about one’s ethnicity in Norway: 
the question would nearly always be one about Sami affiliation or immigrant 
background or citizenship/residence, While the New Zealand census has items on 
ethnic affiliation, Swedish and Norwegian studies tend to focus on immigrant status, 
which reflects the smaller size, and political invisibility of the indigenous ethnic 
minority group in Norway and Sweden, the Sami people. According to Statistics 
Norway, 
 
“[n]o one knows exactly how many Sami there are today […]There is no precise 
definition of who the Sami are, and Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia all have 
varying criteria. The criteria that need to be met in order to vote in the Sameting 
elections in Norway are the most natural definition to use in Norway.  
• The person must have Sami as their home language, or at least one of 
their parents, grandparents or great-grandparents must have or have had Sami as their 
home language 
• The person regards himself to be Sami. 
Because there is no overall registration of the Sami population, it is difficult to generate 
statistics on the Sami as a group. The statistics […] based on the geographic range for the 
Sami Development Fund [estimates numbers of Sami people to:]  
Norway: 40 000 
Sweden: 20 000 
Total:  70 000.” (Statistics Norway, 2007) 
 
A Norwegian report from the Ministry of Health acknowledges that 
“many of the health and living condition surveys conducted has not taken sufficient 
account of ethnic background and Sami living conditions particularly […] There are 
major differences in level of education between the [ethnic] groups” 
(Helsedepartementet, 2006:27, author's translation). While the differences in 
education level suggest that (Sami) ethnicity would have been an interesting variable, 
the lack of data means that a focus on poverty rates in the Sami population falls 
 20 
outside the scope of this thesis, and it will thus follow the convention of focusing on 
immigrant status (which partly is a proxy for ethnicity, and partly is interesting in its 
own right) in Scandinavia, and ethnicity in New Zealand. Due to the use of snapshot-
data, this thesis will also disregard the increasing tendency for migration to be non-
permanent. 
Even though ethnic differences are generally referred to as a matter of 
immigration in Scandinavia, New Zealand has to a much larger extent had a strategy 
behind its migration policy, and has for instance used skills screening of ‘wanted 
skills’ more actively than in Scandinavia. Such differences in migration policy do of 
course affect the welfare of immigrants including child poverty levels. Part of the 
reason why ethnicity is particularly interesting as a predictor of poverty and the 
reason for dealing with it first is that, as opposed to many other predictors, it does 
not change during most people’s lifespan, and most people are not faced with making 
conscious decisions about their ethnicity. However, it also affects many of the other 
variables. Since it is unchangeable the direction of causality is clear; the challenge is 
to establish the degree to which ethnicity works through other variables (i.e. it is 
clear that given a correlation ethnicity affects e.g. education, not reverse, the 
question is to what degree ethnicity affects poverty through e.g. education). This 
section will look at the correlation of ethnicity and poverty, while the extent to which 
the effect works through other variables will be covered in later subchapters. 
Neither ethnicity nor immigrant status should be reduced to dichotomous 
variables in poverty research. In New Zealand the effect of not being a Pākehā/  
European New Zealander varies too much to give a single, meaningful picture: from 
Māori, to Pacific Islander to Australian or Asian immigrants. Similarly there is a vast 
difference between immigrants from Denmark and Somalia in Sweden – presumably 
the issue is to a large extent about being “non-white”, but also the level of economic 
development of the country of origin. Furthermore, this effect also depends on how 
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of immigrant status is defined (e.g. whether children of immigrants are classified as 
having immigrant status, whether it is taken into account how many years are spent 
in the country, refugee or labour migrant, etc.). A priori it seems likely that the 
importance of immigrant status is decreasing with time, i.e. for most variables time 
spent in the new country will decrease the difference relative to the average of the 
locally born population. In this regard immigration status is different from ethnicity: 
it changes with time.  
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Figure 3.1Population proportion with two foreign born parents in 
Norway, by background. Source: Statistics Norway  
  
 Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 demonstrate the importance of immigrants in 
Norway and Sweden, and give an impression of the geographical origin and age 
composition of the immigrant population. It is worth noting that the low number of 
young people in Table 3.1 reflects the low mobility of young people, and would 
probably have been much higher if the definition applied by Statistics Norway, i.e. 
having two foreign born parents, had been used. 
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Table 3.1 Proportion and number of foreign born population in 
Sweden in 2001 by age group. 
Age Group Proportion Thousands 
0-4 years 2.3% 10 
5-14 years 5.5% 64 
15-24 years 11.3% 117 
25-34 years 14.5% 174 
35-44 years 16.6% 205 
45-54 years 14.6% 177 
55-64 years 12.2% 132 
65-74 years 12.4% 91 
75-84 years 7.9% 46 
85-94 years 5.1% 9 
95+ years 5.3% 1 
Total 11.5% 1028 
(Source: Statistics Sweden) 
Table 3.2 New Zealand population by birthplace and ethnicity 2001  
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Share of total population 76.8% 14.1% 6.20% 6.37% 0.67% 95.97% 100.00% 
By birthplace        
New Zealand 85.6% 97.5% 57.7% 22.4% 20.1% 80.2% 77.4% 
Australia 1.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 0.7% 1.5% 1.5% 
Pacific Islands 0.2% 0.1% 40.2% 8.7% 0.2% 3.3% 3.2% 
UK and Ireland 7.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 2.0% 6.2% 6.0% 
Rest of Europe 2.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.6% 
North America 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 2.7% 0.6% 0.6% 
Asia 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 65.8% 1.0% 4.6% 4.4% 
Other 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 71.2% 1.4% 1.4% 
Total Overseas 13.8% 1.4% 41.5% 77.1% 79.2% 19.2% 18.7% 
Missing 0.6% 1.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 4.0% 
Total in thousands 2 871 526 232 238 25 3 587 3 737 
(Source: 2001 Census, Statistics New Zealand) 
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In table 3.2 birthplace and ethnicity of the New Zealand resident 
population are analysed. As opposed to the other datasets used in the thesis this 
contains missing data, and is thus repeated here. In the other datasets missing data 
has already been corrected for. In the rest of the thesis Maori and Pacific island 
ethnicity is prioritised by the dataset, meaning that those who give multiple 
ethnicities are counted as Maori or Pacific Islander. The columns provide the ethnic 
composition of the total population in the top row, and in the rows below that the 
relative frequency of birthplace for each ethnic group is provided. The two rightmost 
columns provide the birthplace of the total resident population, and of the two the 
rightmost only includes the individuals that specified their ethnic affiliation. The 
table shows that New Zealand has more ethnic diversity than Scandinavia both 
through immigration and the indigenous Māori minority: The proportion of foreign 
born inhabitants is a third larger than that of Sweden, and the number of Māori 
people is large enough to make a notable impact on statistics where they differ from 
the mean, which is unlikely to be the case for Sami in Sweden and Norway, with a 
possible exception for language.  
LIS-data for Norway and Sweden are used to show the correlation 
between immigrant status and poverty among families with children. Again, in this 
chapter the focus is on market income. It is appropriate to start with market income 
before actual disposable income because it describes the problem the governments 
are trying to solve through the tax and benefits system.  
According to the 2000 Norwegian survey, out of the 172 000 households 
with some form of immigrant background (12.0 % of total number of households), 80 
000 or 31.7 per cent was poor, while the proportion was 36.2 per cent for the total 
population. This includes the households where either the head or spouse of head 
falls into one of the following categories: ‘first generation immigrant without 
Norwegian background’, ‘born in Norway with two foreign born-parents’, ‘adopted 
from abroad’, ‘born abroad, on Norwegian parent’, ‘born in Norway one foreign-born 
parent’ or ‘born abroad, two Norwegian parents’. Immigrants are in other words 
better off. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 below explores whether this is due to some other 
spurious factor, i.e. whether age and family size changes this picture. The Norwegian 
dataset allows a limitation of immigrant classification to those with ‘first generation 
immigrant without Norwegian background’. This lowers the number of households 
with immigrant head or spouse to 165 000, of which 60 000 or 36.0 per cent were 
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poor. It is also possible to look at the poverty gap to see if those immigrants who are 
poor are poorer than the rest of the poor population. It appears that it is slightly so in 
Norway: the poverty gap, which in section 2.1 was defined as the average gap 
between actual income and the poverty line, in poor households in the entire 
population extends to 24.8 per cent of the poverty line, while if only looking at 
households where head or spouse is ‘first generation immigrant without Norwegian 
background’, the equivalent number is 25.7 per cent.13 
The equivalent definitions are applied in Sweden. For Sweden the 
numbers from the same year shows that out of the 694 000 households with some 
form of immigrant background (16.1 per cent of total number of households) 290 
000, or 41.8 per cent were poor, compared to 39.9 per cent in the total population. 
The poverty gap is 29.1 per cent of the poverty threshold in the total population, but 
slightly higher among immigrants: 31.8 per cent. 
The dataset contains a variable on ethnicity and data both on market and 
disposable income, again market income is used in this chapter. Statistics New 
Zealand uses the Revised Jensen Equivalence scale (Jensen, 1988) (see appendix 7.1 
for details). For New Zealand the ethnicity of the household head is used to 
determine the household’s ethnicity. According to the 2001 HES data, out of 1 100 
000 European households (80.0 per cent of total), 341 000 or 30.9 per cent were 
poor. Out of the 154 000 households with a Māori head (11.2 per cent of total), 68 
000 or 44.1 per cent were classified as poor. The number for Pacific Island 
households were 22 000 or 45.4 per cent poor out of a total of 48 000 households 
(3.6 per cent of total). Perhaps the most interesting finding is that it is in the ‘other’ 
category, which Table 3.2 shows is predominantly people of Asian ethnicity (Asian is 
not a distinct ethnic group in the 2001 HES dataset), has the lowest percentage of 
poor households: 27.1 per cent (19 000 out of 72 000 households, which in turn is 
                                                 
13
 However, when observations where market income is negative are excluded the picture looks 
marginally different. These are 16 000 cases where farm and non-farm self-employment is negative, 
and it is difficult to tell whether these households are in fact living in poverty. Firstly, the poverty 
threshold grows by 1.0 %. The immigrant population changes from 7.9% to 7.8% (a negative market 
income is in other words less common among immigrants). The poverty rate changes to 35.9% in the 
total population and 35.1% among the ‘first generation’ immigrant households. In other words the 
difference between the groups increase six fold compared to when households with negative market 
income are included, albeit from a very small starting point (difference). Because of the changes in 
poverty line the poverty gap does in fact decrease, and the difference between immigrants and total 
population all but disappears: the total average poverty gap is 24.2% of the poverty line both among 
the total population as well as among immigrants. Because of this limited impact in Norway analysis 
of negative market income and various definitions of immigrants, these are not run in Sweden.  
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5.2 per cent of total). For the total number of households the poverty ratio was 32.7 
per cent. 
The New Zealand data used here were derived from the HES by the New 
Zealand Poverty Measurement Project applying their methodology. In other words 
both these New Zealand and the Scandinavian data are applied to a different cause 
than what they were intended for, as neither were constructed for the purpose of 
analysing market poverty through the lenses of ethnicity. This means that the size is 
limited and creates some uncertainties. 
In conclusion, the data imply that Norway had the smallest group of 
immigrants, and that this group had the lowest poverty incidence when assuming 
that the households are otherwise comparable. Sweden had a significantly larger 
group of immigrants. This group was more likely to be poor, and those that were 
poor were poorer than ethnic Swedish households that were also below the poverty 
line. The data for New Zealand households contained more data on ethnicity, 
allowing for four groups of ethnic affiliation painting a more nuanced picture. New 
Zealand households had an even higher degree of diversity in both birthplace and 
ethnicity. It does, however, also describe a situation where ethnicity is a strong 
predictor of poverty. The frequency tables sharply indicates that this is much more so 
for child poverty than household poverty, and also that immigrant background 
explains twice as much of the variation in child poverty rates across households in 
Sweden as it does in Norway. 
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3.3. Family structure and age 
 
This section will explore how difference in family structure and age affects 
poverty rates. In consecutive order it will discuss how poverty is affected by the 
number of children, family type, the correlation poverty rates and poverty depth, 
having elderly people in the household, and the age of the household head. The next 
section will analyse how the effect of family structure and age influence the effect of 
ethnicity/immigrant status. Again, the dependent variables will be poverty rates and 
poverty gap based on market income. Another important variable to take into 
account when looking at household poverty rates is household size, as this differs 
across the countries. For convenience, the data will be arranged by country in a fixed 
order, starting with New Zealand followed by Norway with Sweden last. 
Chapter 4 will run these analyses for disposable income in order to tell 
which households benefited the most from government intervention. Chapter 5 will 
explore to what extent differing family type composition could explain the differing 
poverty rate: by counterfactual analyses of for example looking at what the New 
Zealand child poverty rate would be if the poverty rate for each type of family 
structure remained constant, but children were distributed between the different 
family types by the composition found in Norway and Sweden. 
Of course, poverty rates exist in the context of demographic structures 
that differs across countries.  
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Table 3.3 Age structure 
Age New Zealand Norway Sweden 
0-9 14.9% 13.7% 11.7% 
10-19 14.9% 12.3% 12.3% 
20-29 13.0% 13.7% 12.4% 
30-39 15.4% 15.2% 14.1% 
40-49 14.4% 14.0% 13.1% 
50-59 11.2% 12.1% 13.8% 
60-69 7.6% 7.8% 9.2% 
70-79 5.7% 7.2% 7.8% 
80+ 2.9% 4.2% 5.6% 
Total 3 737 000 4 478 000 8 930 000 
Sources: Statistics New Zealand: Census Usually Resident Population Count 2001 
 Statistics Norway: Folkemengd, etter kjønn og alder, 2000 
 Statistics Sweden: Befolkningen efter region, civilstånd, ålder och kön, 2000 
The three countries had a relatively similar share of the population 
between 20 and 59 years of age: lowest in Sweden on 53.4 per cent, highest in 
Norway on 54.8 per cent and New Zealand in the middle on 54.0 per cent. The 
difference between New Zealand and Scandinavia was larger when it came to the 
share of individuals under 20 years, which were substantially higher in New Zealand 
(29.8 per cent), lowest in Sweden (24.0 per cent), which was not much lower than 
lower than Norway on 26.0 per cent. This means, of course, that New Zealand had 
the lowest share of the population over 59 (16.2 per cent) – over a quarter less than 
in Sweden (22.6 per cent), and nearly a fifth less than in Norway (19.3 per cent) 
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Figure 3.2 Fertility rate by mothers’ age in year 200014 
Live births per 1000 women by age, 2000
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Sources: 
- Statistics New Zealand: Demographic trends 2006; Age specific fertility rates, 1962-2005 
- Statistics Norway: Statistisk årbok 2001: Fruktbarhet, etter mors alder 
- Swedish calculation based on:Statistics Sweden: Befolkningen i riket efter civilstånd, ålder och 
kön. År 1968-2006 and Levande födda efter region, kön och moderns ålder. År 1968-2006 
The fertility rate is important for at least two reasons. First, the higher 
fertility rate in New Zealand (1.98 per woman, compared to 1.85 in Norway and 1.55 
in Sweden) shows that higher immigration levels was not the only explanation for 
New Zealand’s more youthful population. Indeed, through annual variation, New 
Zealand’s fertility rate has consistently been the highest among the three countries in 
the 1993-2005 period (Statistics New Zealand, 2007:48). It is particularly 
noteworthy that the higher rate was found among young New Zealand women (i.e. 
those under 25). At their most fertile age the fertility rate of Swedish and Norwegian 
women (those between 25 and 29) was actually higher than among their New 
Zealand counterparts. For example, the birth rate per 1000 15-19 year-old women 
were 28.2 in New Zealand, contrasted to 11.7 in Norway, and 13.5 among Swedish 19 
year-old women only, and much lower among those under 19. Second, this means 
simply that New Zealand has a higher number of children per household, woman and 
                                                 
14 Self-evidently, age group categories are used for the New Zealand and Norwegian data. 
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thus probably also per income earner. As later sections will show, this is important 
because as two adult families gain children it is in most cases possible to increase the 
income in the market sufficiently to stay above the poverty line. However, when the 
number of children surpasses three it becomes more of a problem to continue raise 
the market income sufficiently without government transfers. 
 As it deals specifically with age, this section is where it is natural to start 
focusing on child poverty rates. Another group whose poverty is often studied in 
detail is the elderly. This is an interesting parallel to child poverty, as that is the other 
age group that mostly fall outside the workforce. However, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to focus much on the poverty among the elderly, although they will be 
briefly mentioned as part of the statistics on poverty in various age categories. The 
correlation of child, elderly and overall poverty has been the matter of some debate. 
In his own words, Brady (2004:503) 
 
 “challenges the claims regarding divergence in elderly, child and overall 
poverty. [… O]verall and child poverty are very strongly correlated with 
each other, whereas elderly poverty has a less strong positive 
correlation with those two. The elderly and children are more likely to 
be poor than the overall population. Both the elderly and children are 
more vulnerable to experience economic insecurity and low household 
incomes than working-age adults. Nevertheless, elderly poverty and 
child poverty do not really cross-nationally and historically diverge 
from overall poverty or from each other. Countries that experience high 
levels of overall poverty also tend to experience high levels of child 
poverty and, to a somewhat lesser extent, elderly poverty. When overall 
poverty increases in a country, child and elderly poverty also increase.” 
 
 That child poverty is closely related to overall poverty is hardly surprising 
given that most children live in households shared with adults.  
 As already indicated, this section will count households like in the 
previous section in order to compare families with and without children. In order to 
put the total poverty rate in perspective a brief comparison with the poverty rate 
among the elderly and the child poverty rate among households with elderly people 
are also provided.  
 The New Zealand 2000/2001 HES data use the following categories for 
family structure:  
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• one adult,  
• one adult with 1+ children, 
• two adults, 
• two adults with 1 child, 
• two adults with 2 children, 
• two adults with 3 or more children, 
• three or more adults, 
• three or more adults with one or more child. 
 It also contains categories for number of children in household (0; 1; 2; 3; 
4; 5 or more) and number of persons over 60 years of age (0; 1; 2 or more), while the 
Norwegian and Swedish LIS datasets counts the number of persons above 65. While 
this discrepancy is not ideal it should still provide a comparable picture. Age 
categories for household head are also provided in seven different groups. 
 It is unfortunate that it does not provide any specified statistics for 
children in various age groups, because as highlighted in chapter 2, the consequences 
of child poverty seems to depend on the age at which it is experienced. For each of all 
the categories above the total and poor number of and percentage of households, 
persons and children, as well as poverty gap is given. This gives a reasonably full 
picture, with a lot of information that may be presented in several ways, even though 
there are some combinations of variables that cannot be observed directly. Except for 
the different upper age threshold, all the equivalent information is available for 
Norway and Sweden in the LIS dataset. Again, a 60 per cent poverty threshold is 
used. This was complemented by a measure of the poverty gap, to give an image of 
the depth of the poverty, but did not give a significantly different image than the 
poverty rate, and was thus ultimately excluded. For Norway and Sweden a square 
root equivalence scale is used, and the Revised Jensen Equivalence scale is intrinsic 
to the HES, but is impractical to implement into the LIS dataset. As commented 
above, appendix 6.1 provides an overview of the discrepancies this causes.  
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Table 3.4A Market income household (HH) and child poverty in New 
Zealand by number of children  
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0 66.1% - 35.3% - 78.4 % 
1 13.2% 20.4% 27.4% 18.7% 61.6 % 
2 13.5% 42.0% 24.9% 34.9% 66.7 % 
3 5.2% 24.3% 26.2% 21.2% 54.6 % 
4 1.4% 8.7% 45.1% 13.1% 65.3 % 
5+ 0.6% 4.7% 77.6% 12.1% 75.5 % 
All households 1 374 000 886 000 29.9% 265 000 74.1 % 
(Source: HES 2001) 
 As seen in the table above households with one, two or three children 
have lower poverty rates than those with no children, but those with four or five has 
higher and double the rate, respectively. The tables below will indicate that the high 
poverty rate in households without children is largely due to the elderly population. 
As is confirmed below, poverty is not a particularly common problem in working age 
households without children. On the other hand, among the poor households, those 
that are the furthest below the poverty threshold are among those without children. 
The child poverty rate is only slightly lower than for the total number of households. 
                                                 
15 The poverty rate is weighted by children in all but the top case, where it weighted by households, in 
this and the two following tables. 
16 In this thesis, poverty gap is to be understood as the average gap between actual income and poverty 
threshold among the poor households as a share of the poverty threshold. In other words, if the 
threshold is $ 10 000, and the poor households (those earning less than $ 10 000) on average earn $ 8 
000, the gap would be 20%. 
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Table 3.4B Market income household (HH) and child poverty in 
Norway by number of children 
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0 72.0% - 43.6%  24.8% 
1 12.1% 24.0% 19.9% 29.0% 19.7% 
2 10.8% 43.1% 14.7% 38.5% 10.8% 
3 4.3% 25.4% 12.6% 19.5% 6.1% 
4 0.6% 5.1% 25.5% 7.9% 10.8% 
5+ 0.2% 2.4% 36.0% 5.1% 19.7% 
All households 2 093 000 1 051 000 16.5% 173 000 24.8% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
 The central figure of these three tables is the total poverty rate, which is 
weighted by children for all but the top column for the households without children, 
where household poverty is used. According to HES data almost three out of ten New 
Zealand children lived in households with market incomes under the poverty line 
used in this thesis. The equivalent figure for Norway was just below one sixth, while 
it was exactly a fifth in Sweden.  
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Table 3.4C Market income household and child poverty in Sweden by 
number of children 
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0 75.1% - 46.7% - 34.6% 
1 10.3% 22.9% 20.1% 23.0% 13.4% 
2 10.3% 45.8% 17.0% 38.9% 10.4% 
3 3.3% 22.2% 18.2% 20.1% 11.2% 
4 0.7% 6.6% 28.4% 9.3% 20.4% 
5+ 0.2% 2.6% 67.2% 8.7% 50.9% 
All households 4 327 000 1 951 000 20.0% 390 000 29.1% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
 When comparing the table of New Zealand data with the Scandinavian 
equivalents two factors stand out. First of all, the larger poverty gap in New Zealand, 
which was also less evenly spread out. In part this is because of differing definitions 
of social insurance as market income and transfers, in the LIS dataset occupational 
pensions are included in market income. This gives lower market income for older 
households in New Zealand where most retired people rely on the universal old-age 
pension which is counted as a transfer. This affect poverty rates and the poverty gap 
measure, especially for households with retired people, i.e. primarily those with no 
children, and old household heads. In other words, even though slightly fewer people 
fell below the 60 per cent of median poverty threshold, those that did fall below it is 
so far below it that one can safely presume that most of them have no market income 
at all. The second factor is that the households without children were a smaller share 
of the poor households in New Zealand (71.3 per cent, not in table) than in Norway 
(86.8 per cent) and Sweden (88.0 per cent). This was a result of the combined effect 
of higher probability of poverty among childless households and childless households 
being more widespread. Except the families with five or more children in Sweden, 
the number of children seemed to matter less in Scandinavia than in New Zealand. 
Having four or more children was more common in New Zealand than in 
Scandinavia. There was a clear trend indicating that the households with two or three 
children were better off than those with one, four, or more than four children.  
 Beyond that there is a striking lack of linear trends in the poverty gaps 
and household poverty rates. This probably reflects that the number of children is a 
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rather crude variable that needs to be complimented with other factors as well. Part 
of this crudeness is that the number of children does not say anything about the 
number of adults, and thus the number of potential earners. This is a crucial factor, 
especially when looking at market income.  
 The table below shows the most common family types in terms of 
numbers of people over and under 18 years of age.  
Table 3.5A New Zealand market income poverty rate by family type  
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1 adult 23.4% 54.3% 38.7% - - 83.7% 
1 adult 1 or more child 5.0% 78.4% 12.1% 14.2% 39.6% 74.0% 
2 adults 30.3% 30.7% 28.4% - - 73.8% 
2 adults 1 child 6.2% 19.1% 3.6% 9.6% 6.1% 57.0% 
2 adults 2 children 9.6% 16.5% 4.8% 29.6% 16.3% 57.3% 
2 adults 3 
Or more children 
5.0% 21.4% 3.2% 25.3% 19.6% 43.0% 
3 or more adults 12.5% 11.1% 4.2% - - 60.5% 
3 or more adults 
1 or more children 
8.1% 19.8% 4.9% 21.4% 18.3% 60.4% 
(Source: HES 2000) 
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Table 3.5B Norwegian market income poverty rate by family type  
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1 adult 41.3% 54.5% 62.3% - - 40.2% 
1 adult 1 or more child  5.3% 55.9% 8.2% 15.2% 54.2% 35.9% 
2 adults 25.1% 33.5% 23.2% - - 20.7% 
2 adults 1 child 6.4% 7.6% 1.4% 12.8% 5.9%  3.4% 
2 adults 2 children 8.4% 7.2% 1.7% 33.5% 14.6% 3.4% 
2 adults 3  
Or more children 
4.4% 10.8% 1.3% 28.2% 20.7%  3.8% 
3 or more adults 5.6% 8.5% 1.3% - - 4.5% 
3 or more adults  
1 or more children 
3.5% 6.4% 0.6% 10.4% 4.6% 2.6% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
Table 3.5C Swedish market income poverty rate by family type  
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1 adult 46.4% 55.6% 64.8% - - 43.0% 
1 adult 1 or more child  5.3% 49.3% 6.5% 19.1% 48.9% 34.1% 
2 adults 25.0% 35.9% 22.5% - - 23.6% 
2 adults 1 child 5.8% 11.1% 1.6% 12.9% 7.2%  6.2% 
2 adults 2 children 7.9% 10.3% 2.0% 35.1% 18.1%  6.3% 
2 adults 3  
Or more children 
3.4% 15.9% 1.3% 24.5% 21.8%  8.9% 
3 or more adults 3.7% 7.9% 0.7% - -  4.5% 
3 or more adults  
1 or more children 
2.6% 7.7% 0.5% 8.5% 4.1%  4.8% 
(Source: LIS 2001) 
 Taking the number of adults into account shows that among the 
households with two adults, except for the New Zealand households with three or 
more children, poverty depth is lowest among those with one child, while the poverty 
rate is consistently lowest among those with two children. Interestingly, the data 
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show that even though New Zealand mothers gave birth at a younger age, children 
were less likely live in households with only one adult: 14.2 per cent of New Zealand 
children lived in a one adult household, compared to 15.2 per cent and 19.1 per cent 
of Norwegian and Swedish children, respectively. 
Table 3.5D Comparing New Zealand with the average of Norway and 
Sweden (New Zealand share divided by the average share of Norway and 
Sweden) 
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1 adult 0.5 1.0 0.6 - - 1.7 
1 adult 1 or more child  1.0 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.8 1.8 
2 adults 1.2 0.9 1.2 - - 2.5 
2 adults 1 child 1.0 2.0 2.4 0.8 0.9 6.6 
2 adults 2 children 1.2 1.9 2.6 0.9 1.0 6.9 
2 adults 3  
Or more children 
1.3 1.6 2.4 1.0 0.9 3.5 
3 or more adults 2.7 1.4 4.2 - - 9.8 
3 or more adults  
1 or more children 
2.7 2.8 8.8 2.3 4.2 9.6 
(Source: LIS 2000, HES 2000) 
The table above shows that the only family type where the New Zealand 
poverty rate was lower than the average of that of Norway and Sweden was the two 
adults, no children type (the New Zealand poverty rate was equivalent to 0.9 of the 
Scandinavian average), while the share of poor household in the 3 adults with 
children type was almost three times higher in New Zealand than the Scandinavian 
average. The one adult only family type carried a smaller share of the poor 
households in New Zealand, while all other types carried a larger share of the total 
number of poor households than Scandinavia. And as already pointed out, the 
poverty gap is almost ten times bigger in New Zealand 3 adult households than 
among equivalents in Scandinavia. 
An interesting question the combination of poverty rates and poverty 
gaps raises is whether the two variables followed a similar pattern across family 
types. In other words, were family types where poverty was most widespread also the 
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family types where poverty was deepest? This would have implications both for 
poverty policy and measurement. If deep poverty is concentrated in groups where the 
poverty rate is not particularly high, it is necessary to include the poverty depth in 
addition to the poverty rate, otherwise the given poverty threshold and the poverty 
rate it produces will present a distorted picture. It would also affect which policy 
solutions that may be viable. If market income poverty depth is high, that is an 
indication of low employment rates, and policy efforts should be directed here, 
whereas if a large number of people in the particular group are just below the poverty 
line, the efforts should be directed towards increased transfers and possibly higher 
minimum wages, or other policies that could increase pay. The following three 
figures display the relationship between poverty prevalence and poverty depth in 
various family types in the three countries: 
Figure 3.3A17  
Poverty Rate and Poverty Depth in New Zealand
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17
  Due to the purpose of these three figures the scales are different. The purpose is not primarily to illustrate the 
poverty rate and depth in the three countries, but (in simplistic way) to explore whether the relation between the 
two variables approach linearity. 
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Figure 3.3B  
Poverty Rate and Poverty Depth in Norway
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Figure 3.3C 
Poverty Rate and Poverty Depth in Sweden
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Recall that the poverty rate describes the proportion of the population 
with an income below the poverty threshold, while poverty depth measures how 
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much below the line this income on average is. While the relation between the 
poverty rate and poverty depth is clearly not fully linear, the relationship does not 
seem to be significantly disproportionate in any of the family types, either. In New 
Zealand there is a trend towards childless families being deeper in poverty than the 
poverty rate indicates, and vice versa for families with children. Testing for a larger 
number of variables other than family type in the data from Norway and Sweden (not 
shown in figures) confirmed the impression that at least in Norway and Sweden the 
correlation between poverty depth and poverty rate was almost linear. The more 
ambiguous relationship in the New Zealand data could be a reflection of the fact that 
the depth of poverty in New Zealand was nearly three times that of Norway and 
Sweden.  
The tables showing the share of households in different family types 
makes it clear that small households were more common in Scandinavia, while larger 
households were relatively more common in New Zealand. This means that even 
though the poverty rate was only slightly higher among families of the three first 
types in New Zealand than in the two Scandinavian countries, those family types 
contained a much larger fraction of the total poor. The explanation for the tendency 
towards larger households in New Zealand is probably one or more of the following: 
  
o Young adults remained in the parents’ household for longer 
o Young adults were more likely to share (larger) flats with other young 
adults 
o Grandparents were more likely to live with their children and 
grandchildren. 4.4 per cent of all New Zealand children lived in 
households with at least one person over the age of 60, according to 
HES 2001. While this was higher than in Scandinavia (where the age 
threshold is also higher), it was not enough to account for much of the 
difference. 
o Different age structure: in other words a larger proportion of middle-
aged people (with children), or more children per adult 
However, looking at tables 3.6 the average size of households with elderly 
people in it was not much larger in New Zealand than in the other two countries, nor 
did New Zealand have fewer elderly people, so there must be other factors than the 
elderly population that explains the nearly double proportion of one-person 
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households in Scandinavia. As a matter of fact, once it is taken into account that the 
overall average household is smaller in Sweden than in New Zealand, families with 
elderly people are on average larger in Sweden than in New Zealand18. The bigger 
households in New Zealand could potentially be a response to more widespread 
poverty or lower overall income, providing stronger incentive for people to exploit 
the economy of scale in larger households. That a so much larger proportion of the 
New Zealand poor live in large households would fit with this hypothesis. Cultural 
differences unrelated to poverty or income could of course also contribute to the 
difference in household size. 
Table 3.6A Households’ market income poverty rates by number of 
people over 60 in New Zealand 
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0 70.3% 2.98 1.12 19.6% 42.2% 95.6% 29.1% 
1 18.7% 1.55 0.59 65.0% 37.1% 2.1% 51.7% 
2 or more 11.0% 2.41 0.91 61.7% 20.7% 2.3% 46.8% 
Total or average 1 374 000 2.65 1.00 32.7% - - 29.9% 
1 or more 29.7% 1.87 0.71 63.8% 57.8% 4.4% 49.2% 
(Source: HES 2001) 
 
Table 3.6B Households’ market income poverty rates by number of 
people over 64in Norway 
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0 74.7% 2.36 1.10 24.4% 47.2% 99.5% 16.3% 
1 17.9% 1.30 0.60 80.8% 37.5% 0.4% 49.4% 
2 or more 7.3% 2.09 0.97 80.9% 15.4% 0.1% * 
Total or average 2 093 000 2.15 1.00 38.7% 100.0% 1 051 000 16.5% 
1 or more 25.3% 1.53 0.71 80.8% 52.8% 0.5% 36.2% 
(Source: LIS 2000)  * Insufficient data. 
 The third column shows the average size of this particular kind of 
household divided by the average household size. These figures are given to facilitate 
comparisons across the countries where the average differs. 
                                                 
18 The average old household size is 71.83% of the overall average in Sweden, and 70.58% in New 
Zealand. 
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Table 3.6C Household’s market income poverty rates by number of people 
over 64in Sweden 
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0 73.7% 2.21 1.10 24.7% 45.6% 99.6% 20.0% 
1 18.7% 1.20 0.60 82.7% 38.7% 0.4% 35.3% 
2 or more 7.7% 2.03 1.01 81.7% 15.7% 0.0% * 
Total in thousands, or average 4 327 2.01 1.00 39.9% 100.0% 1 951 20.0% 
1 or more 26.3% 1.44 0.72 82.4% 54.4% 0.4% 36.4% 
(Source: LIS 2000)  * Insufficient data. 
When looking at the proportion of the poor that are living in households 
with none, one or two or more persons over 60 or 64 the similarities across the 
countries are more striking than the differences, in particular since the slightly lower 
proportion of them living in non-old households in New Zealand may be at least 
partially explained by lower age category threshold. The (low) incidence of, and 
(high) poverty rate among children living in households with elderly people are also 
fairly homogenous across the countries.  
As could be expected on the basis that wages and employability peaks at 
the middle of the career, there was a clear pattern showing that the closer the 
household head were to 45 (55 in Sweden), the less likely the household was to be 
poor, and the less deep was the poverty. The same trend holds for child poverty. This 
illustrates the importance of work. The larger share of children in New Zealand living 
in households where the head is younger than 29 or older than 65 is probably both a 
reflection of the higher fertility of young New Zealand women, as presumably 
children of young parents are more likely to live with grandparents who are older 
than 65. The larger households among young New Zealanders is partly a result of 
more children – out of the people living in households with head under 24 18.1 per 
cent is under 18 in New Zealand, compared to 9.5 per cent and 6.6 per cent in 
Norway and Sweden, respectively. That said, a larger portion of young households in 
New Zealand seem to fare relatively well – although less so among those with 
children. Other studies may wish to explore this further by taking into account young 
people who are in education. 
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Table 3.7 Market income poverty by head of household’s age 
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New Zealand 
(Source: HES 2000/01) 
15-24 5.5% 34.5% 5.8% 2.6 55.1% 4.0% 7.3% 63.6% 
25-29 7.5% 26.9% 6.2% 2.9 48.7% 10.5% 17.2% 65.9% 
30-39 21.8% 18.3% 12.2% 3.3 28.2% 45.7% 43.1% 66.9% 
40-49 20.8% 16.2% 10.3% 3.2 22.5% 30.6% 23.0% 59.5% 
50-59 18.4% 20.0% 11.3% 2.6 25.8% 8.2% 7.1% 67.6% 
60-64 5.9% 39.5% 7.1% 2.0 70.8% 0.3% 0.6% 83.2% 
65+ 20.1% 77.0% 47.3% 1.6 72.0% 0.8% 1.8% 81.6% 
Total in thousands 
or average 
1 374 32.7% 450 2.7 29.9% 886 265 000 74.1% 
Norway 
(Source : LIS 2000) 
15-24 6.6% 60.1% 10.9% 1.3 65.8% 1.6% 5.2% 35.1% 
25-29 9.0% 26.6% 6.7% 1.8 37.4% 7.8% 14.7% 17.1% 
30-39 19.5% 18.0% 9.7% 2.7 23.2% 43.0% 52.7% 11.4% 
40-49 18.3% 13.4% 6.8% 3.0 11.3% 37.9% 21.6% 8.8% 
50-59 16.6% 16.1% 7.4% 2.2 14.1% 7.1% 5.1% 11.4% 
60-64 5.3% 31.3% 4.6% 1.8 11.9% 0.4% 0.2% 23.3% 
65+ 24.7% 78.9% 53.9% 1.5 34.0% 0.3% 0.5% 56.5% 
Total in thousands 
or average 
2 093 36.2% 756 2.2 19.8% 1,051 208 000 24.8% 
Sweden 
(Source : LIS 2000) 
15-24 6.9% 55.2% 9.5% 1.3 63.7% 1.2% 3.1% 36.9% 
25-29 8.3% 26.9% 5.6% 1.7 41.3% 6.2% 10.3% 17.4% 
30-39 18.1% 22.6% 10.3% 2.6 29.4% 44.2% 52.6% 15.2% 
40-49 17.6% 18.4% 8.1% 2.7 17.7% 38.9% 27.8% 13.4% 
50-59 18.2% 17.6% 8.0% 2.0 14.7% 8.9% 5.3% 13.7% 
60-64 6.2% 32.5% 5.1% 1.7 34.5% 0.5% 0.6% 23.0% 
65+ 24.8% 85.8% 53.4% 1.4 41.2% 0.2% 0.3% 64.9% 
Total in thousands 
or average 
4 327 39.9% 1 724 2.0 24.8% 1 951 483 000 29.1% 
 
The LIS dataset for Norway and Sweden allows analyses of a few more 
variables, such as household head gender. Out of the 976 000 households with only 
one adult in Norway, 55.9 per cent had a female adult. However, this relative balance 
                                                 
19 It is worth noting, but ultimately probably of small significance, that the method for determining 
who the household head is differs between the datasets. In Norway the head is always a male adult 
unless the only adult is female. It is not clear how the head is chosen in the datasets from Sweden and 
New Zealand, but certainly in Sweden the head can be a female even where a male adult is present in 
the household. 
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evaporates when looking at children: out of the 160 000 living with only one adult 
85.2 per cent lived with a female. The total poverty rate was 64.7 per cent for 
households with a female adult and 42.0 per cent for those with a male adult. The 
child poverty rate was similar among the female headed households: 63.9 per cent, 
but significantly reduced in those headed by a male, to 28.8 per cent. Similarly, the 
child poverty gap20 were 40.0 per cent, and 20.7 per cent of the poverty line among 
the poor households for children living with a female and male adult, respectively. 
Out of the 2 237 000 households with only one adult in Sweden, in 55.9 per cent of 
the cases the adult were a female. Among these, 63.3 per cent were poor, compared 
to 44.3 per cent among the ones headed by a male. Out of the 372 000 children living 
in single adult-households, 84.7 per cent lived in one led by a female. The child 
poverty rate here was 57.1 per cent, compared to 18.9 per cent among the male 
headed households. The child poverty gap was 39.5 per cent, and 13.3 per cent. If 
anything, it seems that for males, having children in the household is more strongly 
correlated with positive market incomes in Sweden; otherwise the differences 
between the two countries are small. For both the countries it is clear that children 
living with only one adult is worse off, and the majority, that live with a female, are 
particularly unlikely to be well off. 
Another variable contained in the LIS-datasets only is marriage status of 
the household head divided into unmarried, married, divorced, widowed and 
separated. In the Swedish data the category for separated household heads are 
included in the divorced group. 
 
                                                 
20 Note that child poverty gap is different from overall poverty gap, as it is weighted per child rather 
than per household. 
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Table 3.8 A Norwegian market income poverty by marriage status of 
head of household 
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Unmarried 31.8% 35.5% 23.0% 22.1% 25.7% 34.4% 1.6 
Married 41.2% 22.9% 14.1% 65.0%  8.9% 35.1% 3.0 
Divorced 12.0% 38.7% 28.8% 9.0% 35.1% 19.2% 1.7 
Widowed 12.6% 79.2% 60.2% 0.9% 53.2%  2.8% 1.2 
Separated  2.4% 35.1% 25.1% 3.0% 46.7%  8.5% 1.9 
Total or 
average 
2 093 000 36.2% 24.8% 1 052 000 16.5% 173 000 2.6 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
The child poverty figures in the table provides more evidence indicating 
that the number of income earners was the most important factor in predicting child 
poverty, in that households where the adults are married had, by far the lowest child 
poverty rate, and also lower poverty depth. That households where the head is 
divorced, widowed or separated had higher child poverty rate probably reflects that 
these family changes (divorces/separations and deaths of adults) are what DiPrete 
and McManus (2000) calls negative trigger events, even though the overall poverty 
rate for unmarried household heads was similar to that of the households that have 
experienced divorce or separation. This could reflect that households with children 
are more vulnerable to such triggers.  
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Table 3.8  B Swedish market income poverty by marriage status of head 
of household 
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Unmarried 37.1% 35.6% 25.2% 28.8% 24.6% 35.3% 1.6 
Married 36.4% 28.1% 18.9% 58.1% 13.9% 40.3% 2.9 
Divorced 15.2% 45.2% 34.5% 12.4% 38.0% 23.5% 1.6 
Widowed 11.4% 84.1% 67.3%  0.8% 22.3%  0.9% 1.1 
Total or 
average 
4 327 000 39.9% 29.1% 1 951 000 20.0% 390 000 2.0 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
The differences between the countries are modest, and the lower child 
poverty rate in widowed households may not be significant, considering the small 
number of cases. The marriage status is a stronger predictor of the probability of 
poverty in Norway than in Sweden21. 
3.4. Return to ethnicity; the effect on family 
structure, age and poverty 
So far, it has been assumed that households with different ethnic or 
immigrant status are comparable in terms of family type and age. This section will 
relax this assumption, and show how that changes the picture. This section 
nonetheless comes with the same caveat as section 3.2, namely that ethnicity and 
migration really are severe simplifications, and particularly the ‘other’ ethnic 
category in New Zealand and the immigrant category in the Scandinavian countries 
contain extremely heterogeneous cases. With this in mind the findings remain 
interesting. 
The 2001 HES dataset for New Zealand does not allow a direct analysis of poverty 
levels in household types of certain ethnicities. However, it does give the number of 
poor/non-poor individuals, children and households by household head ethnicity. 
Based on this child poverty rates are calculated per ethnicity, as well as average 
household size in the various ethnicities. 
                                                 
21 Many factors such as age and fertility structures could account for this, so it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to account for why this is the case. 
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Table 3.9 A Market income poverty by ethnic affiliation of 
household head in New Zealand 
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European 31.0% 75.8% 22.8% 52.1% 2.5 0.3 0.6 
Māori 44.1% 15.1% 47.2% 26.3% 2.9 0.5 1.0 
Pacific people 45.4% 4.9% 51.7% 13.2% 3.9 0.6 1.4 
Other (Notably Asian) 27.1% 4.3% 34.4% 8.5% 3.5 0.4 0.9 
Total / Average 32.7% 450 000 29.9% 265 000 2.7 0.3 0.6 
 
Clearly, children in the ‘other’ category were much worse off than their 
parents, especially when compared to children in households where the head 
identified as having a European identity. The larger households in the Pacific people 
and ‘other’ groups could reflect  that those groups are more likely to be immigrant 
(see Table 3.2), and that this led to larger households, possibly because of age 
structure. While this dataset cannot determine how much of the effect was caused by 
larger household size and higher number of children, it seems that in the poorer 
ethnic groups, children are particularly likely to be poor. The table below provides 
the almost equivalent figures for households where the head or spouse has 
immigrant background in Norway and Sweden.  
 
Table 3.9 B Market income poverty in Norway by immigrant status 
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Immigrant 
background 
36.0% 7.9% 
 
28.9% 
 
20.8% 
 
2.2 0.4 0.8 
Total 
households 
36.2% 100% 16.5% 
 
100% 
 
2.5 0.3 0.5 
                                                 
22 Note that the in HES dataset the ethnic affiliation of household heads does not correspond to the 
census data on ethnic affiliation of the total population. In the HES dataset 80.1% of total household 
has a head with that identifies as European ethnicity, 11.2%, 3.5% and 5.2% has Māori, Pacific Island 
and ‘Other’, respectively. 
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Table 3.9 C Market income poverty in Sweden by immigrant status 
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Immigrant background 45.4% 16.8% 
 
32.6% 
 
38.0% 2.3 0.4 0.7 
Total households 39.9% 100% 20.0% 100% 2.0 0.3 0.5 
 
Looking closer at the data by including age, as is demonstrated in tables 
3.10 below it becomes clear that the lower poverty rate among households with 
immigrant background in Norway was purely due to a different age composition of 
the immigrant population. When comparing the poverty rate of immigrant and total 
population by the age of the household head, the immigrant group had a higher 
poverty rate than the total in every age group, except the one where the head is older 
than 64 years old. In this category the poverty rate was 74.8 per cent among those 
with immigrant background versus 78.9 per cent for the total households. The age 
group where the poverty rate among immigrants is most different from the total 
(measured in percentage points) was found in the households where the head is 25-
29 years old: Households where head or spouse had immigrant background has a 
poverty rate of 40.6 per cent, compared to 26.6 per cent among the total.  
As the household head age is increased, the outcome for immigrants 
relative to the total steadily improved. In Sweden the situation was similar, even 
though the total poverty rate is much higher among the immigrant population 
relative to the total. This difference from Norway could be explained by the fact that 
the age composition of immigrants in Sweden was more similar to that of the locally 
born population. 24.8 per cent of the total households had a head over 64 years, 
compared to only 14.5 per cent of the immigrant households. It would in other words 
be consistent with the data to assume that the lower poverty rate among immigrants 
among the over 64 is purely because they, on average are younger, even though the 
data do not indicate this. For the population under 65, the group where the poverty 
rate difference (between immigrant households and the total) in percentage points is 
least is in the households where the head is between 25 and 29 years old. In that 
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group of households those headed by a person with immigrant background, had a 
poverty rate of 33.5 per cent, compared to 26.9 per cent in the total group.  
The largest percentage point difference is found in the households where 
the head is in his/her thirties, where immigrant households has a poverty rate of 36.7 
per cent, compared to 22.6 per cent in the total number of households. This could 
reflect that immigrants in this age group are particularly likely to have recently 
arrived, but possibly also that immigrants tend to have more children, which leads to 
higher risk of poverty. 
 
Table 3.10A Household (HH) poverty, by age of household head 
(HHH), immigrant status, Norway 
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HHH age 15-24 6.6% 5.7% 60.1% 67.6% 61.9% * 
HHH age 25-29 9.0% 10.2% 26.6% 40.6% 31.1% 42.5% 
HHH age 30-39 19.5% 29.1% 18.0% 30.3% 19.3% 31.0% 
HHH age 40-49 18.3% 20.5% 13.4% 23.2% 9.0% 24.3% 
HHH age 50-59 16.6% 17.5% 16.1% 20.1% 11.6% 19.8% 
HHH age 60-64 5.3% 4.6% 31.3% 35.0% 11.9% 21.0% 
HHH age 65+ 24.7% 12.6% 78.9% 74.8% 40.0% * 
(Source: LIS 2000;*= Insufficient data) 
Table 3.10 B Household poverty, by age of household head, immigrant 
status, Sweden  
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HHH age 15-24 6.9% 4.7% 55.2% 62.4% 59.3% 61.9% 
HHH age 25-29 8.3% 7.9% 26.9% 33.5% 36.6% 33.0% 
HHH age 30-39 18.1% 22.6% 22.6% 36.7% 23.2% 40.9% 
HHH age 40-49 17.6% 23.5% 18.4% 29.9% 14.0% 24.8% 
HHH age 50-59 18.2% 19.2% 17.6% 28.6% 12.8% 22.8% 
HHH age 60-64 6.2% 7.4% 32.5% 43.5% 31.6% 34.1% 
HHH age 65+ 24.8% 14.5% 85.8% 83.2% 41.2% 66.9% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
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 A regression analysis confirmed that immigrants in Norway had higher 
poverty rate than the native population when demographic structure was controlled 
for, even though the average poverty rate in two groups were very similar. In fact, 
when comparing the two countries the difference in terms of immigrant market 
incomes, the difference seems to be less when other factors are controlled for. It is 
unfortunate that there is not sufficient data to run this model in New Zealand. 
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3.5. Education 
Unfortunately, the New Zealand HES dataset does not contain data on 
education levels of parents or adults. The variable is so important that it is still 
worthwhile to look at the effect of education in the Scandinavian countries, as the LIS 
dataset does contain education data.  
While saying that education affects wages and income may be merely 
stating the obvious, there are competing hypotheses to explain exactly how this 
happens: most logically that education is an investment in human capital that 
increases productivity. However, the decision to undertake a particular kind of 
education may also be motivated by the wish to create a signalling effect, implying 
that higher productivity is the result of innate, rather than acquired ability (Boarini 
and Strauss, 2007:6-7). Education decisions may both cause and be correlated with 
non-pecuniary outcomes such as social prestige, better health, lower propensity to 
commit crimes, etc. (Grossman, 2005). Schooling decisions may also depend on the 
taste for schooling, cost, access to funds and innate ability; it need not always be an 
optimising investment decision. There is a large pool of literature exploring the so-
called internal rates of return (Boarini and Strauss, 2007) to education, i.e. the effect 
of education on the overall income distribution. In this economics dominated 
literature other factors such as ethnicity, age, type of education, gender, etc. are often 
taken into account. The focus is on individual’s income, meaning that the challenges 
involved in comparing different families are avoided. These two differences (i.e. the 
focus on the entire income distribution, not just the lower end, and the focus on 
individual conditions rather than households) are crucial, but in lack of detailed 
studies of the effect of education on poverty, the research done in the area highlight 
the importance of education and illustrates how education interact with other 
variables. This section will start by looking at the private rate of return in all three 
countries, and then look at the effect of adult’s education on poverty in households in 
Norway and Sweden using the LIS dataset.  
Boarini and Strauss (2007:8) decomposes the benefit of schooling into 
three components: the wage premium, i.e. the increase in (net) wage that higher 
education yields while keeping the employment probability constant; the 
employability premium, i.e. the increased probability of being employed holding the 
wage fixed that follows from higher education; and finally the pension premium, i.e. 
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the higher retirement benefit that follows from better outcomes in both the two 
previous components. Blöndal et al (2002:6) highlights that the labour market 
connection, or employability premium can be measured both as lower 
unemployment and higher participation rates, often two separate statistics. Boarini 
and Strauss (2007:41) also control for labour market experience. Looking at 21 
different OECD countries23they find that five countries has a lower wage premia for 
tertiary education among men than Sweden, and only two has a lower wage premia 
for women. They suggest that the strong dispersion of wage premia reflects “country 
specific wage productivity differences between tertiary and upper secondary degree 
holders, but also other factors such as different scarcity rents on skilled labour and 
the degree of labour market regulation” (Boarini and Strauss, 2007:13).  
With regards to the experience premia, on the other hand, one of the 
highest rates is found in Sweden, both for men and women. Here they also find a 
clear trend of higher premia for men than women. No universal trend exists either 
way in education premia. The marginal effect of tertiary education on employment 
probability is on average higher for women than for men in the 21 countries 
examined, and particularly so in Sweden. Only Finnish and Hungarian women raise 
their probability of being employed more per year of tertiary education than Swedish 
women. The effect on Swedish men is slightly below average and median. When 
taking multiple factors into account, including wage premium, employment 
probability, pension premium, taxes, as well as direct and indirect costs of education 
it varies across the countries whether men or women has higher return to education, 
but on average men has slightly higher return. For all countries the return is 
significant and positive. Sweden is among the countries where the return is relatively 
low (Boarini and Strauss, 2007:50).  
According to Blöndal, et al (2002:9) in a cross-country study, education 
does not only provide an earnings advantage when entering the labour market, this 
effect increases with time spent in the labour market. This is important in a 
perspective where the focus is on households and children, and also in a gender 
perspective. The study also finds that not only are individuals with higher education 
less likely to be unemployed, they also tend to have a longer active working life 
(Blöndal, et al., 2002:15). 
                                                 
23 Unfortunately, Norway and New Zealand are not included. 
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Figure 3.4 Upper secondary and tertiary educational attainment 
percentage by age group and gender in New Zealand, Norway24 and 
Sweden 
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(Source: Blöndal, et al., 2002:40) 
 
The figure shows a few clear trends. In upper secondary education 
attainment Norway has the highest rate for both genders and all age groups. This 
could, however be due to different categorisation of the school systems. The Swedes 
has higher than or similar rates to New Zealanders, except for men in the 55-64 
category. For tertiary education attainment, the most obvious finding is that 
Norwegian women’s rate is much higher for the 25-35 group than the 55-64 group. 
The New Zealand women category is the only one where the attainment rate is 
noticeably lower among the young group than the average. Clearly the higher 
attainment among the younger groups is an illustration of the increasing education 
level, which is particularly apparent among women, and more so in the Scandinavian 
countries than in New Zealand.  
                                                 
24 Year of reference 1998 
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Maani (2004) investigates the relationship between ethnicity, education 
and relative income in New Zealand in the 1986 to 1996 period, with a particular 
focus in explaining the deteriorating income levels of Māori. She argues that 
educational attainment is an important contributor to the income gap between Māori 
and the white/European population. She concludes that “while there are significant 
differences in the educational attainment of Māori and non-Māori groups, once 
educational attainment is controlled for, much of the income gap disappears, 
particularly in 1996 [compared to 1986].” (Maani, 2004:123). When running 
regression analyses where income is the dependent variable and the analyses of the 
different ethnic groups are run separately, she finds that even though the 
interception point was lower among Māori, the return to education was higher. The 
income gap was in other words negatively correlated with income: among groups 
with high education attainment, Māori had similar income to non-Māori. While 
Māori with low education still was significantly less paid than non-Māori most of the 
total difference was due to Māorion average being younger and having lower 
education attainment. This suggests that overcoming the tendency of inter-
generational transfer of human capital attainment plays an important role in closing 
the income gap between ethnic groups. As Machin (2006:7) puts it: “education […] 
offer[s] a route where people can escape from disadvantaged family backgrounds and 
climb the social ladder.” For this to become a reality however, the degree to which 
family background predicts education attainment must be reduced as well. Based on 
data from Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) Machin 
(2006:11) finds that in a ranking of 54 countries, New Zealand has the 14th strongest 
correlation between family background and students’ test score, with Sweden and 
Norway a bit behind on number 19 and 23, respectively. This may or may not be an 
illustration of how ethnicity is more important in New Zealand in the sense that 
ethnic minority groups are bigger and poorer.  
Further research could also look into how such findings are received by 
the public. Certainly in the Norwegian public debate the correlation between social 
background and education/test results are seen as an important factor when 
evaluating the school system. 
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Table 3.11A Household (HH) and child poverty in Norway, by highest 
educated adult in household 
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Share of total 
HHs 
18.7% 26.9% 23.5% 2.8% 21.4% 6.7% 2,058,534 
Share of poor 
HHs 
38.6% 32.7% 15.6% 1.4% 10.3% 1.4% 735,849 
HH poverty 
rate 
73.8% 43.5% 23.8% 18.0% 17.2% 7.5% 35.7% 
Share of total 
children 
3.4% 20.8% 30.8% 4.2% 29.9% 10.9% 1,032,922 
Share of poor 
children 
11.5% 45.1% 27.5% 2.4% 12.2% 1.4% 161,747 
Child poverty 
rate 
52.3% 33.9% 14.0% 8.9% 6.4% 2.0% 15.7% 
Average 
number of 
children per 
household 
0.1 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 
 
Table 3.11 B Household (HH) and child poverty in Sweden, by highest 
educated adult in household 
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Share of total HHs 9.4% 7.2% 41.1% 5.2% 23.3% 0.9% 12.8% 4,294 
Share of poor HHs 16.2% 8.9% 30.7% 4.3% 9.5% 0.1% 30.2% 1,699 
HH poverty rate 68.3% 48.7% 29.6% 32.7% 16.1% 5.3% 93.2% 39.6% 
Share of total 
children 
1.4% 6.5% 49.9% 6.6% 34.3% 1.3% - 
 
1,932 
Share of poor 
children 
5.5% 17.8% 54.1% 5.2% 17.1% 0.3% - 376 
Child poverty rate 74.7% 53.5% 21.1% 15.2% 9.7% 4.2% - 19.5% 
Average number of 
children per 
household 
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.5 
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The tables above show that lack of education is a strong explanatory 
factor of market poverty, for both households and children. Clearly, the households 
with only lower secondary education has a very high risk of being poor, and the trend 
is consistent – the higher education the lower probability of being poor.  
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3.6. Employment and benefit status 
 As alluded to in section 3.5 on education, there are two mechanisms that 
makes the labour market create heterogeneity: differences in wage or pay, and 
differences in employment.  
 Employment is obviously the single most direct and important predictor 
of market income, almost to the extent that explaining market income with 
employment status is little more than a circular argument. However, employment 
status is also a variable that is likely to change over relatively short term (compared 
to e.g. education), and over the lifetime of most individuals, and employment status 
will be predicted by many of the variables discussed above. Again, the variables used 
in New Zealand and Scandinavia do not correspond fully. The LIS dataset for Norway 
and Sweden includes data for head and spouse of household on disability status, 
whether employment is largest income source and alternatively what kind of benefit 
is received. The New Zealand HES dataset gives numbers, poverty rate and poverty 
gap of children adults and households separated into those where the majority 
income is from benefits, some income from benefits, and those that has no benefit 
income and one, two, or three adults. In other words, it does not tell whether the 
individuals have a work income, only whether benefits are received. Benefit status 
will be used as a proxy for employment status. 
Table 3.12A New Zealand market income poverty by benefit status 
 Share of total 
households 
Household 
poverty rate 
Share of 
children 
Child 
poverty rate 
Poverty 
gap 
Majority income 
from benefits 
18.8% 100.0% 12.5% 100.0% 93.8% 
Some income from 
benefits 
15.1% 57.6% 12.1% 63.1% 52.8% 
1 adult no benefit 
income 
22.4% 16.9% 23.6% 31.1% 41.7% 
2 adult no benefit 
income 
32.3% 3.7% 42.9% 5.6% 29.2% 
3 adult no benefit 
income 
11.4% 2.1% 9.0% 1.3% 34.3% 
Total/ average 1,374,000 32.7% 886,000 29.9% 74.1% 
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Table 3.12B Norwegian market income poverty by benefit status 
 Share of total 
households 
Household 
poverty rate 
Share of 
children 
Child 
poverty 
rate 
Poverty 
gap 
Main income from 
benefit 
36.0% 87.9% 8.6% 94.2% 65.1% 
Head or spouse main 
income from 
employment 
36.8% 11.9% 32.2% 24.2% 3.5% 
Head and spouse main 
income from 
employment 
27.2% 0.5% 59.3% 1.0% 0.1% 
Total/ average 2,093,000 36.1% 
 
1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
24.8% 
 
 
Table 3.12C Swedish market income poverty by benefit status 
 Share of total 
households 
Household 
poverty rate 
Share of 
children 
Child 
poverty 
rate 
Poverty 
gap 
Main income from 
benefit 
34.3% 91.1% 7.2% 98.1% 72.2% 
Head or spouse main 
income from 
employment 
37.0% 20.8% 27.0% 36.5% 10.3% 
Head and spouse main 
income from 
employment 
28.7% 3.1% 65.8% 4.6% 1.5% 
Total/ average 4,327,000 39.8% 1,951,000 20.0% 29.0% 
 
The data from Norway and Sweden do not have a variable for ‘some’ 
income from benefits, rather it distinguishes between the cases where the head and 
spouse has employment as their largest source of income, if the head or the spouse 
has the main income from employment, and the third group where the household’s 
main income is from benefits. 
3.7. Spouse resemblance 
Obviously, children’s income depends on parents’ income, and most 
children still grow up in households with two adults. In many cases only one income 
is sufficient to keep the household out of poverty. This section will focus on the cases 
with two adults in the household. Previous sections have shown that this group is 
already less likely to be poor (not only because of increased probability of at least 
having one income, but also because more human capital in itself increases the 
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probability of (remaining) living with a partner), but the group is still the majority, so 
still worth a closer look.  
Differences in adults’ income are driven by circumstances or co-incidents 
and human capital, and ultimately human capital is an important factor in explaining 
poverty, particularly at the individual level. If parents (or: more precisely: adults in 
households with children) have similar amounts of human capital that can be 
expected to contribute to more heterogeneous incomes for children across 
households, and ultimately it is possible that this accentuation of low income and/ or 
poverty means higher child poverty rates. This is relevant because, if the degree to 
which spouses share traits that predict poverty varies across countries, this may 
explain some of the variation in child poverty rates across countries. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to measure the relationship between spouse resemblance and 
child poverty at macro-level, but it is possible to run some household-level analyses 
to establish whether the relationship is observable at all. 
Tambs and Moum (1992:957-58) list three non-rival explanations of 
spouse resemblance: social homogamy, assortative mating and convergence during 
time spent together. Social homogamy is understood as spouse selection from social 
groups that tend to share certain characteristics, assortative mating is understood as 
a tendency for individuals to form partnerships with individuals with whom they 
share certain traits. Even though the cause of the phenomenon is not fully 
understood, it is beyond doubt that spouses tend to share many traits. 
Obviously, when describing how spouse resemblance in human capital 
affects poverty rates through income, human capital cannot be operationalised as 
income, even though it may well be that spouses’ incomes may show a homogeneous 
tendency. Since educational attainment is an important predictor of income and is 
relatively straightforward to compare across countries (as opposed to e.g. ethnicity, 
religious affiliation etc.), this will be used as an indicator of spouse resemblance in 
human capital. The argument that spouse resemblance affects child poverty among 
household with more than one adult rests on the assumption that homogeneous 
couples/parents leads to homogeneous incomes (between the spouses), which in turn 
leads to more heterogeneous incomes across households. This can be tested by 
running an OLS regression where households’ ‘distance’ from the median income is 
the dependent variable, and difference in educational attainment between spouses 
are the main independent variable. The advantage of regression analysis is that it 
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allows the inclusion of education level as control variables. Based on the theory 
above, the a priori expectation is a U-shaped relationship, i.e. that the divergence 
from the median income is largest where education is highest and lowest. In order to 
control for this factor, educational level and the square of the educational level of 
household head and spouse are included as control variables. The theory above 
predicts that on average there will be a positive relationship between spouse 
educational resemblances and the distance from the household median income. 
There are done several studies of the effects of the (changing) effect of education and 
age and other factors in the mating process. 
The LIS dataset separates education level for household head and spouse 
into 8 tiers. In order to avoid distortion from exceptionally high incomes the natural 
logarithm of all income data is used. Here a square root equivalence scale is used to 
calculate the median income and the deviation from it. The income analysed is the 
market income, i.e. income before tax and transfers, because this presumably is what 
is most affected by human capital. An analysis of LIS-data for household with 
couples shows that for every standard deviation the distance in level of education 
between spouses increases, Norwegian households’ income deviates from the median 
income on average by .064(2000); .116(1995); .057(1991); .055 (1986) standard 
deviations less. Equivalent analysis for Sweden shows somewhat weaker effects: 
.019(2000); .035(1995); .011(1992).  
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Table 3.13 OLS Regression of household (HH) divergence from 
median income by education and spouse resemblance, standardized 
coefficients 
 Norway 
2000 
Norway 
1995 
Norway 
1991 
Norway 
1986 
Sweden 
2000 
Sweden 
1995 
Sweden 
1992  
Spouse 
difference in 
educ. Level 
 -.06** -.12** -.06** -.06** -.02** -.04** -.01** 
HH head 
education level 
 -.87** -.32** -.15** -.17** -.55** -.41** -.75** 
HH head 
education 
level, square 
.81** .26** .13** .15** .48** .41** .64** 
Spouse 
education level 
-1.06** -.49** -.08** -.10** -.66** -.66** -.79** 
Spouse 
education 
level, square 
.89** .26** -.06** -.05** .57** .55** .56** 
R square .11 .10 .03 .03 .06 .05  .22 
N25 7336 6085 5576 3291 5472 8071 7995 
 
Even though the effects are not very large (as would be expected), and 
shows considerable variation without any clear trend over relatively short time 
periods, every analysis where sufficient data were available yielded results significant 
at a .000-level, and is always pointing in the expected direction. Thus the evidence 
provides a reasonably strong support for the theory that spouses’ similarity in human 
capital measured as education attainment in it self contributes to child poverty.  
                                                 
25 The number of cases is somewhat meaningless, as the observations have been weighted to give a 
better picture of the total population. The number given is thus the number of observations the 
analysis is based on. 
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3.8. Interaction effects 
So far the various groups in which market poverty levels have been 
measured have been dealt with individually. While this gives a straightforward 
picture that is easy to read, it masks the fact that many poor households are poor not 
because they belong to one particularly vulnerable group, but in many cases they are 
poor because they belong to a certain combination of groups. Measuring poverty 
incidence in various groups does not capture this effect, as many of these are 
measured twice because they belong to two groups. This section will provide some 
data on the incidence and poverty rates among households and children that 
simultaneously belong to two groups that are likely to be poor. Unfortunately the 
dataset used here to analyse New Zealand does not permit this kind of analysis, so 
this particular analysis is limited to Norway and Sweden. As in the rest of this 
chapter the focus is on market poverty measured with the basis of income before 
taxes and transfers. 
Four groups that tend to have higher poverty rates than the average are 
those with household head aged less than 31 years old, those with three or more 
children, those with immigrant background and those with only one adult in the 
household. The incidence and poverty among children or households that belong to 
some combination of these groups will be analysed in this section.  
The first group to be studied here is the households with only one adult 
and where the adult is 30 years old or younger. For comparison incidence and 
poverty data on households and children in one-adult households and households 
where the household head is 30 years old or younger are also provided. 
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Table 3.14 Market poverty in young parent and one-adult households 
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households where the head is 30 
or younger 
15.6% 9.4% 40.7% 36.2% 
All households with only one adult 46.6% 15.2% 54.7% 58.7% 
Households with only one adult 
where the head is 30 or younger 
11.1% 2.7% 51.2% 86.5% 
Sweden 
All households where the head is 30 
or younger 
15.2% 7.4% 39.8% 40.3% 
All households with only one adult 51.7% 19.1% 55.0% 51.2% 
Households with only one adult 
where the head is 30 or younger 
11.3% 2.2% 47.8% 81.9% 
 
In the table above, the two columns to the right shows the market poverty 
rate in the various kinds of households. The two columns furthest to the right, 
column three and four, show the percentage of households and children respectively 
in the various categories that are poor. Column one shows the frequency of the 
various categories as a percentage of all households. Column two does the same for 
children. It shows for example that 11.1% of all Norwegian households had only one 
adult who is also 30 years or younger. 2.7% of all Norwegian children lived in this 
kind of household. These incidence figures are important in part because they show 
that having a young household head and being sole adult in a household is positively 
correlated.26 In other words are households that have young head more likely to 
                                                 
26
 To show this one can calculate what the incidence of young sole-adult 
households would have been if young household head and sole adult head had not 
been correlated. If 15.6% of the one-adult households had a head aged 30 or less (as 
is the case in the total population), while the frequency of one-adult households 
remained at 46.6%, the frequency of young one-adult households would be (15.6% 
multiplied by 46.6%) 7.3%. Because the order in which two numbers are multiplied 
does not matter, this also means that if 46.6% of all young households were one-
adult households and 15.6% of all households head a young head, the frequency of 
young one-adult households would also be 7.3%. In Sweden the equivalent figure 
would be 7.8%. The observed frequencies are much higher. 
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contain only one adult than the average household, and households that have only 
one adult are more likely to have a young had than the average. The row of the table 
also shows that of the Norwegian households that had a young and single head 51.2% 
were market poor. Out of all the children living in this kind of households, 86.5% of 
were market poor. Among households that have only one adult those with a young 
head are, in other words, less likely to be poor than the rest. As is argued previously 
this is probably due to low market income among the elderly. Among the households 
with a young head those with more than one adult are less likely to be poor than 
those with only one.  
Also when it comes to the relative frequency of children in family types 
there is a correlation: Children that live with only one adult are more likely to live 
with a young adult, and children that live with a young adult are more likely than 
others to live with only one adult. While children that live with young adults and 
children who live with only one adult are more likely to be poor than the average 
child in both countries, the children that live with only one adult who also 30 years or 
younger has even higher risk of market poverty. These two factors combined means 
that it is fair to say that living with a young adult is primarily a (poverty) risk factor 
for children that also only live with one adult. Among these children, market poverty 
is the norm, not an exception. No other combination of two factors examined here 
gives a higher risk of market poverty. 
A similar cumulative effect can be observed among children that live with 
two or more other children and also lives with a young household head. However, 
most families with a large number of children naturally have older adults, so because 
very few children fall into this category, no statistics will be provided here. 
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Table 3.15 Market income in one-adult households with three or 
more children 
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households with three or more 
children 
5.1% 32.8% 15.2% 16.3% 
All households with only one adult 46.6% 15.2% 54.7% 58.7% 
Households with only one adult and 
three or more children 
0.2% 2.7% 72.2% 72.5% 
  Sweden 
All households with three or more 
children 
4.3% 31.3% 22.3% 24.2% 
All households with only one adult 51.7% 19.1% 55.0% 51.2% 
Households with only one adult and 
three or more children 
0.7% 5.0% 56.1% 58.2% 
 
Table 3.16 examines another combination of factors that makes households 
and children particularly vulnerable to poverty, namely one-adult households with 
three or more children. Looking first at the incidence ratios it is clear that in neither 
country is this group more common than would be expected based on the frequency 
of all households with only one-adult and the frequency of households with three or 
more children. This observation also holds true when looking at the data for children. 
So, even though those living both with a single adult (or alone) and three or more 
children are substantially more likely to be market poor, this combination of factors 
are not more common than the two factors seen in isolation.  
Table 3.16 Market income in one-adult, immigrant households  
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households with only one 
adult 
46.6% 15.2% 54.7% 58.7% 
All immigrant  households  7.9% 11.8% 36.0% 28.9% 
Immigrant households with 
only one adult  
3.0% 1.5% 57.7% 68.9% 
  Sweden 
All households with only one 
adult 
51.7% 19.1% 55.0% 51.2% 
All immigrant  households  14.1% 20.7% 43.6% 35.6% 
Immigrant households with 
only one adult  
6.2% 3.4% 60.5% 61.1% 
The table above shows the same statistics as the previous one, but with focus 
on households that are both immigrant and have only one adult. In both countries 
this particular group is smaller than expected: i.e. households with only one adult are 
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slightly less likely to be immigrant than the average of all households and conversely: 
immigrants are slightly less likely to live in households with only one adult than the 
rest of the population. The data is mainly shaped by findings established in previous 
sections: immigrants are more likely to be poor than the average, especially in 
Sweden and among children. The impact of having only one adult in the household is 
substantially larger in all cases. In the households that are both immigrant and one-
adult the probability of being poor is slightly higher than the average of all one-adult 
households. The same observation is true, in fact even more so, when the unit of 
analysis is children.  
 
Table 3.17 Market income in immigrant households with 3 or more 
children 
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households with three or more 
children 
5.1% 32.8% 15.2% 16.3% 
All immigrant  households  7.9% 11.8% 36.0% 28.9% 
Immigrant households with three 
or more children  
0.6% 4.2% 30.3% 33.4% 
  Sweden 
All households with three or more 
children 
4.3% 31.3% 22.3% 24.2% 
All immigrant  households  14.1% 20.7% 43.6% 35.6% 
Immigrant households with three 
or more children  
1.0% 7.7% 46.7% 49.7% 
 The final table in this section analyses the situation for those living in 
immigrant households with three or more children. Being immigrant increases the 
probability of having many more than two children living in the household, but not 
dramatically so, especially when looking at children. Nonetheless, this is a group that 
contains a substantial number of children, despite the relatively narrow definition. It 
is also a group that experiences higher risk of poverty than the two groups it is 
constructed of and is compared with here. Some simple fractions from the table 
provide an illustration of why it is fruitful to look at how effects can be 
“compounded”: one fifths of all Swedish children were (market) poor according to 
the methodology applied in this study. Out of those living with three or more 
children in the household this increases to nearly one quarter, and among children 
living in households with some form of immigrant background, over one third are 
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poor. However; children in immigrant households with more than two children has a 
nearly 50% probability of being poor.  
Further to these combinations of two factors it is also possible to study 
combinations of three factors. For example one could study poverty levels of 
immigrants with only one adult and more than two children. Obviously this would 
mean an even smaller group with even higher risk of poverty (child poverty rates of 
89.2% and 85.7% in Norway and Sweden, respectively).   
A more general finding that can be confirmed on the basis of this section is 
that, in categories of households that are more likely to be poor than the average 
household, this effect is usually even stronger for children living in this type of 
household. 
This section has not attempted to explain why these particular combinations 
of factors “compounds” the risk of market poverty to varying degree, the point here is 
to demonstrate that it is possible and meaningful to study the effect of several 
variables simultaneously. It also shows how increased detail can predict or explain 
poverty levels more accurately. This is important both for policymaking and 
normative debates about poverty. For example, it is worth noting that many of the 
categories used here do not change often (if at all, the case in point being the 
immigrant status). That those variables can explain much of the variation in poverty 
is reason for concern because it means that individuals that are in major risk of 
poverty today are likely to be at risk tomorrow as well.  That this effect is stronger 
among children has profound implications for the risk of poverty being passed on 
across generations, and this should be kept in mind by policy-makers who regards 
equal opportunities as an important goal. The next chapter will deal with how the 
outcomes of policy affect this picture. 
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4. Policy 
This chapter will focus on poverty using households’ disposable income. 
This is important because it gives an impression of actual poverty levels, but also 
because when it is contrasted with market income poverty described in the previous 
chapter that describes the impact that governments make on poverty through taxes 
and transfers. The first section of the chapter will look closer at the conceptual 
difference between market and disposable income, and how these are affected by 
taxes and transfers. It is followed by a section on policy differences in the three 
countries. The third section explores methodology and findings in a cross-national 
study looking at factors that determine how effective governments are at reducing 
poverty. The next sections will look at the effects of government intervention on 
poverty from a micro-perspective in the same way as was done in chapter 3.2-3.8. 
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4.1. Market and disposable income, taxes and 
transfers 
Taxes are deducted from households’ market income27 and can thus bring 
households with a market income, which would otherwise be above the poverty line, 
below the poverty line. Furthermore, taxation can deepen the poverty for households 
with a market income that is below the poverty line. Government social spending on 
transfers has the opposite effect: boosting households’ income can bring them out of 
poverty or relieve it. Obviously the design and type of taxes and transfers affect the 
rate at which this happens. 
Two factors that make it reasonable to assume that the net effect of 
government interventions is to reduce poverty (in other words that transfers bring 
more people out of poverty than taxes bring households into poverty). Although 
some benefits are taxed (notably in New Zealand, although only the net amount is 
paid out) taxes affect mainly people with access to a market income, and affect those 
with large market incomes the most. The degree to which taxes affect rich 
households more than poor households depend on how progressive the taxation is, 
as well as the tax base definition i.e. what economic activity is eligible for taxation. 
Norway, for instance, has a wealth tax which is more limited in the two other 
countries. Clearly, the larger share of the economy that the government raises in 
(income) taxes, the larger the gross effect on households’ income will be.  
The other factor that makes the net effect of government interventions 
lower poverty is that transfers for the most part benefit poorer household more than 
rich households. Here, the degree to which a given amount of money spent on 
transfers reduces poverty depends on the degree of universalism of transfers or 
benefits. Transfers that are income tested, or targeted, benefit mostly households 
that are in (or have a high risk of) poverty, while universal benefits are spread out 
relatively evenly on the population. Similarly as with taxes, the larger share of the 
economy that is used on transfers, the bigger the effect on households’ income and 
poverty will be. 
The conclusion is that high taxes increases poverty, but the effect 
decreases if they are progressive. Transfers reduce poverty, especially if they are 
                                                 
27
 While there are many ways that governments can raise money, in this case it is not unreasonable to assume 
that income taxes are a dominant source of income for governments. 
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income tested. Two factors make this picture more complicated. First, while transfers 
affect all eligible households, income taxes and their progressiveness affect mainly 
households with a taxable market income (i.e. households with employed 
individuals, and in the cases where pensions or benefits are taxed).  
Second, so far the argument has assumed that households’ disposable 
income does not affect their market income, which clearly is not the case. Increases 
in the marginal tax rates means that increases in market income has less effect on the 
disposable income. Market income is in part a result of the employment decisions of 
the adults in households, and these are to some extent affected by incentives to 
increase the disposable income. Employment decisions also affect economic activity 
levels, but in terms of relative poverty it is not clear what the effect would be28, since 
economic activity may raise the median income and thus also the poverty line.  
However, the effect of increased levels of employment is first and 
foremost higher market income for the individual household who move into 
employment at an adequate income. How much higher depends on the labour 
market and its institutions, some of which can be influenced by the government, such 
as a legal minimum wage. When individuals make employment decisions they are 
concerned with the effect on their disposable income, of which the market income is 
only one (albeit large) fraction. Obviously, taxes will affect how much of an increase 
in market income is retained in the disposable income. When looking at poverty 
specifically, this marginal tax rate is frequently low, since low income households 
should benefit from many of the available deductions. A highly progressive tax 
system could thus give poor households a low marginal tax rate, even if the overall 
tax rate is relatively high.  
The relation between market and disposable income (and thus the 
incentives in employment decisions) is also affected by government transfers. This 
could be expressed in the effective marginal tax rate (Stephens, 1999:97) which takes 
into account that income tested transfers can reduce the incentives to increase the 
market income through the labour market. Since low income households often face a 
relatively low income tax rate, the reduction in income tested transfers that could 
follow from an increased market income could in some cases be a more important 
factor than taxes for employment decisions in low income households. The effective 
marginal tax rate (as opposed to the marginal tax rate) is the sum of the marginal 
                                                 
28
 While the question is an interesting one, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve deeper into it. 
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income tax rate and the rate at which transfers are reduced when market income is 
marginally increased.  
This means that a government wishing to reduce poverty by 
redistributing income faces a choice beyond how much income it wishes to 
redistribute. It also has to decide how progressive the tax rate should be, and 
whether transfers should be universal or targeted. A targeted benefit system could 
increase the disposable income of poor households for a relatively small expenditure, 
or conversely, could increase the disposable income of poor households more for the 
same expenditure. The downside of this solution is that it would run the risk of 
reducing the incentive of the poor to increase their market income through increased 
levels of employment, through what is also known as the negative income tax. The 
alternative way to ensure adequate level of disposable incomes for everyone is 
through universal transfers, e.g. child benefits. These do not raise the effective 
marginal tax rate, but does of course require far larger expenditures, and will thus, 
ceteris paribus, require a higher tax level to be funded if poverty is to be relieved. As 
has already been established, increased income taxes can reduce labour supply 
incentives through tax avoidance. This affects primarily households with middle or 
higher incomes. The choice between universal and targeted benefits is of course not a 
choice between two absolutes, taxing the benefit and making the cut-off points for 
targeted benefits gradual and generous29 can offer some compromises. A highly 
progressive tax system can also go some way in offering a solution, but since it only 
affects households with a market income the dilemma remains: which group should 
‘pay’ for poverty reduction in the form of higher effective marginal tax rates, the low 
income groups (targeted benefits) or middle to high income groups (universal 
benefits, with higher overall tax level)? Atkinson (1996) introduces the perennial 
issue of economic growth into this discussion, and argues that contrary to the 
orthodoxy of economic theory at the time, there are also reasons to believe that 
offering more or less extensive safety nets can have some positive effects as well, 
pointing towards some of the strengths of what would later be known as the 
flexicurity model (Madsen, 2005).  
Facing this dilemma it is clearly important to know who the market 
income poor are, and whether they face a real choice in the labour market. If the 
                                                 
29
 Generous should here be interpreted as offering some benefits to households that are slightly above the 
poverty line. 
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market income poor are mostly households that for some reason have no way of 
increasing their market income, it does not matter if they face a high effective 
marginal tax rate. Thus, if the goal is to reduce poverty while minimising the effective 
tax rate for those that can affect their market income, the optimal solution is targeted 
benefits to people already working long hours (who still don’t earn enough to avoid 
poverty), caregivers, disabled or sick people and others that cannot be expected 
increase their level of employment. Establishing rules for determining who are in a 
position where it is possible to increase levels of employment does, however, present 
vast normative, conceptual, legal and practical difficulties. Despite looking at many 
different variables, chapter 3 in this thesis does not provide more than a few clues to 
how many of the market income poor that could escape poverty through increased 
employment levels. This suggests that it is hard for governments to know how much 
poverty would be relieved by higher wage and employment levels, and it is limited 
how much governments can affect these in a sustainable manner. 
There are also a wide range of other considerations that have made some 
policymakers introduce benefits without income testing. The political support for 
benefits is presumably higher when they benefit the entire population. Some benefits 
incorporate an element of compulsory insurance on areas where information 
asymmetry makes voluntary and sometimes also commercial insurance impossible 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999). Other benefits redistribute income between age groups, or 
encourage certain type behaviour that the government considers have positive 
externalities. There may also be less social stigma connected to receiving benefits 
based on universal rights. 
Child poverty poses a particular challenge for governments, because while 
children are affected by poverty in their household, they are not making the 
employment decisions for the adults in the household30. The literature surveyed in 
section 2.2 suggests that exposure to poverty as a child has lasting negative 
consequences for individuals affected and the wider society. Even though households 
with adults in child-rearing age (see figure 3.2) are not as likely to have a market 
income below the poverty line as those in retirement age, their income peaks on 
average almost 20 years later (see tables 3.10), suggesting that there is scope for 
redistributing from the age-group that are at their market income peak to those in 
                                                 
30
 Children can of course make employment decision for themselves, but it seems unlikely that the income of 
underage children is a sufficient solution to poverty that does not harm education attainment and thus lifetime 
income opportunities. 
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child-rearing age. The aging population (driven by fertility below the replacement 
rate and increases in life expectancy), means that the dependency ratio is dropping. 
This suggests that there are long term positive externalities associated with making 
child-rearing more attractive. These factors are all reasons why governments to 
varying degrees use universal tools such as child benefits to redistribute to 
households with children.  
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4.2. Tax and transfer policies in New Zealand and 
Scandinavia 
OECD provides extensive data on tax and spending data in the three 
countries. Since the focus in this thesis is on relative poverty, it is natural to focus on 
the spending and taxes as a share of the countries’ total GDP, rather than absolute 
figures per capita. As is shown in figure 4.1, in year 2000 New Zealand had the 
lowest tax revenue at 33.6 per cent of GDP, Norway was in the middle at 43.0 per 
cent, well below Sweden which had the highest largest tax revenue in OECD at 53.4 
per cent of GDP. Year 2000 was also the year when Sweden’s tax revenue as a share 
of the GDP peaked.  
Figure 4.1 Total tax revenue, 1955-2005 
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Figure 4.2Public sector social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD Stats: Social Expenditure – Aggregated data 
fromhttp://stats.oecd.org/wbos/(2008, 30/4) 
 Figure 4.2 shows that the government expenditure on the social sector as 
a share of GDP was relatively similar across the three countries. The differences 
between New Zealand and Norway are relatively small, but the relative proportion of 
the spending is in the order that e.g. Esping–Andersen (1999, 1990) would 
presumably predict based on perceptions of welfare regime (New Zealand as “liberal” 
with smaller spending proportion than the “socialdemocratic” Scandinavian 
countries), with the exception that Norway spent less than New Zealand on cash 
benefits. Two possible explanations of the difference between Norway and Sweden 
could be role of the high-productivity petroleum industry in the Norwegian private 
sector and the age composition where Norway has a slightly larger share of the 
population in working age. 
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4.3. Cross-national explanations of poverty 
reduction 
Moller et al. (2003) find that, out of the variables listed in section 3.1, 
unemployment rates, politically left cabinet, lack of constitutional veto points and 
welfare generosity, were the predictors of high reduction of whole-population 
poverty rates from taxes and transfers. In their model they achieved a R² of .91.31 
Garfinkel, Rainwater, & Smeeding (2006:898) argue that a limitation of this and 
other research that attributes differences in inequality between countries to “history, 
culture and political choices rather than to income and demography [… and] contrast 
the strength of the Scandinavian labo[u]r movements and their social democratic 
parties that are committed to reducing class and gender inequalities to the strength 
of the 19th-century liberal belief in limited government in the English speaking 
countries” is that it does not take into account in-kind transfers and indirect taxes.  
This criticism merits some further comments. It is obvious that 
comparative studies of government welfare policy and inequality should take into 
account welfare spending beyond transfers. However, it is not entirely accurate that 
the literature Garfinkel et al (2006) criticise does not take public spending on in-kind 
benefits into account. The most obvious counterexample is the work of Esping-
Andersen (1999, 1990) who extensively studies public spending on government 
production of goods and services as well as income redistribution, although he 
focuses mostly on the impact on the labour market, rather than as a measure of 
inequality. Secondly, while it is obvious that in-kind benefits should not be 
overlooked when considering governments’ redistributive efforts, there are many 
problems associated with including this spending in income statistics for individuals, 
which the authors acknowledge. Their model builds on the assumption that 
government expenditure on in kind provision of goods and/or services reflect their 
value to the recipients. There are obvious problems with comparing the efficiency of 
the process where expenditure is transformed into services across countries. In some 
cases the model also assumes that the public goods are distributed equally. Another 
potential problem is that using the same equivalence scale for in-kind provisions of 
goods and services and cash benefits assumes that there are economies of scale in in-
                                                 
31This means, somewhat simplistically put, that the model could account for 91% of the variation in 
the dataset. 
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kind benefits, which may not be an accurate representation of reality, and is 
potentially problematic because goods and services may not be redistributed within 
the household as readily as cash. 
That counting in-kind benefits’ cash value and including these in income 
statistics lowers inequality between households in any given country is not 
surprising. This is because by assuming that in-kind benefits are distributed equally 
(i.e. the same amount to every individual, without regard for contributions paid in 
tax), while taxes are usually related to income, it follows logically that this will have a 
progressive effect. What makes Garfinkel et al’s (2006) findings interesting, though, 
is that it changes the ranking between countries. Using their measure of inequality 
the ‘three worlds of welfare’ (inter alia Esping-Andersen, 1990) evaporates. This is 
partly because some of the countries whose welfare regime conventionally is counted 
as ‘liberal’, (notably the US) use food stamps and other similar voucher systems.  
Ultimately, this question boils down to what form of inequality one 
wishes to measure. Partly because of the conceptual and methodological challenges 
outlined above, most research that attempts to measure post-transfer 
inequality/poverty measures cash and near-cash income, ignoring spending on items 
such as health and education. The degree to which it is useful to include in-kind 
benefits in comparative studies depends, among other factors, on the variation in 
private funding of these products across the countries, because this reflects the 
(potentially unequal) level of expenditure on these items. Including in-kind benefits 
has the potential of opening the proverbial can of worms, in the sense that when in-
kind benefits provided by the state one needs to justify why one does not include 
other non-cash factors such as employer provided “perks”, infrastructure, 
environment, security, etc. in the measure of equality. This conceptual quagmire is 
avoided when measuring cash income exclusively. Cash differs from other goods in 
that it can be used to acquire many goods, rather than being an inherent good itself.  
It is not clear why indirect taxes (typically Value Added Tax, (VAT) or 
Goods and Services Tax, GST) should affect poverty rates if poverty is defined in 
relative terms and the taxes are charged at a fixed rate, and savings are unaccounted 
for. Incorporating the savings rate is not particularly meaningful if wealth and 
longitudinal effects are unaccounted for32, which means that expenditure are 
                                                 
32 Garfinkel et al. (2006) sites evidence that consumption exceeds income among the poor, however 
this obviously cannot be sustained over very long time, and the individuals that are exposed to poverty 
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assumed to be equal to income, and the tax thus affect all income at the same 
proportion. Thus, while it is true that indirect taxes are regressive (Garfinkel, et al., 
2006:902), they should lower the income and the poverty threshold by an equal 
proportion, and the poverty rate should be unchanged. While GST lowers disposable 
income, revenue neutral tax reforms would need to replace GST with personal 
income taxes, and the net incidence change for the poor would be small. In this 
author’s view, correcting for VAT or GST when measuring how much a given income 
can buy is not necessary when using a relative definition of poverty in Scandinavia 
and New Zealand. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
for long periods of time are those that are of particular interest. It is also possible that their findings 
contain a bias from self-employed who understate their income, without having the traditional 
challenges of other income poor. 
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4.4. The effect of government intervention on 
poverty in New Zealand and Scandinavia 
 
Table 4.1 below shows the proportion of children and households that 
falls below the 60 per cent of median income poverty line. The first two columns 
show the poverty rate by market income (as described in chapter three) and 
disposable income. Disposable income is the income that households have available 
to spend, and is thus the real observed poverty. In the household rows the number of 
poor and non-poor households is counted to calculate the household poverty rate 
(which in other words does not describe the proportion of poor people, but the 
proportion of poor households), while in the child rows the poor and non-poor 
children are counted to calculate the child poverty rate. The same measure of poverty 
and thus the same poverty line is used for market and disposable income, as well as 
for calculating the poverty gap. 
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Table 4.1 Child and household poverty rates by market and disposable 
income in New Zealand and Scandinavia  
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New 
Zealand 
households 
32.7% 18.0% 45.0% 
 
* * 74.0% 15.6% 
New 
Zealand 
children 
29.9% 24.3% 18.7% * * 63.0% 18.6% 
Norwegian 
households 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 18.5% 1.0% 24.8% 5.0% 
Norwegian 
children 
16.4% 6.6% 59.8% 10.5% 0.6% 9.0% 1.7% 
Swedish 
households 
39.8% 13.0% 67.3% 27.5% 0.6% 29.0% 4.2% 
Swedish 
children 
20.0% 5.6% 72.0% 14.6% 0.2% 13.0% 1.5% 
(Sources: LIS 2000, New Zealand HES 2000/2001;*= No data) 
The difference between market income poverty and disposable income 
poverty is described in the third column; it describes the proportion of the 
households or children with a market income below the poverty line that the net 
effect of taxes and transfers brings above the poverty line. This means that 45 per 
cent of the New Zealand households that have a market income below the poverty 
line are brought above it by transfers, but only 18.7% of children. 
The fifth column shows the proportion of the total (number of households 
or children) that has a market income above the poverty line but a disposable income 
below this line. In other words the households that pays more in tax than they 
receive in benefits, and where this gap is large enough to bring them below the 
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poverty line. Clearly, this effect hits a very small part of the population where data 
are available. Data are not available for New Zealand, which is particularly 
unfortunate since New Zealand also eradicates a very small proportion of the total 
child poverty compared to the two other countries, and this may or may not be a 
result of the tax effect. The fourth column shows the gross effect of government 
interventions, in other words the proportion of households or children that transfers 
bring out of poverty, not subtracting those that taxes bring into poverty (column five, 
which is the difference between this column and column three). 
Columns six and seven give the data on poverty depth in the measure as 
used in chapter 3, namely the average gap between observed income and the poverty 
line in the households that fall below it. Column six uses the market income data as 
described in chapter three, while column seven describes the actual poverty depth in 
disposable income.  
It was only in New Zealand that child poverty rates were higher than 
poverty rates weighted by households. The findings in the column showing 
disposable income poverty gap mirrors the findings for the poverty rate: in New 
Zealand children were worse off than households without children, and the reverse 
was the case in Scandinavia. This shows that not only were children in New Zealand 
more likely to be poor, those that were poor were also poorer, relative to households 
without children. When discussing the poverty depth it is also worth noting that the 
market income gap was larger among households with children than those without. 
As noted this is reversed by the effect of taxes and transfers.  
The data on poverty reduction confirm a trend clearly shown in a cross-
country analysis done by Whiteford and Adema (2007), namely that in countries 
with high levels of poverty reduction through redistribution, more of the reduction 
will benefit children. This fits for Norway (at least when looking at poverty depth) 
and Sweden, in that they remove much of the overall (i.e. household) market income 
poverty through government intervention, and that this effort benefits children even 
more than adults. New Zealand is a case of the opposite; less than half of the 
households in market income poverty are brought above the poverty line by 
redistribution, and government intervention appears to make only a limited impact 
on child poverty. That said, this only holds for poverty rates or the frequency of 
poverty, less so for poverty depth; income redistribution in New Zealand reduces the 
poverty gap substantially, whereas in Norway and Sweden the impact is more 
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modest, primarily because the market income gap was many times larger in New 
Zealand than in Scandinavia. As pointed out in section 3.3 this is partially because of 
different definitions of old age pensions. 
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4.5. Income redistribution and ethnicity  
As discussed in section 3.2, ethnicity’s (and to some extent, immigration) 
effect on poverty is particularly interesting because usually it is not the result of 
conscious decisions and usually does not change. Regression analysis of Norwegian 
data showed that immigrant households per se were no worse off than the total 
population, but when considering the demographic composition of the immigrant 
population, immigrant households, and immigrant children in particular, were more 
likely to be poor and poorer than comparable groups without immigrant background. 
This result means that since the New Zealand data did not allow multivariate 
analysis, the New Zealand findings are not conclusive. The discrepancy between the 
ethnic groups were so large (again, especially for child poverty) that it still provided 
strong evidence suggesting that ethnicity is an important factor in predicting market 
income poverty.  
That chapter 3 found that ethnicity and immigrant background is a factor 
that is correlated with market income poverty, presents arguments in favour of 
considering ethnicity as a factor when designing policies aimed at reducing poverty. 
This could be done (and is done) both through policies aimed at ethnic groups 
directly, and through policies directed at households at risk at poverty regardless of 
ethnicity, but that will benefit certain ethnic groups more than others because of 
their composition. 
This section will look at data on the effect of government intervention on 
poverty in various ethnic groups in the three countries. This will show to what extent 
income redistribution reduces poverty differences between ethnic groups, and as far 
as data allow, it will show to what extent certain ethnic groups benefits more from 
government intervention than others. As shown in chapter 3, this must in part be 
seen in the context of demographic composition, and part of the analysis will 
therefore be in later sections.  
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Table 4.2 A New Zealand child and household poverty by ethnicity  
Ethnicity by 
household 
head 
Proportion 
of total 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
European 
household 
80.1% 
 
31.0% 16.0% 48.4% 
 
74.6% 14% 
Māori 
Household 
11.2% 
 
44.1% 27.4% 37.9% 
 
70.9% 18% 
Pacific 
households 
3.5% 
 
45.4% 31.3% 31.1% 76.3% 20% 
Other, HH 5.2% 
 
27.1% 20.05% 26.0% 73.6% 28% 
Total, HH 1,374,000 32.7% 18.0% 45.0% 74.0% 15.6% 
European 
children 
68.3% 
 
22.8% 20.9% 8.3% * * 
Māori 
Children 
16.6% 
 
47.2% 33.2% 29.7% * * 
Pacific 
children 
7.6% 
 
51.7% 34.2% 33.8% * * 
Other, 
children 
7.4% 
 
34.4% 25.3% 26.5% * * 
Total, 
children 
886,000 29.9% 24.3% 18.7% 63.0% 18.6% 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001; *= No data) 
 
The New Zealand data use, as in chapter 3, household head’s ethnic 
affiliation. Table 4.2A has two rows for every group of ethnicities recognised in the 
HES dataset, one weighted by households and one by children, as well as two total 
rows, with data equal to table 4.1. The first column shows the relative frequency of 
households and children (in households) of household head’s ethnic affiliation, while 
the other columns have the same content as their equivalents in table 4.1. Also see 
table 3.13A for information on household size and number of children and adults per 
households in various ethnicities. 
The data on households show that income redistribution in the ethnic 
groups with the highest market poverty rates, Māori and Pacific Islanders, brings a 
smaller proportion out of poverty than the average, even though the higher poverty 
rate means that a larger proportion of households are brought out of poverty. The 
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income redistribution effect on the two groups with lower market poverty rates than 
average; ‘European’ and ‘others’ is in stark contrast, showing completely opposite 
outcomes. While the poverty reduction in European households is higher than the 
average on all accounts, the effectiveness of government poverty reduction through 
tax and transfers is only about half of the average in the ‘other’ group. This is 
presumably partly a function of pensions: more Europeans are elderly and thus 
receives superannuation. The data on child poverty show a more consistent pattern; 
that the higher the poverty rate, the larger the reduction through government 
intervention. In sum this means that European households with children tend to be 
in work.  
However, the interpretation of these findings, especially the data on 
households, requires caution because, as the Norwegian data in chapter 3 
demonstrated, the population in different ethnic groups may not be comparable. A 
possible explanation for the low rate of poverty reduction in ‘other’ households could 
be that these tend to be younger households that are still within working age, 
whereas the market poor in the other ethnic categories to a larger extent are retired 
old-age pensioners without market income, who therefore benefit from the age 
pension. The different picture of child poverty would be consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
Table 4.2 B Norwegian child and household poverty by ethnicity  
 Proportion 
of total 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
Immigrant 
households 
9.6% 
 
36.0% 
 
25.6% 
 
28.9% 25.8% 9.8% 
Total 
households 
2,093,515 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 24.8% 5.0% 
Immigrant 
children 
11.8% 
 
28.9% 
 
15.5% 
 
46.4% 18.3% 4.3% 
Total 
children 
1,051,715 
 
16.4% 6.6% 59.8% 9.0% 1.7% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
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Table 4.2 C Swedish child and household poverty by ethnicity  
 Proportion 
of total 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
Immigrant 
households 
14.1% 
 
43.6% 
 
16.2% 
 
62.8% 29.0% 5.2% 
Total 
households 
4,327,000 39.8% 13.0% 67.3% 29.0% 4.2% 
Immigrant 
children 
20.7% 
 
35.6% 
 
10.8% 
 
69.7% 25.1% 2.4% 
Total 
children 
1,951,000 20.0% 5.6% 72.0% 13.0% 1.5% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
As in table 3.3 immigrant status is defined as households where the head 
or spouse is first generation immigrant without Swedish background, otherwise the 
content of the columns are identical to those explained in detail for New Zealand 
(table 4.2A).  
Immigrant households in Sweden are consistently worse off than the 
total, but the difference is by no means vast, all the figures are in roughly the same 
magnitude, which could not be said of the New Zealand data – even when 
considering that the Swedish data is less refined in only using two categories where 
New Zealand has four groups. The difference is more noticeable when looking at 
child poverty. The fifth of children in Sweden with a parent with immigrant 
background are almost twice as likely to live in poverty, and those that do would need 
over 50 per cent more income increase to reach the poverty line compared to the 
average. Most of the differences are created by the market, but government 
intervention is still slightly less effective in alleviating poverty among immigrant 
household and children than among those without immigrant background.  
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4.6. Government intervention and family structure 
Section 3.3 demonstrated that household composition is an important 
predictor of market income poverty. Important parts of governments’ redistributive 
efforts aim to reduce the risk of poverty for certain types of households. This section 
will look at how taxes and transfers affect the disposable income of various family 
types. Some of these policies affect not only poverty levels, but at times also affect 
family composition and related decisions in ways that are sometimes intended and at 
other times not. Section 4.1 suggests, for example, that fertility rates much below the 
replacement rate can be a negative externality. None of the three countries have 
particularly low fertility rates compared to the rest of the OECD, and this may in part 
be a result of government policies and thus an intended outcome. Former Norwegian 
Minister for children and equality, Karita Bekkemellem (2006), did for example 
warn against falling birth rates as a negative consequence of the Progress Party’s 
suggested changes to family benefit policy. This shows that existing family and child 
benefits aims not only to alleviate poverty, but also to influence decisions as ‘private’ 
as birth rates. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore how policies affect the 
formation and aggregate composition of families. The composition of families will 
therefore be taken as given, and the focus will be on how family composition 
influences the government’s redistribution and its’ consequences for disposable 
income. 
As in section 3.3, the first variable that will be discussed is the number of 
children.  
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Table 4.3 A New Zealand household poverty by number of children 
 Proportion of 
households 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income 
poverty gap 
No 
children 
66.1% 35.3% 16.1% 54.4% 78.4% 14.0% 
One child 13.2% 27.4% 17.5% 36.3% 61.6% 18.0% 
Two 
children 
13.5% 24.9% 22.4% 10.0% 66.7% 18.0% 
Three 
children 
5.2% 26.2% 22.5% 14.0% 54.6% 19.0% 
Four 
children 
1.4% 45.1% 39.6% 12.2% 65.3% 19.0% 
Five or 
more 
children 
0.6% 75.8% 52.2% 31.2% 75.5% 23.0% 
Total or 
average 
1,374,152 
 
32.7% 
 
18.0% 45.0% 74.1% 
 
15.6% 
 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001) 
Table 4.3 B Norwegian household poverty by number of children 
 Proportion 
of total 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
No 
children 
72.0% 43.6% 23.2% 46.8% 30.6% 6.3% 
One child 12.1% 19.9% 7.8% 60.8% 12.1% 1.9% 
Two 
children 
10.8% 14.7% 6.4% 56.5% 8.1% 1.7% 
Three 
children 
4.3% 12.6% 5.6% 55.6% 6.1% 1.4% 
Four 
children 
0.6% 25.5% 8.8% 65.5% 10.8% 1.0% 
Five or 
more 
children 
0.2% 35.4% 4.4% 87.6% 19.7% 2.0% 
Total or 
average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 24.8% 5.0% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
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Table 4.3C Swedish household poverty by number of children  
 Proportion 
of total 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
No 
children 
75.1% 46.7% 15.4% 67.0% 34.5% 5.1% 
One child 10.3% 20.0% 6.6% 67.0% 13.4% 2.0% 
Two 
children 
10.3% 17.0% 5.1% 70.0% 10.4% 1.6% 
Three 
children 
3.3% 18.0% 5.1% 71.7% 11.1% 1.2% 
Four 
children 
0.7% 28.4% 5.6% 80.3% 20.4% 0.7% 
Five or 
more 
children 
0.2% 66.4% 10.8% 83.7% 51.0% 2.5% 
Total or 
average 
4,327,273 
 
39.8% 
 
13.0% 
 
67.3% 29.0% 
 
4.2% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
Columns number one, two and five in tables 4.3 contain mostly the same 
information as tables 3.4, except that in tables 4.3 the market income poverty rate is 
weighted by household rather than children, in order to make the measure of poverty 
reduction comparable. As in tables 4.2 the net poverty reduction refers to the 
proportion of households that are market income poor that have a disposable income 
above the poverty line. Taxes have a marginal impact on poverty in all groups in 
Scandinavia where data are available, especially the households with children, and 
the gross effect of taxes and transfers are thus not included in a separate column. 
As discussed in section 3.3, the households without children are 
somewhat hard to compare in Scandinavia and New Zealand because a so large 
proportion of the poor are pensioners, and differences in the pension systems thus 
play a large role. Superannuation is counted as a benefit, while occupational 
pensions count as market income in all three countries. It seems like the New 
Zealand superannuation is less efficient in bringing elderly people out of poverty, but 
this need not be a fault of the superannuation scheme itself, it could just as well be a 
result of less efficient occupational pensions. The lower poverty rate and smaller 
poverty gap, and larger poverty reduction in Scandinavian households with no 
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children should be seen in this context. Another problem with the New Zealand 
household data for the elderly is that the pension in many cases are just above the 
poverty line, which means that small changes in the pension or poverty line leads to 
large changes in poverty incidence in this group. Since the focus in this thesis is on 
child poverty, it falls beyond the scope to explore this question deeper. Focusing on 
the households with children it becomes clear that in New Zealand and Norway both 
the market income poverty rate and the poverty reduction rate has a U-shape when it 
comes to the number of children. In New Zealand households with 2 children has the 
lowest poverty rate, 3 in Norway. Transfers seem to be far more directed to one-child 
households in New Zealand however, so poverty rates are consistently rising with the 
number of children. Poverty reduction rates are both higher and more evenly 
distributed in both the Scandinavian countries. In Sweden the rate of poverty 
reduction is steadily increasing with the number of children, but disposable income 
poverty rates and poverty depth in the very large families (five or more children) are 
still almost twice of those in the smaller households. This does of course affect only a 
very small number of households.  
As shown in section 3.3, the number of adults in a household is in some 
ways more important than the number of children. 
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Table 4.4 A New Zealand household poverty by family type 
 Proportion 
of 
households 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
1 adult 23.4% 54.3% 26.8% 50.6% 83.7% 12% 
1 adult,  
1 or more 
child 
5.1% 78.4% 64.7% 17.5% 74.1% 17% 
2 adults 30.3% 30.7% 12.4% 59.6% 73.8% 14% 
2 adults,  
1 child 
6.2% 19.1% 11.1% 41.9% 57.0% 21% 
2 adults,  
2 children 
9.6% 16.5% 16.1% 2.4% 57.3% 20% 
2 adults,  
3 or more 
children 
5.0% 21.4% 19.3% 9.8% 43.0% 18% 
3 or more 
adults 
12.5% 11.1% 5.2% 53.2% 60.5% 26% 
3 or more 
adults, 
1 or more 
children 
8.1% 19.8% 11.1% 43.9% 60.4% 18% 
Total or 
average 
1,374,152 
 
32.7% 
 
18.0% 45.0% 74.1% 
 
15.6% 
 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001) 
 92 
Table 4.4 B Norwegian household poverty by family type 
 Proportion 
of total 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Disposable 
income 
poverty rate 
Net poverty 
reduction 
Market 
income 
poverty 
gap 
Disposable 
income, 
poverty gap 
1 adult 41.3% 54.5% 36.3% 33.4% 40.2% 10.0% 
1 adult 1 
or more 
child 
5.3% 55.9% 21.4% 61.7% 35.9% 5.5% 
2 adults 25.1% 33.5% 6.6% 80.3% 20.7% 1.4% 
2 adults 1 
child 
6.4% 7.6% 3.5% 53.9% 3.4% 0.7% 
2 adults 2 
children 
8.4% 7.2% 3.7% 48.6% 3.4% 0.8% 
2 adults 3 
Or more 
children 
4.4% 10.8% 4.7% 56.5% 4.6% 1.3% 
3 or more 
adults 
5.6% 8.5% 1.1% 87.1% 4.5% 1.1% 
3 or more 
adults 
1 or more 
children 
3.5% 6.4% 1.6% 75.0% 2.6% 0.7% 
Total or 
average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 24.8% 5.0% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
Tables 4.4 show that in all three countries, out of the households with 
children, the disposable income poverty rate was substantially higher among those 
with only one adult. The highest poverty reduction rate was found in large families 
(i.e. those with two adults and three or more children, and three adults with 
children) in Sweden, where more than three out of four poor households are brought 
above the poverty line by transfers. It is worth noting that occupants of many small 
households may have been pensioners, and looking ahead to tables 4.7 it is found 
that the Scandinavian countries had a higher poverty reduction rate among elderly. 
The highest market income poverty rate in household types with children is found 
among the single adult households in New Zealand where nearly four out of five 
households are poor, presumably because of low labour participation among sole 
parents. Nonetheless, the poverty reduction here is far from being the most effective. 
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Table 4.4 C Swedish household poverty by family type 
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1 adult 46.4% 55.6% 22.7% 59.2% 42.9% 7.5% 
1 adult 1 or 
more child 
5.3% 49.3% 14.4% 70.8% 34.1% 3.5% 
2 adults 25.0% 35.8% 3.9% 89.1% 23.4% 1.4% 
2 adults 1 
child 
5.8% 10.9% 3.7% 66.1% 6.1% 1.3% 
2 adults 2 
children 
7.9% 10.3% 3.7% 64.1% 6.2% 1.4% 
2 adults 3 
Or more 
children 
3.4% 15.7% 3.7% 76.4% 9.7% 0.9% 
3 or more 
adults 
3.7% 7.9% 1.7% 78.5% 4.4% 0.8% 
3 or more 
adults 
1 or more 
children 
2.6% 7.7% 1.8% 76.6% 4.7% 0.6% 
Total or 
average 
4,327,273 39.8% 13.0% 67.3% 29.0% 4.2% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
In Norway and Sweden, where the single adult household with children 
are also vulnerable to market income poverty relative to other household types with 
children, the poverty reduction from transfers is more extensive than in households 
with two adults (which also have very low market income poverty rates), but lower 
than in households with three adults. This is also the case in New Zealand except that 
the households with two adults and only one child also have a remarkably high 
poverty reduction rate. 
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Table 4.5 A New Zealand child poverty by family type 
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1 adult, 1 or more child 14.2% 83.6% 71.6% 14.4% 
2 adults, 1 child 9.6% 19.1% 11.1% 41.9% 
2 adults, 2 children 29.6% 16.5% 16.1% 2.1% 
2 adults, 3 or more children 25.3% 23.3% 20.7% 10.8% 
3 or more adults,1 or more children 21.4% 25.7% 14.4% 43.9% 
Total or average 886,000 29.9% 24.3% 18.7% 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001) 
Tables 4.5 give the same figures as tables 4.4, but with data weighted by 
the number of children. The Norwegian and Swedish data on poverty depth are 
weighted by number of children in the household in tables 4.5. Table 4.5A does not 
contain measures of poverty depth, because the New Zealand dataset lacks a measure 
for these variables weighted by children. 
Table 4.5 B Norwegian child poverty by family type 
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1 adult, 1 or more child 15.2% 
 
58.7% 
 
22.2% 
 
62.2% 
 
37.1% 
 
5.7% 
 
2 adults, 1 child 12.8% 7.6% 3.5% 53.9% 
 
3.4% .7% 
2 adults, 2 children 33.5% 7.2% 3.7% 48.6% 3.4% .9% 
2 adults, 3 or more children 28.2% 12.1% 4.9% 59.5% 5.2% 1.3% 
3 or more adults, 
1 or more children 
10.4% 
 
7.3% 
 
1.7% 
 
76.7% 3.1% 
 
.6% 
 
Total or average 1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
6.6% 
 
59.8% 
 
9.0% 
 
1.7% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
Sweden had the highest proportion of children living with one adult, New 
Zealand had the lowest, and Sweden also had the highest poverty reduction rate in 
this group of children, New Zealand had the lowest. The disposable income child 
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poverty rate of 71.6 per cent was the only group in the family type tables that was 
above 50 per cent. While the market income poverty rate was also high in this group, 
the poverty reduction rate was lower than the average in New Zealand, and this rate 
was less than a third than the Norwegian equivalent. 
Table 4.5 C Swedish child poverty by family type 
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1 adult, 1 or more child 19.1% 51.2% 14.3% 
 
72.1% 35.6% 
 
3.1% 
 
2 adults, 1 child 12.9% 10.9% 3.7% 66.1% 6.1% 1.3% 
2 adults, 2 children 35.1% 10.3% 3.7% 64.1% 6.2% 1.4% 
2 adults, 3 
Or more children 
24.5% 17.7% 3.8% 78.5% 11.1% 0.9% 
3 or more adults, 
1 or more children 
8.5% 9.6% 1.9% 
 
80.2% 5.7% 
 
0.6% 
 
Total or average 1,951,000 20.0% 5.6% 72.0% 13.0% 1.5% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
Table 4.6 A New Zealand poverty rates by household head age 
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15-24 5.5% 34.5% 28.2% 18.3% 4.0% 55.1% 45.8% 16.9% 
25-29 7.5% 26.9% 21.1% 21.6% 10.5% 48.7% 35.6% 26.9% 
30-39 21.8% 18.3% 16.0% 12.6% 45.7% 28.2% 25.5% 9.6% 
40-49 20.8% 16.2% 13.2% 18.5% 30.6% 22.5% 17.7% 21.3% 
50-59 18.4% 20.0% 15.4% 23.0% 8.2% 25.8% 20.5% 20.5% 
60-64 5.9% 39.5% 18.2% 53.9% .2% 70.8% * - 
65+ 20.1% 77.0% 23.6% 69.4% .8% 72.0% * - 
Total or 
average 
1,374,000 
 
32.7% 
 
18.0% 45.0% 886,000 
 
29.9% 24.3% 18.7% 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001; *= insufficient data) 
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Table 4.6 B Norwegian poverty rates by household head age 
House-
hold 
(HH) 
head age 
Share of 
total 
HH’s 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Net 
poverty 
red-
uction 
Share of 
total 
children 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
(Child) 
15-24 6.6% 60.1% 57.6% 4.2% 1.6% 61.9% 18.3% 70.4% 
25-29 9.0% 26.6% 20.3% 23.7% 7.8% 31.0% 13.1% 57.7% 
30-39 19.5% 18.0% 9.6% 46.7% 45.0% 19.3% 7.7% 60.1% 
40-49 18.3% 13.4% 6.5% 51.5% 37.9% 9.0% 4.1% 54.4% 
50-59 16.6% 16.1% 6.8% 57.8% 7.1% 11.6% 3.8% 67.2% 
60-64 5.3% 31.3% 13.6% 56.5% 0.4% 11.9% 7.9% 33.6% 
65+ 24.7% 78.9% 32.7% 58.6% 0.2% 40.0% * - 
Total or 
average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
6.6% 
 
59.8% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000;*= insufficient data) 
Tables 4.6 show that the poverty reduction in Scandinavian households 
gradually increases along with increases in age, while in New Zealand the poverty 
reduction is relatively stable until the household head reaches the age of 60. The high 
market poverty rate among young people, particularly in Scandinavia, probably 
reflects that this age group contain many students. That students are poor is less 
concerning than it would be for most other groups, as they can be expected to 
increase their income when they enter the labour market, and the poverty situation is 
highly likely to be only temporary. The situation in New Zealand is rather distinct 
with its’ lower market poverty for young household heads, which is particularly 
important because the population also is younger on average. New Zealand has a 
larger group of children living with younger parents and this group has higher 
market poverty rates. These two observations would both support a hypothesis 
suggesting that they finish studies younger or study less. Poverty reduction weighted 
by children is higher in Scandinavia and the group of children living with a 
household head aged below 30 is under 10 per cent. With those caveats it still seems 
that government efforts to reduce poverty in this group are more successful in 
Norway than in Sweden. In New Zealand there is no clear pattern. 
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Table 4.6 C Swedish poverty rates by household head age 
House-
hold 
(HH) 
head age 
Share of 
total 
HH’s 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Net 
poverty 
red-
uction 
Share of 
total 
children 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
(Child) 
15-24 6.9% 55.2% 53.3% 3.4% 1.2% 59.3% 44.0% 25.8% 
25-29 8.3% 27.0% 20.4% 24.4% 6.2% 36.6% 12.9% 64.8% 
30-39 18.1% 22.5% 7.9% 64.9% 44.2% 23.0% 6.0% 73.9% 
40-49 17.5% 18.4% 5.8% 68.5% 38.9% 14.0% 3.4% 75.7% 
50-59 18.2% 17.6% 4.2% 76.1% 8.9% 12.8% 2.2% 82.8% 
60-64 6.2% 32.3% 5.1% 84.2% 0.4% 31.6% 11.5% 63.6% 
65+ 24.8% 85.8% 16.6% 80.7% 0.2% 41.2% 10.3% 75.0% 
Total or 
average 
4,327,273 
 
39.8% 
 
13.0% 
 
67.3% 1,951,000 20.0% 5.6% 
 
72.0% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
 
Table 4.7 A New Zealand poverty rates by people over 60 
Number 
of people 
over 60 
years old 
in HH 
Share of 
total 
HH’s 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Net 
poverty 
red-
uction 
Share of 
total 
children 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
(Child) 
0 70.3% 19.6% 17.0% 13.3% 95.6% 29.1% 25.2% 13.4% 
1 18.7% 65.0% 23.3% 64.2% 2.1% 51.7% 8.2% 84.1% 
2 or more 11.0% 61.7% 15.5% 74.9% 2.2% 46.8% * * 
1 or more 
29.7% 63.8% 
 
20.4% 68.0% 4.4% 49.2% 
 
3.9% 
 
92.1% 
Total or 
average 
1,374,000 
 
32.7% 
 
18.0% 45.0% 886,000 
 
29.9% 24.3% 18.7% 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001; *= insufficient data) 
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Table 4.7 B Norwegian poverty rates by people over 64 
Number 
of people 
over 60 
years old 
in HH 
Share of 
total 
HH’s 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(HH) 
Net 
poverty 
red-
uction 
Share of 
total 
child-ren 
Market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Dispos-
able 
income 
poverty 
rate 
(Child) 
Net 
poverty 
reduction 
(Child) 
0 74.7% 22.0% 14.1% 35.9% 99.5% 16.4% 6.6% 59.8% 
1 17.9% 78.3% 41.6% 46.9% 0.4% 49.4% 13.2% 73.3% 
2 or 
more 
7.3% 77.0% 8.8% 88.6% 0.1% * * * 
1 or more 25.3% 77.9% 32.1% 58.8% 0.5% 36.2% 9.7% 73.2% 
Total or 
average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
6.6% 
 
59.8% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000; *= insufficient data) 
 The household data in tables 4.7 are a particularly useful addition to the 
rest of the household poverty reduction data. Note that, as in section 3.3, the age 
threshold used is 60 in New Zealand and 64 in Norway and Sweden. It clearly shows 
that Sweden has a very high market poverty rate among the elderly, and that almost 
all of this is removed by government transfers, resulting in Sweden having the lowest 
disposable income poverty. Also among the households without anyone over 64 the 
poverty reduction is more extensive in Sweden than the two other countries. For 
every row in these tables the market income poverty rate is higher in Norway than in 
New Zealand, but lower than in Sweden. The New Zealand government’s poverty 
reduction benefits the elderly more than in Norway where poverty reduction is more 
effective among households without anyone over 64. This finding is consistent with 
the finding that child poverty reduction is more successful in Scandinavia. The 
findings should be seen in light of the caveat from section 3.3 regarding classification 
of pensions as market and disposable income. 
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Table 4.7 C Swedish poverty rates by people over 64 
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0 73.7% 24.6% 12.0% 51.2% 99.6% 19.9% 5.6% 71.9% 
1 18.7% 82.7% 20.9% 74.7% 0.4% 35.3% 4.9% 86.1% 
2 or more 7.7% 81.7% 2.9% 96.5% 0.0% * 0.0% - 
1 or more 26.3% 82.4% 15.7% 80.9% 0.4% 36.4% 4.8% 86.8% 
Total or average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
6.6% 
 
59.8% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
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4.7. Government intervention and education 
attainment 
As shown in section 3.5 there is an extensive literature discussing how 
education affects market income. How government policies to relieve poverty affect 
people with different levels of education attainment is a much less researched 
question. Evaluations of broad labour market policy may consider how returns to 
education and inequality as such are affected, but policies to relieve poverty are 
seldom considered in the light of education attainment. This is in part because 
education-driven differences in disposable poverty can primarily be traced back to 
higher market income among the higher educated. It is also worth noting that 
education is seen as a long-term solution of poverty rather than a short term way of 
alleviating poverty, in the same way as entry into the labour market. Education can 
facilitate entry into the labour market, and reduce the risk of poverty in other ways 
(e.g. through better health and lower risk of crime), either way it has a long term 
effect. Some government spending and some kind of benefits are designed to 
encourage education and entry into the labour market. The analysis here is also 
somewhat incomplete, as education was not included in the New Zealand survey, and 
the Swedish data are suffering from missing data. 
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Table 4.8 A Norwegian poverty rates by head’s or spouse’s highest 
education attainment 
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Primary 18.4% 73.8% 17.9% 75.7% 3.4% 52.3% 24.5% 53.2% 
Lower 
secondary 
26.4% 43.5% 14.0% 67.8% 20.5% 33.9% 11.7% 65.5% 
Upper 
secondary 
23.1% 23.8% 14.0% 41.2% 30.2% 14.0% 5.2% 62.9% 
Post-
secondary, 
non-tertiary 
2.7% 18.0% 7.7% 57.2% 4.1% 8.9% 5.9% 33.7% 
Lower 
tertiary 
21.1% 17.2% 10.0% 41.9% 29.3% 6.4% 2.6% 59.4% 
Upper 
tertiary 
6.6% 7.5% 2.5% 66.7% 10.7% 2.0% 1.6% 20.0% 
Total or 
average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
6.6% 
 
59.8% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
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Table 4.8 B Swedish poverty rates by head’s or spouse’s highest 
education attainment 
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Primary 9.3% 68.2% 87.6% -28.4% 1.4% 74.7% 20.2% 73.0% 
Lower 
secondary 
7.2% 48.6% 78.3% -61.1% 6.4% 53.3% 13.9% 73.9% 
Upper 
secondary 
40.7% 29.5% 9.1% 69.2% 49.4% 21.0% 5.3% 74.8% 
Post-
secondary, 
non-
tertiary 
5.2% 32.6% 25.8% 20.9% 6.6% 15.0% 5.3% 64.7% 
Lower 
tertiary 
23.2% 16.1% 8.1% 49.7% 34.0% 9.7% 3.3% 66.0% 
Upper 
tertiary 
0.9% 5.3% * - 1.2% * * - 
Missing 12.7% 93.2% 23.7% 74.6% 0.0% 74.7% 20.2% 73.0% 
Total or 
average 
4,327,000 
 
39.8% 
 
13.0% 
 
67.3% 1,951,000 20.0% 5.6% 
 
72.0% 
(Source: LIS 2000; *= insufficient data) 
The Swedish missing data do not appear to be randomly distributed, 
possibly because of age factors, and must therefore be interpreted with due caution. 
The distribution of education attainment below upper secondary education 
compared to Norway suggests that if the distribution was similar to that in Norway, 
the households where education data are missing were disproportionally from the 
households with low levels of education attainment. Coupled with the high poverty 
reduction among the household with missing education data would explain the 
increase in poverty caused by taxes among households with low education 
attainment in Sweden compared to Norway.  
Despite this caveat the data make a handful of interesting observations 
stand out. The relationship between poverty and education attainment appears to be 
firmly correlated in that increase in education leads to lower poverty in nearly all the 
categories, both market and income, household and child poverty in both countries, 
with the occasional exception of the small post secondary, non-tertiary category.  
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Secondly, the relationship between household poverty reduction and 
child poverty reduction is virtually unrelated. The poverty reduction is systematically 
lower for child poverty than household poverty in each education category. In 
Norway, where data are more reliable, the poverty reduction in households does not 
show a clear pattern, while in both countries the proportional child poverty reduction 
was gradually decreasing with higher education attainment.  
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4.8. Government intervention and income source 
 
Table 4.9 A New Zealand poverty rates by income source and 
employment status 
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Majority 
income 
from 
benefits 
18.8% 100.0% 54.1% 45.9% 12.5% 100% 81.1% 18.9% 
Some 
income 
from 
benefits 
15.1% 57.6% 20.8% 63.9% 12.1% 63.1% 41.6% 34.0% 
1 adult no 
benefit 
income 
22.4% 16.9% 12.5% 26.0% 23.6% 31.1% 26.6% 14.5% 
2 adult no 
benefit 
income 
32.3% 3.7% 4.8% -29.7% 42.9% 5.6% 6.5% -16.2% 
3 adult no 
benefit 
income 
11.4% 2.1% 2.9% -38.1% 9.0% 1.3% 1.3% 0.0% 
Total in 
thousand
s or 
average 
1,374 
 
32.7% 
 
18.0% 45.0% 886 
 
29.9% 24.3% 18.7% 
(Source: New Zealand HES 2000/2001) 
 105 
Table 4.9 B Norwegian poverty rates by income source and employment 
status 
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Main income 
from benefit 
36.0% 87.9% 43.6% 50.4% 8.6% 94.2% 44.5% 52.8% 
Head or 
spouse main 
income from 
employment 
36.8% 11.9% 7.7% 35.3% 32.2% 24.2% 7.8% 67.8% 
Head and 
spouse main 
income from 
employment 
27.2% 0.5% 0.4% 20.0% 59.3% 1.0% 0.5% 50.0% 
Total or 
average 
2,093,000 
 
36.1% 
 
18.6% 
 
48.5% 1,051,000 
 
16.4% 
 
6.6% 
 
59.8% 
 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
The net increase of poverty among households with two or three adults 
but no benefit income as a result of taxes in New Zealand was strikingly absent in 
Norway and Sweden. Even the gross increase in household poverty rate from 
taxes33was below 2.5 per cent of total households in Norway and below 1.5 per cent in 
Sweden for all groups (not shown in table). However, the market poverty rate was 
also markedly lower, and New Zealand is one of the few countries where tax is 
charged from the first dollars earned, and this may have been a major factor in 
explaining the negative effect for the group that did not receive any benefits in New 
Zealand. As shown in table 4.1 this affected 1 per cent of all households in Norway 
and 0.6 per cent of Swedish households. In both Scandinavian countries this affected 
mostly the households with employment income from either head or spouse 
(presumably mostly single adult households), while the phenomenon were less 
common (but existent) among households that had two adults in employment or had 
their income mainly from benefits. In the three countries studied here the correlation 
between tax rates and proportion of households that are brought below the poverty 
line by taxes was in other words negative. The highest total tax rate (measured as a 
                                                 
33
 I.e. the proportion of the total number of households that had a disposable income below the poverty line 
despite having a market income that was above the poverty line. 
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share of GDP) was found in Sweden (see figure 4.1), but hardly any households were 
brought into poverty by this tax burden.  
The tax level in Norway was slightly lower, but the tax burden 
nonetheless brought a larger proportion into poverty. The New Zealand data do not 
provide gross figures for poverty reduction, but looking at the increase in poverty 
rate from market income to disposable income among the households that didn’t 
receive benefits, at least .45 per cent34 of all households were taxed into poverty when 
only looking at the two last categories. Among the 18.8 per cent of households with 
their majority income from benefits, none had a market income above the poverty 
line, so none of these may have been adversely affected by taxes. Among the 37.5 per 
cent that either had one employed adult or some benefit income, the disposable 
poverty were more widespread, so potentially the total effect of taxes on bringing 
households into poverty could be several times larger than the 0.45 per cent in the 
last two categories, even though the New Zealand had the lowest tax take of the three 
countries. This shows that the effect of taxes on poverty potentially depends more on 
the tax system and the distribution of the tax burden than the tax rates per se. 
Regardless, as was pointed out in section 4.1, the effect is marginal compared to the 
effect that transfers can have in reducing poverty.  
 
                                                 
34
 This is based on the following calculation: in non-beneficiary households with two adults 4.8% - 3.1% = 1.1% 
out of the 32.3% of the total households (32.3% x 1.1% = 0.36%) were brought into poverty by the tax burden, 
and adding the 2.9%-2.1%= 0.8% of the 11.4% of the non-beneficiary households with three adults gives .09% 
to a total of 0.45% of the total households. 
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Table 4.9 C Swedish poverty rates by income source and employment 
status 
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Main income 
from benefit 
34.3% 91.1% 26.5% 70.9% 7.2% 98.1% 34.1% 65.2% 
Head or 
spouse main 
income from 
employment 
37.0% 20.8% 9.7% 53.4% 27.0% 36.5% 8.5% 76.7% 
Head and 
spouse main 
income from 
employment 
28.7% 3.1% 1.2% 61.3% 65.8% 4.6% 1.3% 71.7% 
Total or 
average 
4,327,273 
 
39.8% 
 
13.0% 
 
67.3% 1,951,000 20.0% 5.6% 
 
72.0% 
(Source: LIS 2000) 
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4.9. Interaction effects in disposable income 
poverty 
In this section the same analyses as in section 3.8 will be done on 
disposable income.  As in the rest of chapter four, the difference from chapter three is 
that this chapter deals with actually disposable income, rather than market income. 
In other words this chapter says something about living standards, and the difference 
in poverty levels between these two chapters describes how successful the 
government’s taxes and benefits was at reducing poverty. This difference could have 
been described separately as well, but at some point the level of detail must be 
limited, and this is where the line is drawn in this thesis. As in section 3.8 it will not 
be speculated in what the causes for the interaction effects may have been (as the in 
the dataset employed here would provide limited empirical evidence for such 
speculation), the purpose of the chapter is to show that a more detailed description of 
demographic groups can explain more of the difference in poverty levels, and also to 
shed some light on the strength of this effect compared to the effects on market 
income. As already explained the New Zealand dataset attained for this thesis does 
not allow this particular analysis, so it will unfortunately be limited to Norway and 
Sweden. 
As in section 3.8 the first group whose poverty rate is to be examined is 
the children and households with one adult who is 30 years old or younger. Recall 
that in Norway the total disposable poverty rate was 18.7% for households and 6.6% 
for children. Figures for Sweden were 13.0% and 5.6%. 
  
The findings in table 4.10 demonstrate that the findings from the first 
table of section 3.8 holds for disposable poverty as well as market poverty, namely 
that children and households that has a young and single adult are more likely to be 
poor than those who live with one adult aged over 30 and those who live with two or 
more adults aged 30 or under. The child poverty reduction rate35 (not in table) in 
Norway is similar for all groups in the table; in Sweden the rate is lowest for the 
young and single group but only marginally lower than for the 30 or under group. 
                                                 
35
 I.e. the fraction of the market poor that are brought out of poverty by taxes and benefit. 
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Table 4.10 Poverty in young parent and one-adult households 
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households where the head is 30 
or younger 
15.6% 9.4% 36.0% 14.0% 
All households with only one adult 46.6% 15.2% 34.6% 22.2% 
Households with only one adult 
where the head is 30 or younger 
11.1% 2.7% 47.1% 34.4% 
Sweden 
All households where the head is 30 
or younger 
15.2% 7.4% 35.3% 18.0% 
All households with only one adult 51.7% 19.1% 21.8% 14.3% 
Households with only one adult 
where the head is 30 or younger 
11.3% 2.2% 43.7% 38.6% 
 Table 4.11 Poverty in one-adult HHs with three or more children 
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households with three or more 
children 
5.1% 32.8% 5.9% 6.0% 
All households with only one adult 46.6% 15.2% 34.6% 22.2% 
Households with only one adult and 
three or more children 
0.2% 2.7% 15.8% 38.6% 
Sweden 
All households with three or more 
children 
4.3% 31.3% 5.5% 5.6% 
All households with only one adult 51.7% 19.1% 21.8% 14.3% 
Households with only one adult and 
three or more children 
0.7% 5.0% 23.7% 22.7% 
Table 4.11 shows much the same information as table 4.10, but focuses on 
households with one adult and three or more children. In the number of households 
this group was far less common than the group described in table 4.10, but a larger 
fraction of children lived in this sort of household. Again, the findings show that the 
subgroup was more exposed to poverty than any of entire groups separately.  
In this group the two groups fare quite differently in the two countries: 
Even though Sweden’s overall reduction in child poverty through taxes and transfers 
are large, the reduction in child poverty is relatively low, notably when compared to 
Norway.  Again, the reduction rate is found when comparing the data from the tables 
here in chapter 4 with the market poverty rates from chapter 3. The difference 
between the countries is caused by a combination of higher disposable income 
poverty in Sweden, and higher market poverty in Norway.  
 110 
Table 4.12 Poverty in one-adult, immigrant households  
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households with only one adult 46.6% 15.2% 34.6% 22.2% 
All immigrant  households  7.9% 11.8% 25.6% 15.5% 
Immigrant households with only 
one adult  
3.0% 1.5% 47.8% 31.9% 
Sweden 
All households with only one adult 51.7% 19.1% 21.8% 14.3% 
All immigrant  households  14.1% 20.7% 16.2% 10.8% 
Immigrant households with only 
one adult  
6.2% 3.4% 27.5% 26.0% 
Among households with only one adult, if that household had some 
immigrant background the risk of being poor was substantially higher. This was yet 
another case where the children in a vulnerable group are particularly exposed to 
poverty. 
Table 4.13 Poverty in immigrant HHs with three or more children 
Household type Household 
Incidence  
Share of 
children 
Household 
poverty 
Child 
poverty 
Norway 
All households with three or more 
children 
5.1% 32.8% 5.9% 6.0% 
All immigrant  households  7.9% 11.8% 25.6% 15.5% 
Immigrant households with three 
or more children  
0.6% 4.2% 17.0% 16.9% 
  Sweden 
All households with three or more 
children 
4.3% 31.3% 5.5% 5.6% 
All immigrant  households  14.1% 20.7% 16.2% 10.8% 
Immigrant households with three 
or more children  
1.0% 7.7% 12.1% 12.8% 
 
Table 4.13 confirms the finding from section 3.8, that immigrant 
households with children are in fact better off than other immigrant households, but 
that immigrant children are better off if the number of children in the household is 
one or two. This factor is small compared to the immigrant factor itself when 
compared to the child poverty rates in the entire population. In Sweden, the poverty 
reduction rate in immigrant households three or more children is nearly as high as 
that for all households with three or more children, in Norway the rate for immigrant 
households is significantly lower than for the entire group. This largely explains why 
having immigrant background is a more negative factor for households with many 
children in Norway than in Sweden.  
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This section has, like section 3.8, not attempted to explain why these 
combinations of factors lead to higher poverty rate. Again the purpose of the section 
is to demonstrate that this interaction-effect is just as important when looking at 
disposable income as it is for market income. It has also shown how this interaction 
effect can influence effect of government intervention. Even though it was argued at 
length earlier in the chapter for why government intervention benefits the poor most, 
this section has shown that there is little reason to assume that groups that are 
particularly vulnerable to poverty are more likely to be helped by government 
intervention than other poor groups. The charitable, but pessimistic interpretation of 
this is that that this shows how hard it is to make universalist government 
interventions aid those most in need. A more optimistic view would be to say that the 
findings show that there is room for improvements. 
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5. Counterfactual analysis 
 
Chapter 4 focused on the effect of government income redistribution on poverty 
within various groups in the three countries introduced in chapter 3 where the focus 
was on market income distribution. This separation is chosen because the main aim 
of this thesis is to say something about how much child poverty a government can be 
expected to eradicate, and how much the levels of child poverty depends on market 
income and the demographic composition. That analysis is done in this chapter, by 
exploring what the child poverty levels in New Zealand would have been if 
government intervention had brought the same proportion of poor in various groups 
out of poverty as is done in Norway and Sweden, and by asking what poverty levels 
would have been in Norway and Sweden if those countries had New Zealand’s 
demographic composition or market income poverty levels. This should make it 
easier to discern to what extent it is possible for a government to eradicate child 
poverty through policy reforms, and to what extent variations in child poverty across 
countries is explained by demographic and other factors beyond the reach of 
policymakers. If the counterfactual analysis of Scandinavian increases poverty rates 
by ‘imagining’ that Norway and Sweden have New Zealand’s market poverty rates 
and demographic composition that would suggest that factors that it is difficult for 
policymakers to change are the most important explanations. Conversely, the extent 
to which New Zealand’s poverty rate is reduced when the rate at which Scandinavian 
(market) poverty rate is reduced by transfers and taxes is ‘imagined’ implemented 
would suggest that policies can make a difference despite more or less favourable 
demographic and market poverty conditions. 
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5.1. Overall household and child poverty level 
analysis 
It would, of course, be too simplistic to assume that any policy model found in 
Norway or Sweden could simply be implemented in a country on the other side of the 
earth such as New Zealand. And if reality was so simple that the complexities of 
income redistribution policies could be expressed in one percentage figure, that 
would put many social scientists out of work.  
Notwithstanding these points, the percentage of households and children that are 
lifted above the poverty line by government intervention does say something about 
the priority given to poverty eradication by the respective governments. It is worth 
noting, though, that what is counted as government intervention here gives a limited 
picture of the scope of policies that can potentially reduce poverty; only the most 
direct ways of influencing households’ income are included. Minimum wage 
legislation can, for example influence the income available to low income working 
households, without being noticed in the figure discussed here. Although the 
distributive impact of such indirect policies may be significant, it does not seem to be 
a miracle cure. Studying the extent to which this figure varies across countries and 
the extent to which it has a decisive impact on poverty measured in disposable 
income, should therefore give some indication about the degree to which it is 
possible for governments to alleviate poverty. 
Table 5.1 New Zealand household and child poverty rates with 
Scandinavian rates of poverty reduction 
 M
ar
ke
t 
in
co
m
e 
p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
e 
D
is
p
os
ab
le
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
e 
A
ct
u
al
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 
S
w
ed
is
h
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 
D
is
p
os
a
bl
e 
p
ov
er
ty
 
w
it
h
 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n
 p
ol
ic
y 
D
is
p
os
a
bl
e 
p
ov
er
ty
 
w
it
h
 
S
w
ed
is
h
 p
ol
ic
y 
Households 32.7% 18.0% 45.0% 48.5% 67.3% 16.8% 10.7% 
Children 29.9% 24.3% 18.7% 59.8% 72.0% 12.0% 8.4% 
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The first five columns of table 5.1 contain data from table 4.1. The first three 
columns are New Zealand data. Poverty reduction refers to the proportion of market 
income poor that are brought above the poverty threshold by government 
intervention. Throughout this chapter italic fonts are used to denote counterfactual 
analyses. The counterfactual analysis in table 5.1 is found in column six and seven, 
and shows what the poverty rates would have been in New Zealand if government 
intervention had brought the same proportion of poor out of poverty as was done in 
Norway and Sweden respectively. It should, in other words, be compared to column 
two. The analysis shows that the household poverty rate would have been 7 per cent 
lower with Norwegian policy and 41 per cent lower with Swedish policy. This 
difference which seems dramatically large at first glimpse reflects that the poverty 
reduction rate in Norway was 48.5%, only slightly higher than New Zealand’s at 
45.0%, while Sweden’s was markedly higher at 67.3%. For child poverty the 
equivalent figures was 51 per cent and 65 per cent. These findings suggest that higher 
benefit levels, child assistance and more progressive taxes could have lowered child 
poverty and overall poverty substantially in New Zealand in year 2000. 
Table 5.2 Scandinavian household and child poverty rates with New 
Zealand market poverty rates  
 Actual 
market 
income 
poverty 
rate 
Dispos-
able 
poverty 
rate 
Net 
reduction 
by taxes 
and 
transfers 
New 
Zealand 
market 
income 
poverty 
Disposable 
poverty rate 
with New 
Zealand’s 
market 
poverty  
Norwegian households 36.1% 18.6% 48.5% 32.7% 16.8% 
Norwegian children 16.4% 6.6% 59.8% 29.9% 12.0% 
Swedish households 39.8% 13.0% 67.3% 32.7% 10.7% 
Swedish children 20.0% 5.6% 72.0% 29.9% 8.4% 
 
The next step is to analyse to what extent differences in market poverty, which is 
less directly linked to governments’ policy and policy reforms than disposable 
income poverty, explains why disposable income poverty is lower in Scandinavia 
than in New Zealand. This is done by calculating what the disposable income poverty 
rate would have been if the poverty reduction rates were constant, but the market 
poverty rates were changed to rate observed in New Zealand. In table 5.2 the first 
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three columns contain Norwegian and Swedish data from table 4.1. Column four 
contain the New Zealand equivalent to the data in column three, which is why data in 
row one and three, and two and four are identical. These data are also from table 4.1. 
The fifth column contains the counterfactual analysis, and shows what the disposable 
income poverty rate would have been, if the market income were not the figure found 
in column one, but rather the figure from New Zealand in column four. Reflecting 
that household market income poverty rates were higher in Scandinavia, the 
observed disposable income poverty rates are 10 per cent higher than what it would 
have been with New Zealand’s market income poverty rates in Norway. The 
equivalent for Sweden was 22 per cent higher. Market income child poverty rates 
were higher in New Zealand, and having New Zealand’s market child poverty rate 
would have increased the disposable child poverty rate by 82 per cent in Norway and 
50 per cent in Sweden. 
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5.2. Household and child poverty level analysis – 
ethnicity  
It was pointed out in section 3.2 that in a small-N study (in the sense of 
using data from a small number of countries) like this it is possible to include a 
variable like ethnicity, which it is too complicated to include in large-N studies. That 
is, however, not to say that making data on ethnicity and poverty comparable across 
the three countries in question is straightforward. This section will give particular 
attention to ethnic minority groups that has higher poverty rates than the average 
population. As was illustrated by the Norwegian case, looking at aggregate figures 
only in this area is not unproblematic, but for New Zealand that appears to be the 
best data available. In New Zealand these groups are households where the head 
identifies with Māori or Pacific Island identities, and children living in households 
where the head identifies as Māori, Pacific Islander or ‘other’ (i.e. not European New 
Zealander). These are grouped together to form one entity so to make it comparable 
to the single entity of immigrants in Norway and Sweden. It would be easy to argue 
that these groups are so heterogeneous that comparing them are not meaningful. 
However, the data show that at least in some of the cases these groups’ aggregated 
poverty levels differs from the average of the total population in the country they live 
in. It is on that basis the analysis in this chapter is done, it is by no means argued 
here that these are good measures of the impact of ethnic affiliation on poverty. 
This section starts with table 5.3 which, based on tables 4.2, estimates 
what the disposable income poverty rates would have been in New Zealand if the 
poverty reduction rate among the ethnic groups with higher poverty than the average 
were equal to that of the immigrant population in Norway and Sweden. In Norway, 
the poverty reduction rate were lower for immigrants than the overall population 
(whereas minority groups in New Zealand had higher rates of poverty reduction than 
the average, but recall that the overall market income poverty among Norwegian 
immigrants were indistinguishable to that of the average), at 28.9 per cent for 
households and 46.4 per cent for children. In column 5 it is calculated what the 
disposable income would have been if these poverty reduction rates were applied to 
the poverty exposed ethnic minorities. The Swedish immigrant population poverty 
reduction rates were only slightly lower than those for the overall population, at 62.8 
per cent for households and 69.7 per cent for children, and the disposable income for 
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the poverty exposed ethnic groups with these poverty reduction rates are calculated 
in column 6.  
Table 5.3 Counterfactual analysis of New Zealand child and household 
poverty by ethnicity  
E
th
n
ic
it
y 
b
y 
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
 h
ea
d
 
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
M
ar
ke
t 
in
co
m
e 
p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
e 
N
et
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 
A
ct
u
al
 
d
is
p
os
ab
le
 
in
co
m
e 
p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
e 
C
ou
n
te
r-
fa
ct
u
a
l 
d
is
p
os
a
bl
e 
p
ov
er
ty
, N
or
w
eg
ia
n
 r
a
te
 
C
ou
n
te
r-
fa
ct
u
a
l 
d
is
p
os
a
bl
e 
p
ov
er
ty
, S
w
ed
is
h
 r
a
te
 
European 
household 
80.1% 
 
31.0% 48.4% 
 
16.0% N/A N/A 
Māori 
Household 
11.2% 
 
44.1% 37.9% 
 
27.4% 31.4% 16.4% 
Pacific 
households 
3.5% 
 
45.4% 31.1% 31.3% 32.3% 16.9% 
Other, HH 5.2% 
 
27.1% 26.0% 20.1% N/A N/A 
Total, HH 1,374,000 32.7% 45.0% 18.0% 18.5% 16.3% 
European 
children 
68.3% 
 
22.8% 8.3% 20.9% N/A N/A 
Māori 
Children 
16.6% 
 
47.2% 29.7% 33.2% 33.6% 14.3% 
Pacific 
children 
7.6% 
 
51.7% 33.8% 34.2% 36.8% 15.7% 
Other, 
children 
7.4% 
 
34.4% 26.5% 25.3% 24.5% 10.4% 
Total, 
children 
886,000 29.9% 18.7% 24.3% 24.4% 18.6% 
 
The total rate for child and household poverty in the counterfactual 
columns shows what the weighted poverty rate would have been if the Swedish and 
Norwegian reduction rate had been applied to the poverty exposed ethnic groups 
only, and the less exposed groups had been left unchanged. These findings show that 
the total poverty would have increased slightly in the Norwegian model, and reduced 
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significantly in the Swedish case, but in both cases the impact would naturally be 
miniscule compared to the impact done by the models run in table 5.1. 
In a similar vein one could ask how Norwegian and Swedish would be 
affected by having an ethnic composition or market poverty rate similar to that of 
New Zealand. In New Zealand, the sum of Māori and Pacific households extended to 
14.7 per cent of the total number of households. If the proportion of immigrant 
households in Norway were increased from 9.6 per cent to 14.7 per cent, the total 
disposable income poverty rate would, according to table 4.2, ceteris paribus have 
been increased from 18.6 per cent to 19.0 per cent, in other words a marginal change. 
In this calculation the poverty rate of immigrants and non-immigrants in Norway are 
kept constant, only the proportion of immigrants is changed. The proportion of 
Swedish immigrant household was 14.1 per cent, so obviously introducing the 
proportion of ethnicities particularly vulnerable to poverty that New Zealand had 
(14.7 per cent) would have led to changes too small to be measure in any meaningful 
way. The sum of children living in New Zealand households where the head is of 
Māori, Pacific Island or ‘other’ ethnicity (the ethnicities that has higher than average 
child poverty), extended to 31.6 per cent of the total, which compared to 11.8 per cent 
of children in households with immigrant head or spouse in Norway and 20.7 per 
cent in Sweden. If the proportion of immigrant children were increased to 31.6 per 
cent, that would have increased the child poverty in Norway from 6.6 per cent to 8.6 
per cent and from 5.6 per cent to 6.3 per cent in Sweden, all according to calculations 
based on tables 4.2. That child poverty is more affected than household poverty is the 
combined result of two factors: that the higher poverty rate among immigrants in 
Scandinavia was more pronounced for children than households, and that the 
increase in proportion in New Zealand of the total was larger for children than 
household. 
While that would have been an increase of Norwegian child poverty of 
over a quarter, an equally important driver behind the ethnic differences in child and 
household poverty in New Zealand were the differences in market income. The 
weighted average market income poverty rate among Māori and Pacific Island 
headed households were 44.4 per cent, and children in these and households with 
head of ‘other’ ethnicity had a market income poverty rate of 45.3 per cent, or rates 
that were 35.8 per cent and 51.5 per cent higher than the respective averages. If 
Norwegian and Swedish immigrant households had market income poverty rates 
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that much higher than the average (and the proportion of immigrant households and 
their poverty reduction rates were held constant) they would have had disposable 
income poverty rate of 34.9 per cent and 20.1 per cent, respectively, compared to the 
actual figures of 25.6 per cent and 16.2 per cent. For the total household poverty rate 
that would equate an increase from 18.6 per cent to 19.5 per cent in Norway and from 
13.0 per cent to 13.5 per cent in Sweden. The equivalent immigrant child poverty 
rates would have shown an equivalent increase from 15.5 per cent to 23.5 per cent in 
Norway and 10.8 per cent to 16.3 per cent in Sweden. That would extend to an 
increase of the total child poverty from 6.6 per cent to 7.5 per cent in Norway and 
from 5.6 per cent to 6.7 per cent in Sweden. 
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5.3. Household and child poverty level analysis – 
demographics: age and family structure  
This section will, like the previous one perform a counterfactual analysis 
of the impact on disposable income poverty rates if New Zealand had the poverty 
reduction rate of Norway and Sweden, and the impact on Swedish and Norwegian 
poverty rates of having composition and market poverty rates equal to that of New 
Zealand, but rather than dealing with ethnicity, this section will look at the family 
structure and age variables from sections 3.3 and 4.6.  
 
Table 5.4 A Counterfactual analysis of New Zealand household poverty 
rates by number of children, based on Scandinavian poverty reduction 
rates 
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No 
children 
66.1% 35.3% 16.1% 54.4% 18.8% 11.6% 
One child 13.2% 27.4% 17.5% 36.3% 10.7% 9.0% 
Two 
children 
13.5% 24.9% 22.4% 10.0% 10.8% 7.5% 
Three 
children 
5.2% 26.2% 22.5% 14.0% 11.6% 7.4% 
Four 
children 
1.4% 45.1% 39.6% 12.2% 15.6% 8.9% 
Five or 
more 
children 
0.6% 75.8% 52.2% 31.2% 9.4% 12.4% 
Total or 
average 
1,374,152 
 
32.7% 
 
18.0% 45.0% 16.2% 10.5% 
The first four columns of table 5.4 is from table 4.3A, the last two is 
calculated based on the Norwegian and Swedish poverty reduction rate from 
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government intervention, and the New Zealand market income poverty rate, and 
shows what the disposable poverty rate would be in New Zealand households if the 
poverty reduction rate were equal to that in Norway and Sweden, respectively. The 
values in the two cells of the counterfactual columns and average row are weighted 
averages, and are thus slightly different from the values in table 5.1, but the factor is 
clearly not large enough to make a large difference.  
If Norway had the composition of households according to number of 
children that New Zealand has, its household disposable income poverty rate would 
ceteris paribus be 17.7 per cent rather than 18.0 per cent, for Sweden it would be 12.1 
per cent rather than 13.0 per cent. This is calculated by finding the sum of the 
products of New Zealand’s proportion of households in the categories of number of 
children and the disposable income poverty rate for the same categories in Norway 
and Sweden. 
Table 5.4 B Counterfactual analysis of Scandinavian household poverty 
rates by number of children, based on New Zealand market poverty rate 
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No 
children 
23.2% 28.2% 15.4% 30.2% 
One child 7.8% 14.4% 6.6% 14.5% 
Two 
children 
6.4% 11.0% 5.1% 12.8% 
Three 
children 
5.6% 9.3% 5.1% 13.3% 
Four 
children 
8.8% 14.0% 5.6% 15.6% 
Five or 
more 
children 
4.4% 8.6% 10.8% 16.1% 
Total or 
average 
18.6% 23.8% 13.0% 26.1% 
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Table 5.4 B shows the actual disposable income poverty rates for 
Norwegian and Swedish households from tables 4.3 in columns one and three, while 
columns two and four contains calculations of what that poverty rate would have 
been had the country had New Zealand’s market poverty rates, but the poverty 
reduction rates were kept constant. Again, the total is weighted, and thus different 
from that in table 5.2. The substantially higher values in both totals (more than 
double the rate in Sweden) compared to table 5.2 is interesting because it shows that 
not only the higher overall redistribution rate in Sweden causes Sweden to have 
lower poverty than New Zealand, but also the way it is calibrated towards the 
households where the market income poverty is the greatest. The same applies to 
Norway, but to a slightly lesser extent. Again, this must be qualified with the factor 
mentioned in sections 3.3 and 4.6, namely that not all public old-age pension income 
are defined as transfers in Scandinavia, but it is in New Zealand. 
Table 5.5A does the same estimations as table 5.4A, but with family types 
rather than number of children in the rows, and thus based on data from table 4.4A 
and 4.5A rather than 4.3A. The four counterfactual columns are thus estimates of 
child and household poverty rates where the market poverty rate in New Zealand is 
multiplied by the rate at which government intervention (the net effect of transfers 
and taxes) reduced poverty in Norway and Sweden. 
 123 
Table 5.5 A Counterfactual analysis of New Zealand household poverty 
rates by family type, based on Scandinavian poverty reduction rates 
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1 adult 50.6% 26.8% 36.2% 22.2% - - - - 
1 adult, 1 or 
more child 
17.5% 64.7% 30.0% 22.9% 14.4% 71.6% 31.6% 23.3% 
2 adults 59.6% 12.4% 6.0% 3.3% - - - - 
2 adults, 1 
child 
41.9% 11.1% 8.8% 6.5% 41.9% 11.1% 8.8% 6.5% 
2 adults, 2 
children 
2.4% 16.1% 8.5% 5.9% 2.1% 16.1% 8.5% 5.9% 
2 adults, 3 
or more 
children 
9.8% 19.3% 9.3% 5.1% 10.8% 20.7% 9.4% 5.0% 
3 or more 
adults 
53.2% 5.2% 1.4% 2.4% - - - - 
3 or more 
adults 
1 or more 
children 
43.9% 11.1% 5.0% 4.6% 43.9% 14.4% 6.0% 5.1% 
Total in 
thousands 
or average 
45.0% 18.0% 14.2% 9.3% 18.7% 24.3% 11.5% 8.0% 
Table 5.5 A confirms that the Scandinavian policies are more successful at 
reducing child poverty, even marginally more so when taking into account what 
family types child poverty is reduced in. This highlights that differences in policy is in 
many ways more important than differences in composition of households and 
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distribution of market poverty into different family types when explaining the higher 
disposable income poverty in New Zealand. As was already pointed out in section 
4.6, especially children living in households with one adult would be less likely to live 
in poverty. The only household type that would be worse off with a Norwegian 
poverty reduction rate was single adult households. The Swedish poverty reduction 
was higher for all household types. 
If Norway had New Zealand’s composition of family types, ceteris paribus 
its child poverty rate would be 6.2% rather than 6.6%. The equivalent figure for 
Sweden was 4.8% rather than 5.6%. One interpretation of these finding is that the 
policies in Scandinavia was geared towards the composition of family types found in 
New Zealand. Certainly it means that composition of family types cannot explain the 
higher child poverty rate in New Zealand, if anything this particular finding suggests 
that it should be lower. Granted, 90% of the decrease in Swedish child poverty 
stemmed from the lower proportion of children living with only one adult. The 
equivalent figures for households and household poverty rate confirms that the 
compositions of family type are not an advantage for the Scandinavian countries; if 
Norway had New Zealand’s family composition, the country’s disposable income 
household poverty rate would fall from 18.6% to 12.7%, and Sweden’s would fall from 
13.0% to 8.4%. Again, this shows such dramatic differences that the different types of 
old age pension probably cannot explain all of them. Much of the difference can be 
explained by the higher proportion of poor, single adults in Scandinavia. 
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Table 5.5 B Counterfactual analysis of Scandinavian household poverty 
rates by family types, based on New Zealand market poverty rate 
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1 adult 36.3% 36.2% 22.7% 22.2%  - -  - - 
1 adult, 1 or 
more child 
21.4% 30.0% 14.4% 22.9% 22.2% 31.6% 14.3% 23.3% 
2 adults 6.6% 6.0% 3.9% 3.3% -  -  - - 
2 adults, 1 
child 
3.5% 8.8% 3.7% 6.5% 3.5% 8.8% 3.7% 6.5% 
2 adults, 2 
children 
3.7% 8.5% 3.7% 5.9% 3.7% 8.5% 3.7% 5.9% 
2 adults, 3 
or more 
children 
4.7% 9.3% 3.7% 5.1% 4.9% 9.4% 3.8% 5.0% 
3 or more 
adults 
1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 2.4% - - -  - 
3 or more 
adults 
1 or more 
children 
1.6% 5.0% 1.8% 4.6% 1.7% 6.0% 1.9% 5.1% 
Weighted 
average 
18.6% 
 
20.0% 13.0% 
 
13.6% 6.6% 12.1% 5.6% 9.0% 
 
Table 5.5 B shows that while Scandinavia would have coped well with a 
composition of family types closer to that of New Zealand, having New Zealand’s 
market poverty rate would have led to substantial increase in disposable income 
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poverty, in particular when weighted by children. Despite these two factors, the child 
poverty rate in Norway would still be less than half of that observed in New Zealand. 
 
Table 5.6 A Counterfactual analysis of New Zealand household poverty 
rates by age of household head, based on Scandinavian poverty reduction 
rates 
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15-24 18.3% 28.2% 33.1% 33.3% 16.9% 45.8% 16.3% 40.9% 
25-29 21.6% 21.1% 20.5% 20.3% 26.9% 35.6% 20.6% 17.1% 
30-39 12.6% 16.0% 9.8% 6.4% 9.6% 25.5% 11.3% 7.4% 
40-49 18.5% 13.2% 7.9% 5.1% 21.3% 17.7% 10.3% 5.5% 
50-59 23.0% 15.4% 8.4% 4.8% 20.5% 20.5% 8.5% 4.4% 
60-64 53.9% 18.2% 17.2% 6.2% * * 47.0% 25.8% 
65+ 69.4% 23.6% 31.9% 14.9% * * * 18.0% 
Weighted 
average 
45.0% 18.0% 16.1% 10.1% 18.7% 24.3% 11.4% 12.2% 
(*=Insufficient data) 
The columns in table 5.6A are the same as those used in table 5.5A; the 
difference is obviously that in the rows family type has been replaced by the 
household head’s age.  
The household poverty rates shows how the Scandinavian poverty 
reduction rate would reduce poverty rates among middle age households, i.e. those 
within working age, but would increase the poverty rate among the oldest and the 
youngest. Comparing the counterfactual total poverty rates here and in table 5.1 gives 
a rough estimate of the net effect of the two factors. For households table 5.1, which 
estimates the effect of New Zealand having Scandinavia’s poverty reduction rate 
without taking differences across age groups into account, the household poverty 
rates would have been 16.8 per cent with Norwegian poverty reduction and 10.7 with 
Sweden’s poverty reduction. Scandinavian poverty reduction rates are in other words 
more effective in reducing poverty when applied to specific age groups.  
When looking at child poverty it is necessary to keep the skewed 
distribution in mind: the vast majority of children live in households where the head 
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is between 30 and 50 years old, especially in Scandinavia. For the older age groups 
the number of children is in fact so low that it is difficult to estimate the poverty rate 
in New Zealand and Norway. For all age groups where reliable data were available for 
all countries Scandinavian poverty reduction rate is lower than the one for New 
Zealand. When comparing the total child poverty in table 5.1 and the equivalent rate 
in table 5.6 A it is clear that taking household head age into account (as is done in 
table 5.6 A, but not 5.1) when implementing the reduction rate the total child poverty 
rate is slightly lower when the Norwegian rate is applied, but substantially higher 
when the Swedish rate is applied. In other words, no firm pattern appears when 
taking the age of household head into account when implementing Scandinavian 
poverty reduction rates on New Zealand’s rate of child poverty. 
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House-hold (HH) head age 
Norwegian actual disposable house-hold poverty 
rate 
Counter-factual Norwegian poverty rate, based on 
New Zealand's market poverty rate 
Swedish actual disposable household poverty rate 
Counter-factual Swedish poverty rate, based on 
New Zealand's market poverty rate 
Norwegian actual disposable child poverty rate 
Counter-factual Norwegian child poverty rate, 
based on New Zealand's market child poverty rate 
Swedish actual disposable child poverty rate 
Counter-factual Swedish child poverty rate, based 
on New Zealand's market child poverty rate 
15-24
 
57
.6%
 
33
.1%
 
53
.3%
 
33
.3%
 
18
.3%
 
16
.3%
 
44
.0%
 
40
.9%
 
25-29
 
20
.3%
 
20
.5%
 
20
.4%
 
20
.3%
 
13
.1%
 
20
.6%
 
12
.9%
 
17
.1%
 
30
-39
 
9
.6%
 
9
.8%
 
7
.9%
 
6
.4%
 
7
.7%
 
11
.3%
 
6
.0%
 
7
.4%
 
4
0
-4
9
 
6
.5%
 
7
.9%
 
5
.8%
 
5
.1%
 
4
.1%
 
10
.3%
 
3
.4%
 
5
.5%
 
50
-59
 
6
.8%
 
8
.4%
 
4
.2%
 
4
.8%
 
3
.8%
 
8
.5%
 
2
.2%
 
4
.4%
 
6
0
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4
 
13
.6%
 
17
.2%
 
5
.1%
 
6
.2%
 
7
.9%
 
47
.0%
 
11
.5%
 
25
.8%
 
6
5+
 
32
.7%
 
31
.9%
 
16
.6%
 
14
.9%
 
*
 
*
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18
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13
.0%
 
11
.0%
 
6
.6%
 
11
.6%
 
5
.6%
 
7
.5
 %
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5.4. Household and child poverty level analysis – income 
source 
This section attempts to give an accessible overview of the data in section 
4.8. As in previous sections it will demonstrate what would happen if New Zealand 
had Scandinavian poverty reduction rates or if Scandinavia had New Zealand’s 
market poverty or demographic composition. In this section the focus is - as section 
4.8 – on income source.  
The New Zealand data categories differ slightly from those used in 
Norway and Sweden; the Scandinavian poverty data separates household head and 
head’s spouse into those with main income from benefits and employment. This 
means that in this section households are separated into three groups: those where 
one adult (head or spouse) has employment as main income, those where two or 
more (head and spouse) has employment as main income and the remaining 
households where some form of benefit are presumed to be the main source of 
income. As seen in section 4.8 the New Zealand data provide some more 
information, with slightly different categories; households are separated into five 
groups: those with benefits as their main income, those with parts of their income 
from benefits, and those with no benefit income divided into households with 1, 2, or 
three or more adults. In order to make the five categories used in New Zealand 
comparable with the three used in Scandinavia as possible, two of the pairs of the 
New Zealand groups are merged: the two groups that receive benefits (some and 
majority) are merged into one, and the households that doesn’t receive benefits any 
with two or more adults form one group (merging the two and three or more 
categories). Section 7.3 in the appendix provides a table describing all the New 
Zealand employed categories simultaneously. The problem from section 4.8 remains, 
namely that households which receive benefits in New Zealand (regardless of 
whether they work or not) are compared to and treated as identical to any household 
in Scandinavia that does not have adults with paid work as their usual occupation 
(whether they receive benefits, or not). That so many New Zealand pensions are just 
above the poverty line is also a problem here. With these caveats in mind, the 
findings are still interesting.  
As shown in table 5.7 A, in one case, namely poverty level among benefit 
receiving households one of the counterfactual cases (Norwegian reduction rate) 
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were higher than the actual one, i.e. in only that case were the New Zealand 
reduction rate higher than in Scandinavia. In all other groups (notably all child 
poverty groups) the counterfactual poverty was lower. 
Table 5.7 A Counterfactual analysis of New Zealand household poverty 
rates by employment status, based on Scandinavian poverty reduction 
rates 
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All 
benefit 
receivers 
51,6 % 39,3 % 40,3 % 23,6 % 24,7 % 61,7 % 38,6 % 28,5 % 
No 
benefit 
income, 
1 adult 
26,0 % 12,5 % 10,9 % 7,9 % 14,5 % 26,6 % 10,0 % 7,2 % 
No 
benefit 
income, 
2 or 
more 
adults 
-31,9 % 4,3 % 2,6 % 1,3 % -15,3 % 5,6 % 2,4 % 1,4 % 
Total 
average 
45,0 % 18,0 % 17,2 % 10,3 % 18,7 % 24,3 % 13,1 % 9,4 % 
When estimating what the poverty level would have been in Norway and 
Sweden if they had New Zealand’s market poverty rate the picture is less clear. For 
both household and child poverty it would lead to a higher poverty rate in Norway, 
but lower in Sweden. Market poverty also seems to be higher among benefit receivers 
in New Zealand, especially compared to Sweden. This is in some way as expected 
given the higher levels of universal benefits in Scandinavia. 
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Employment status 
Norwegian actual disposable house-
hold poverty rate 
Counter-factual Norwegian poverty 
rate, based on New Zealand's 
market poverty rate 
Swedish actual disposable household 
poverty rate 
Counterfactual Swedish poverty 
rate, based on New Zealand's 
market poverty rate 
Norwegian actual disposable child 
poverty rate 
Counter-factual Norwegian child 
poverty rate, based on New 
Zealand's market child poverty rate 
Swedish actual disposable child 
poverty rate 
Counter-factual Swedish child 
poverty rate, based on New 
Zealand's market child poverty rate 
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6. Answered and unanswered questions 
6.1. Policy developments in New Zealand since 
2000 
While this thesis relies on data from 2000, there have been several 
developments since then: policies has been changed, partly as a response to findings 
from the 2000 dataset suggesting widespread poverty in New Zealand, and new 
research based on more recent data has been published in part evaluate recent policy 
reforms. Among these is Perry (2004). He evaluates the effect on child poverty of the 
major policy shift in New Zealand since 2000, the introduction of the Working for 
Families package. This package seeks to combine the goals of “improving income 
adequacy [and] making work pay.” (Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, 
2007:1) as well as making sure that people receives the assistance they are entitled 
to. This combination is the application of the balance suggested in section 4.1 
between reducing poverty and not reducing the incentive to work. Thus, many of the 
benefits are in the form of tax credits, and target those in work through tax credits or 
‘negative income tax’, and increases in Family Support which benefits low income 
earners both within and outside the labour market. Perry (2004: 41) shows that this 
reduces child poverty significantly from 22% to 16% in one measure. Other studies 
show different findings, however: Fletcher and Dwyer (2008:65) finds that 22 
percent of children were living in households with incomes below 60% of the median 
after housing costs are taken into account. StJohn and Wynd (2008) emphasis how 
none of the effort made through family tax credits benefits the children that needs it 
the most, namely those on in households that rely on benefits, and argues that a 
move towards universal child benefits is necessary (2008:135). 
That the lower measure is still about ten percentage points higher than in 
Scandinavia means that it is still debatable whether the balance between ensuring 
income adequacy and making work pay is tilted sufficiently towards income 
adequacy. Studies such as StJohn and Wynd (2008) and Fletcher and Dwyer (2008) 
measures and highlight the multitude of aspects of deprivation experienced by poor 
children, and in a normative debate over this balance it is also worth noting that in 
absolute living standard poverty in New Zealand is more severe than in Scandinavia 
because overall living standards are lower. Given that New Zealanders already work 
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relatively long hours and participation rates are high compared to most countries, it 
is questionable how effective incentives to work more will be in increasing 
productivity. It seems likely that even after the introduction of the working for 
families-package there is scope for reducing child poverty further, without risking 
dramatically lower productivity. 
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6.2. Answered questions 
Chapter two suggested that poverty can, for a variety of reasons, be 
inherited across generations, because experience of poverty as a child increases the 
risk of poverty later in life. This is an important explanation for policymakers’ and 
researchers’ interest in child poverty. This factor was also an important factor in this 
thesis.  
Cross country studies of causes of poverty referred to in chapter 3 
suggested that labour market relations are paramount in explaining differences in 
levels of poverty. Single-mother families and low female labour participation as well 
as low public social and health spending contributed to high child poverty rates. On 
this background this thesis focuses largely on demographics and labour relations as 
well as education in Scandinavia. The small number of country cases also allowed the 
inclusion ethnicity in a way that would not be meaningful in studies of a larger 
number of countries. 
To study the prevalence of poverty and child poverty several 
methodological decisions were required. These were mostly done on a theoretical 
basis, but in some cases the availability of data forced the use of second best options. 
Among the decisions made were to apply a 60% of the median income poverty line, 
i.e. a relative measure of poverty, supplemented by a measure of poverty depth. 
Among the decision made by need rather than choice based on theory was the one to 
use to use the square root equivalence scale on data from Norway and Sweden, but 
the Jensen’s equivalence scale on the New Zealand data. 
Chapter three and four focused on market income poverty and disposable 
poverty, respectively. Each of the two chapters described the depth and incidence of 
poverty among households and children in various groups in the three countries. 
Much focus was given to various demographic groups, but ethnicity, education, and 
income source were also taken into account. The data were presented in frequency 
tables, and partly confirmed by regression analyses. Poverty data on each of these 
groups showed interesting and often complex dynamics, especially when market and 
disposable income data were contrasted. 
In order to highlight the differences in policy and policy outcomes, 
chapter five summarised these findings in counterfactual portrayals of, among other 
things, what the incidence of poverty in New Zealand would have been if levels of 
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poverty reduction (i.e. government intervention outcomes) had been implemented in 
New Zealand. This method provided a simplistic description of the importance of 
policy while taking market poverty and demographic differences into account.  
Figure 6.1 Observed and counterfactual child poverty levels in New 
Zealand36 
 
The light, blue columns in table 6.1 summarizes the observed child 
poverty rate in various groups in New Zealand, and the darker, red columns refers to 
the reduction in percentage point that would result if the poverty reduction rate were 
equal to the Scandinavian average. So, in households with one adult and one child 
the actual child poverty in New Zealand was 71.6%, whereas if New Zealand had 
achieved the reduction in child poverty that was achieved in this group in 
Scandinavia (the average of Norway and Sweden), the poverty rate would have been 
44.2 percentage points lower. The groups are ranked by the size of the reduction. It 
appears that children living with only one adult, adults that receive benefits, young 
household heads and minority ethnicity have relative minor advantage of Norwegian 
poverty reduction (large gap between blue and red column, since the blue column is 
                                                 
36All numbers are per cent. HHH refers to household head. In the weighted average groups the reduction 
specific to age, and in the weighted per child categories the units are weighted by number of households rather 
than per child. ‘Other’ ethnicity refers to those who does not identify as Māori, Pacific Islander, or ‘European 
New Zealander’ (see section 3.2). Ethnicity refers to that of the household head. 
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bigger in all cases they are still better off) relative to households with large number of 
children or older adults and two or more adults. 
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6.3. Unanswered questions 
 
This final section suggests some topics that this thesis does not attempt to 
cover, and thus provide ideas for further research. First of all, the thesis has a limited 
scope in terms of time and space. Further analysis may wish to incorporate more 
countries and more recent data as they become available. Performing similar 
analyses of more countries would make a wider and more reliable picture, and could 
provide lessons about a wider spectre of policy solutions from different ‘worlds of 
welfare’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Extending the analysis in time would be 
particularly interesting because some of the New Zealand data applied here has 
already been analysed (e.g. Waldegrave, Stephens and King, 2003) and these 
findings may have had some impact on subsequent policy (Perry, 2004), notably 
with the “working for families”-package. More research is needed to fully assess how 
these changes in policy have changed the picture that this thesis presents based on 
the 2000 data. One way of doing this would be to run the same kind of 
counterfactual analysis as chapter 5 does with more recent data, and see how much 
of the differences in child poverty rates remain unexplained by differences in policy. 
Such a study may also wish to employ uniform equivalence scales. 
A different direction could be taken from the same point of departure 
would be to consider what evidence exist that suggests that the changes in policy 
were a direct result of research findings that suggest that New Zealand policies were 
unsuccessful in reducing child poverty both compared to other countries and relative 
to the effect of taxes and transfers on household poverty levels. In a similar vein (in 
the sense that it points more towards political science than public policy) one could 
ask whether the seemingly lower priority given to eradicate child poverty in New 
Zealand than in Scandinavia was a result of different attitudes to equality of 
opportunity, and the role of the state in ensuring this. Starke (2008) provides a study 
of the political aspects of the radical welfare state retrenchment in New Zealand in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and puts this in a comparative perspective. 
The emphasis in the empirical section of this thesis is to describe those 
that were poor before government intervention in the three countries, the 
characteristics of those that governments succeeded in bringing out of poverty, and 
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those who remained poor after government interventions through tax and transfers. 
The focus is not on explaining why some groups are poor or are more or less 
successful in using government assistance to relieve poverty. Nor is the focus on 
describing the policies that were more or less successful in bringing households and 
children out of poverty. These are, in other words, areas where there is left scope for 
further analyses. 
Because of lack of equivalent data some of the analysis done for Sweden 
and Norway, were not performed with New Zealand data, notably on education, and 
the gender of household adult, as well as the analysis on assortative mating. It would 
also be interesting to see if the gender of children makes any difference on poverty. 
All of this leads to a somewhat incomplete analysis. 
This thesis uses a ‘snapshot’ image to describe the poverty situation in the 
three countries. It does, in other words, not apply data that says anything about how 
long those that were poor remained poor for. This is the methodologically easiest 
approach and the only possible approach when access to longitudinal data is limited 
or even non-existent. However, it also gives a limited picture, especially because the 
focus on child poverty is chosen in part because experiencing poverty as a child can 
influence outcomes later in life, and thus equality of opportunity. Using ‘snapshot’ 
data is problematic in this context because the evidence that suggest that childhood 
poverty impact on later opportunities also show that prevailing poverty is a much 
more important risk factor than short spells. As data and resources become available 
research using longitudinal data is obviously needed. This kind of analysis is often 
also used to explore what sort of events that typically bring households and children 
into poverty (e.g. diPrete and McManus, 2000). Those analyses are important in 
explaining why some groups are poor, a topic already suggested in the previous 
paragraph. 
Another limitation of the findings in this thesis and most studies doing 
similar analyses is that, as discussed in section 4.1, it does not measure accurately 
what impact changes in policy has on market income and labour market decisions at 
the household level. For policy-makers it is particularly interesting to know how 
much reductions in the incentives to work reduces the actual labour participation. To 
answer this one needs counterfactual analysis: what would be the outcome if policies 
were different and all other factors were constant. This thesis, for all its limitations, 
goes some way in answering one part of that question, and suggests that it is indeed 
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possible for governments to come a long way in eradication child poverty. It does not, 
however, attempt to say anything about what the effect of the policies required to 
achieve this would have on labour participation, and thus ultimately economic 
growth. As already indicated the focus is on the impact of taxes and transfers on 
various groups, rather than on isolating which particular (tax and transfer) policies 
that lead to the different outcomes. As long as no conclusive evidence exists that 
measure the effect that policies that reduce child poverty has on economic growth 
controversy over this policy area will most certainly remain.  
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6.4. Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to pull together many factors in one 
comparative study of child poverty. If nothing else it will have shown some of the 
depth and complexity income data as a way of studying living condition for children 
may involve. 
Based on the theory and definition outlined in chapter two, the prevailing 
focus has been to measure the extent and depth of poverty measured in households 
and children in various groups, be they demographic, ethnic or educational. 
Measured along these axes market poverty was systematically compared with 
disposable income poverty, revealing a complex three-way relationship between 
poverty at the household level, demographic group variables (such as ethnicity, age, 
education and unemployment measured as market income), and effects of tax and 
transfer policies. Nearly all of these variables had an effect on poverty that was 
stronger when measured as child poverty rather than poverty at the household level. 
Furthermore, they appear to be cumulative. This has two major implications. Firstly, 
in societies where economic resources are scarce in some groups, children become 
major victims. This is important both because children have very limited 
opportunities to change their situation (even more so than adults), and because this 
limits their opportunities later in life. This, of course, is important both because of 
the direct suffering it causes, and because makes it impossible for society to give all 
its citizens and their children equal opportunities to succeed. Secondly, on a more 
positive note, it also shows that while policy is only one of several predictors of 
poverty, it has flow-on effects. In other words: a policy that reduces poverty in one 
vulnerable group will usually have a strong effect in bringing children out of poverty. 
The thesis’ findings suggests that higher benefit levels, child assistance and more 
progressive taxes could have lowered child poverty and overall poverty substantially 
in New Zealand in year 2000.  
Finally, to contrast the different situations in the ‘antipodean’ countries, a 
counterfactual thought experiment has been performed. This has shed some light on 
what the outcome would be if New Zealand had implemented Scandinavia’s rate of 
poverty reduction in various groups, as well as what the result would be if 
Scandinavia had New Zealand’s market poverty rates and demographic composition. 
The purpose behind this thought experiment was twofold: partly it was a way of 
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presenting the detailed findings and comparisons of the chapters on market poverty 
and disposable poverty. It was also, however, theory driven: this particular approach 
was chosen with the aim of say something about the relative importance of 
government intervention, demographics and inequality created in the labour market 
in understanding differences in poverty rate between Norway and Sweden on the one 
hand, and New Zealand on the other. One such interesting finding is that it rules out 
the number of children in households as an important explanation of the higher child 
poverty in New Zealand: One finding was that if Norway and Sweden had New 
Zealand’s distribution of children in households the increase in child poverty would 
be only marginal. This means that even though household type is highly important in 
explaining risk of poverty, it is of relatively minor importance when explaining the 
difference in poverty level between New Zealand and Scandinavia. Government 
policies could account for much more of the difference. 
The findings made in the thesis are also relevant when exploring the 
relative merit of universal and targeted type benefit policies, despite the one-
dimensional perspective of the approach that was used here gives. It is still fair to say 
that the experiences of the targeted policies mostly employed in New Zealand do not 
appear to be superior in reducing child poverty when contrasted to the Scandinavian 
experience with more of the universal type benefits, even though they have some 
intuitive advantages at the theoretical level. The Scandinavian experiences also 
demonstrate that it is possible to combine mostly relying on universal benefits for 
income redistribution with relatively high levels of economic growth.  
Generally the approach has shown that at least some of the child poverty 
in New Zealand in year 2000 was a result of deliberate or unconscious political 
choice. The positive flipside of this finding is that through policy reforms it is 
possible to reduce child poverty. 
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1. The Revised Jensen Equivalence Scale 
 
Family 
type 
No 
children 
1 
child 
2 
children 
3 
children 
4 
children 
5 
children  
6 
children 
1 adult 0.65 
(1) 
0.91 
(1.41) 
1.14 
(1.73) 
1.34 
(2) 
1.52 
(2.24) 
1.69 
(2.45) 
1.85 
(2.65) 
2 adults 1 
(1.41) 
1.21 
(1.73) 
1.41 
(2) 
1.58 
(2.24) 
1.75 
(2.45) 
1.91 
(2.65) 
2.06 
(2.83) 
3 adults 1.29 
(1.73) 
1.47 
(2) 
1.65 
(2.24) 
1.81 
(2.45) 
1.96 
(2.65) 
2.11 
(2.83) 
2.25 
(3) 
4 adults 1.54 
(2) 
1.71 
(2.24) 
1.87 
(2.45) 
2.02 
(2.65) 
2.16 
(2.83) 
2.30 
(3) 
2.44 
(3.16) 
 
The table shows that when using the Revised Jensen equivalence scale, a household of for 
example four adults and five children must have an income of 2.3 times the income of a 
household with two adults and no children to be considered to be equally well off. Square 
root equivalence factors are presented in parentheses. The two scales differ by a factor of 
absolute maximum 19.9 per cent: when comparing the poverty threshold for a household of 
one adult and one child in the Revised Jensen Equivalence scale to that of a household of four 
adults and 6 children in the Square root Equivalence scale, the two thresholds will differ by 
close to 20 per cent. However, for most other comparisons the discrepancy is much smaller. 
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7.2. Public sector social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP  
 New Zealand Norway Sweden 
Total 19.1% 22.2% 28.7% 
Cash benefits 11.3% 11.1% 14.4% 
In-kind benefits 7.2% 10.3% 13.0% 
Source: OECD Stats: Social Expenditure - Aggregated data from 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos 
Note that for some reason the total (not used in figure 4.2) in the original data are not 
equal to the sum of cash and in-kind benefits.  
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7.3. New Zealand source of income data and poverty; 
various categories 
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Majority income from 
benefits 
18,8% 100,0% 54,1% 45,9% 12,5% 100,0% 81,1% 18,9% 
Some income from 
benefits 
15,1% 57,6% 20,8% 63,9% 12,1% 63,1% 41,6% 34,0% 
1 adult no benefit 
income 
22,4% 16,9% 12,5% 26,0% 23,6% 31,1% 26,6% 14,5% 
2 adult no benefit 
income 
32,3% 3,7% 4,8% -29,7% 42,9% 5,6% 6,5% -16,2% 
3+ adult no benefit 
income 
11,4% 2,1% 2,9% -38,1% 9,0% 1,3% 1,3% 0,0% 
Total in thousands 
or average 
137,4% 32,7% 18,0% 45,0% 88600 29,9% 24,3% 18,7% 
All benefit receivers 33,9% 81,1% 39,3% 51,6% 24,6% 81,9% 61,7% 26,3% 
2 or more adults w/o 
benefit income% 
43,7% 3,3% 4,3% -31,9% 51,9% 4,9% 5,6% -13,4% 
 
In section 5.4 the categories ‘All benefit receivers’ and ‘2 or more adults without benefit’ 
replaces the majority and some income from benefits and the 2 and 3+ adults without benefit 
categories respectively, that were used in section 4.8. The categories are merged in this part 
of the thesis to make the data as comparable as possible to the Scandinavian data.  
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